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' I f The King Had Asked For An Ass, He Would Have Received His Wish, This Time': 
A Study of the Career of Thomas de Hatfield, bishop of Durham (1345-1381), as a 
Royal Servant, 1336-1357. 
'If the king had asked for an ass, he would have received his wish, this time.' 
[Chronicon Angliae, ed. E.M. Thompson, Rolls Series, vol. 64. (London, 1874), 20.] 
This was the reported reply of Pope Clement V I to his cardinals, after they had 
expressed reservations regarding Thomas de Hatfield's provision to the see of Durham 
in 1345. Whilst the authenticity of such a comment is clearly doubtful, it does provide a 
useful starting point from which to study Thomas de Hatfield's rise to Edward Ill 's 
episcopate, and then assess his achievements up until 1357. Through a career in royal 
administration, Hatfield followed the typical path to the English episcopate, and by the 
time of his provision he was Edward's keeper of the privy seal. However, Clement's 
comment has indicated to historians that Hatfield's personal relationship with Edward 
and Anglo-Papal relations in the mid-1340s, were the dominant factors in the clerk's 
acquisition of Durham. Therefore, there is temptation to take this as a measure of 
Hatfield's unsuitability for the office. However, in this dissertation I hope to illustrate 
that this was not the case. Hatfield did establish a close relationship with the king, and 
this did subsequently play an integral role in his ascent to Durham's episcopal throne. 
Yet this was precisely because, as a royal servant, Hatfield showed himself entirely 
worthy of royal trust. His promotion was no unwarranted rewarding of an unworthy 
favourite and from 1345, until the end of this survey, the bishop continued to serve his 
king with zeal. Hatfield was a warrior bishop, the bishop Odo of his time, and hence, 
much of this thesis focuses on the part he played in Edward Ill 's achieving, by 1357, of 
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Importantly, Hatfield appears to have been in no way embarrassed by the 
support he received fi-om his monarch. In fact, in later life he was keen to visibly 
acknowledge both this debt and how he continued to see himself as a servant of the 
crown. Hatfield ordered a depiction of Edward Ill 's crowned head and heraldic device, 
to be placed at the foot of the steps to the episcopal throne, which he had constructed 
and incorporated into his funerary monument. This provides a graphic depiction of how 
his path to the episcopal chair lay in his serving his king.' 
The highly sought afl:er 'flesh-pots'^ of Durham were a great reward for a royal 
servant. Yet Hatfield was in no sense receiving a retirement present, as his service of 
his king did not end upon his installation. However the king's purpose in raising 
Hatfield to the bishopric was rather different fi-om William Edington's, for example. 
Edington was provided as bishop of Winchester a few months after Hatfield was to 
Durham.^ Whilst Hatfield left Edward's civil administration once he had secured 
Durham,"* Edington spent almost 'his entire episcopal career as either treasurer or 
chancellor'.^ Durham and Winchester were two vastly different sees, and Edward had 
vastly differing agendas in securing them for two of his favourite clerks. By this period, 
Winchester held no great political or geographical significance. For Edington it 
represented a continuation, albeit the pinnacle, of his monarch's method of paying those 
in his civil service, by dispensing ecclesiastical patronage. 
Durham was very different: its location was all important. By the mid-
fourteenth century the office of bishop of Durham had long since developed a very 
particular importance as a bulwark against the Scots. Hatfield was not merely being 
invited to sustain himself from the temporalities, as Edington surely was. Edward went 
to great lengths to secure Durham for Hatfield. This was because the bishop of Durham 
had a real job to do, and in Hatfield the king believed he had found a man more than 
capable of doing it. 
' N.A. Barker, 'Death and the Bishop: the Salvation and memory of Thomas Hatfield (Bishop of Durham 
1345-1381)' (BADissertation, University of Durham, 2001), 19. 
" Tout [Chapters in the Administrative History of Mediaeval History of England, ill, (Manchester, 1928-
33), 436.] used this term when describing bishop Fordham's removal to Ely in 1388. 
^ Edington was bishop from 1345-66 [Handbook of British Chronology, eds. P.M. Powicke and E . B . 
Fryde,2"'' ed., (London, 1961), 258.]. 
Hatfield was finally provided to Durham by Clement VI on 9 June 1345 and his last identificafion as 
keeper was on the 3"*. Tout wrongly suggests Hatfield remained keeper for sometime after his provision 
[Chapters, v, 20.]. 
As the title indicates, this thesis is Umited in its scope. Hatfield enjoyed a long 
pontificate, being bishop for just less than thirty-six years, having spent just under a 
decade in Edward Ill 's civil service. Therefore this thesis is restricted to a consideration 
of Hatfield as a servant of the crown, trom 1337 until 1357. This incorporates 
[approximately] the decades that preceded and succeeded his provision to Durham. The 
choice to study Hatfield as a royal servant was not a difficult one. His service to his 
king is most striking in uniting his career before and after his provision. This was how 
Hatfield both became bishop and sought to justify this promotion, and it therefore 
facilitates the greatest insights into his life. 
Clearly as bishop of Durham Hatfield's role was mulfifaceted. He was the head 
of civil government in the palatinate of Durham, also its universal landlord, head of 
justice and its ecclesiastical head. Much work has been done on the nature of the 
palatinate of Durham in general, and this thesis does not attempt to greatly expand upon 
this debate.^  Except in that it provides another example of how a bishop of Durham 
could be both personally close to his monarch but also hope to uphold his rights against 
him.' Nor has it been possible to study in any detail Hatfield's ecclesiastical workings 
within his diocese, though his relationship with the priory of Durham is addressed 
briefly.^ And also because of its potential to stand in the way of the defence of the 
north, Hatfield's part in the on going dispute between York and Durham has been 
considered. Additionally, it is worth noting how in recent times, many important 
insights into the lives of notable figures have been provided by thorough investigations 
of both the activities and make up, of their administrative departments, retinues and 
other adherents.^  Clearly such a survey for a military man such as Hatfield would be 
most advantageous, and indeed it would appear to be possible fi^om available extant 
documentation, yet it is sadly beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
' J . Aberth, Criminal Churchmen in the Age of Edward III: the case of Bishop Thomas de Lisle 
(Pennsylvannia, 1996), 11. 
See particularly G.T. Lapsley, The County Palatinate of Durham: A Study in Constitutional History 
(New York, 1900). J. Scammell, 'The Origin and Limitations of the Liberty of Durham', EHR, cccxx 
(1966). For Hatfield as a landlord see R.H. Britnell, 'Feudal Reaction after the Black Death in the 
Palatinate of Durham', Past and Present, 198 (1990). 
' For a more detailed survey see S.S. Martin, Richard D'Aungerville de Bwy, 1287-1345 (Emory 
University Ph.D. Thesis, 1986). 
Hatfield's visitation of 1354 has been the focus of an article. See B. Harbottle, 'Bishop Hatfield's 
Visitation of Durham Priory in 1354', Archaeologia Aeliana, 4* Series, xxxvi (1958). A highly useful 
general survey that includes many of the activities of northern bishops in this period is A .D .M. Barrell, 
The Papacy, Scotland and Northern England, 1342-1378 (Camhridge, 1995). 
' For two notable examples see Aberth, Lisle., and the work of Andrew Ayton, as seen in A. Ayton, 
Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward HI (Woodbridge, 
1994). 
Before embarking on the main body of the dissertation, and assessing first how 
Hatfield convinced his king that he was capable of it, it is necessary to look briefly at 
the particular nature of the office of bishop of Durham. The temptation to see the 
palatinate of Durham as a 'microcosm of the kingdom', and its bishop as it king, should 
be resisted.'" Such an interpretation elevates the bishop to a level, which after the 
troublesome pontificates of Bek and Beaumont, he not only failed to achieve but never 
truly actively sought." Dobson suggests that though ' in terms of geography, 
administrative autonomy, wealth and prestige', the bishop of Durham was peerless in 
his potential to injure the English monarchy, after Beaumont ' i t would be hard to find a 
series of bishops... who gave... fewer grounds for concern.''^ 
This paradox should not be surprising. Great efforts were made not only to 
neutralise the potential threat of the occupant of the bishopric, but beyond this to utilise 
his potential power to the crown's advantage. However to do this it was essential that 
the king trust the bishop completely. Also English kings, as a rule, chose southerners 
for the see of Durham to ensure that they had 'no previous vested interest in the 
north.''^ Hatfield is said to have been the second son of Walter de Hatfield, from a 
knightly family of Holdemess, near Hull, though his exact ancestry is not clear.''' 
Therefore, though a northerner, he lacked the degree of ties and interests in the region 
that later made the ascent of various Nevilles to the northern episcopate so dangerous.'^ 
The later successes of Edward III , and the unity of purpose they engendered, 
should not fully disguise the king's position in 1345. The English king had himself 
taken the naval victory at Sluys in 1340 as a sign that times were changing for the 
better. Yet the victories of 1346-7 were as yet only dreams, with the reality being one 
of immense financial burden and relative failure. For all his great labours 'Edward III 
seemed but little closer to his stated goal of recovering his rightfiil heritage of France.''^ 
Therefore, though Durham had been a royal stronghold since Beaumont's death and the 
young king had fostered a sense of unity amongst his nobility and administration, a 
return to the disharmony of 1341 carmot have seemed a total impossibility. Hence 
Quote from Lapsley, Palatinate, 2. Scammell ['Liberty of Durham', 449 n. 2.], for example, suggests 
how Lapsley's interpretation goes too far. 
" For quick summary of the problems, see Martin, Biiiy, 89-96. See below for discussion of some signs 
of tensions between Hatfield and Edward III, over palatinate rights. 
R.B. Dobson, 'The Church of Durham and the Scottish Borders, 1378-88', War and Border Societies in 
the Middle Ages, ed. A. Goodman and A, Tuck (London, 1992), 129. 
''ibid, 130. 
DNB, X X V , 154. 
Dobson, 'Durham and the borders', 130. 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 221. 
Edward could i l l afford to allow such a see as Durham, to fall into the wrong hands, no 
matter how much later historians have suggested that the potential power of the bishop 
was limited. However Edward was far from just filling a potentially dangerous see with 
a loyal servant in the hope of maintaining domestic calm. 
It is as guardian of the north of England that the choice of Hatfield makes the 
most sense. Though, as noted above, the bishop had many other duties, most were 
transferable to deputies, and cannot have had much influence upon Edward's choice. 
Indeed the appointment of one of Hatfield's predecessors, Lewis de Beaumont, provides 
evidence of the integral part played by the ideal that 'the bishop of Durham enjoyed his 
franchise at the service of defending the borders.''^ I f a letter sent by Edward II to 
Beaumont in 1323 is factually true in detail,'^ it is likely that by this point in time such 
an ideal was widely held, and was not merely part of the rhetoric used, in 1318, to 
secure Beaumont's election.'^ Some five years after he had first written to the pope 
proposing his wife's blood relation as a 'wall against the Scots', an angry Edward II 
was hoping to spur his negligent bishop into action. The king sought to do this by 
reminding Beaumont how he had put himself up for the office by offering the opinion 
that a man of noble birth was needed against the Scots. 
By 1345 Edward Ill 's main focus had long since shifted from the northern 
frontier, to France. However in order to avoid fiill-scale war on two main fronts it was 
vital to control the Scots. Hence Hatfield was being given a very specific task to carry 
out. In order to understand this Edward Ill 's war policy needs to be studied. The 
English king had devoted much of the early years of his reign to fighting the Scots but 
in 1336 had failed to get a peace agreement sealed. '^' Although the Anonimalle and 
Lanercost chronicles are surely correct to point to Scottish pride as a reason for the 
failure, Knighton's highlighting of French influence is important.^' The Scots could be 
broken militarily but in the French they had a vital ally. It was in French interests to 
stop the Scots withering completely, and hence Edward had to take the auld alliance 
very seriously. 
Diplomatically the auld alliance was a great hindrance to both potential Anglo-
Scottish and Anglo-French agreements. In this period the most notable example of this 
" Lapsley, Palatinate, 305. 
"* Foedera, ii, i, 506. 
" For 1318 letter of Edward II to the Pope see Script. Tres., 98., and Lapsley, Palatinate, 305. 
Campbell, 'England, Scotland', 205-09. 
'^ Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 111. 
" Ibid, 128. Campbell, 'England, Scotland', 208. 
was in 1334. With the agreement already being proclaimed in the streets, the French 
delegation informed their English counterparts that they, of course, demanded the 
inclusion of the Scots before the treaty could be ratified.^^ However French aid was not 
limited to the negotiating table, as some efforts were also made to supply victuals, arms, 
and men. Though it is unlikely that French assistance actually ever amounted to much, 
the potential was always there. This could help convince the Scots to fight on and leave 
the English legitimately fearfiil.^'* 
Nevertheless by the end of the 1330s Edward III seems to have had a clear 
understanding of the nature of his problems to the north. He knew that through swift 
raiding the Scots could inflict a great degree of damage to the north of England. 
Though it never reached the disastrous depths it had during his father's reign, the state 
of the northern frontier upon Hatfield's appointment must have been a profound concern 
for Edward I I I , as wil l be discussed below. Hatfield's predecessor, Richard de Bury, 
had been reduced to paying off the Scots in order to protect the bishopric.^^ 
After concentrating his focus on France, Edward's holdings in Scotland had 
dwindled. The English king's greatest advantage over his brother-in-law, David I I , had 
been that he could raise far greater forces. He could then take them across the border, 
and overpower the Scots, inflicting terrible damage, as the Scots were unable to muster 
an army sufficient to challenge the English in battle. Yet with his efforts on the 
continent Edward had insufficient money left in his coffers for such additional efforts in 
Scotland. Hence the north of England was left largely to defend itself, both in terms of 
the raising of men and supplies, and also the fiinds needed to maintain them.^^ In 1345 
Hatfield was being sent to join forces with the likes of Ralph Neville and Henry Percy 
in creating a wall against the Scots. The magnitude of the task should not be 
underestimated. 
Raiding created a lawless fi-ontier and was very bad for morale, especially north 
of the Trent. It also drew potential resources and troops away from France. However, 
from the mid-1330s this had arguably been the most that the Scottish could threaten. 
The Scots lacked the internal cohesion to do much more than cause destruction within 
English territory. As Campbell succinctly notes; 'while the Scots could, easily, almost 
naturally, keep the borders in turmoil, their effectiveness for war on a grander scale was 
Sumption, Trial by battle, 136. 
For information on French supply ships sent to Scotland and plans for the landings of French armies in 
the British isles see Campbell, 'England, Scotland', 209-10. 
Martin, Bury, 151. Campbell, 'England, Scotland', 211. 
Campbell, 'England, Scotland', 211-12. 
impaired by the weakness of the Scottish Crown.'^'' So, whilst in his early years as 
king, Edward III used Scotland to establish and prove himself, the English monarch's 
situation had changed.^ ^ Hence, Hatfield's role as bishop of Durham was essentially a 
defensive one; to allow his king to focus on France by securing his northern frontier. 
^'^ Ibid, 213. 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 28. 
The Sources 
Historians have strangely neglected the career of Thomas de Hatfield. He 
appears to have been the English warrior bishop of his age, and his magnificent tomb 
situated in Durham Cathedral reveals a bishop who clearly thought himself a man of no 
small import.^^ One apparent explanation of the dearth of work upon Hatfield is the 
relative lack of primary source information. Thomas de Hatfield's pre-1345 career in 
the king's service was clearly illustrious enough to secure him the bishopric of Durham, 
yet historians are left with little to distinguish Hatfield from his civil service peers.^ ^ 
But furthermore it seems that Hatfield's very importance is the cause of his elusiveness 
to the historian. 
In early December 1344 after Thomas had rendered his chamber accounts to 
Edward III , the king had them burned, so 'that they may not again come in demand'.^' 
In addition to this, the chamber's secretive nature has meant that in addition to the 
dearth of account records, subsidiary documentation is also all but non-existent.^^ 
Therefore, whilst the papal and chancery rolls, and wardrobe account books^^ do 
provide many insights, we are denied the most potentially fertile window into his pre-
Durham career. Even had Hatfield's chamber account been extant, our task would be 
far from straight forward. As Tout laments, 'the hardest problem in dealing with 
medieval records is to disentangle the human element from the dull forms, and tell what 
manner of men they were'.'''' 
Regarding his first decade of his pontificate in Durham we are once again 
fhistrated to a degree. Unfortunately the strong tradition of local historical writing in 
Durham was collapsing by the fourteenth century. Whereas writers the likes of Symeon 
produced 'narrative discourse' that offered many insights into events, Hatfield is only 
The tomb uniquely incorporates the episcopal throne. For discussion of the tomb see Barker, 'Death 
and the Bishop', 14-23. 
Chapters, \, 20. As Cuttino ['King's Clerks and the Community of the Realm', Speculuum xxix (1954, 
Massachusetts), 397. ] points out there was some 'specialisation of functions... but never to a point 
where it is unusual for a clerk to be reassigned or to be taken away from his customary task for a special 
mission'; clerks had to be all-rounders. 
^' CPR, 1343-45. 371. 
-^ J . Vale, Edward III and Chivalry - Chivalric Society and its Context, 1270-1350 (Woodbridge, 1982), 
82. 
" E36/204. B L MS Cotton Nero C V l l l [The Wardrobe Book of Robert Ferriby, 1334-1337]. The 
Wardrobe account book of William de Norwell: 12 July 1338 to 27 May 1340, eds. M. Lyon, B. Lyon and 
H.S. Lucas (Brussells, 1983). 
T . F . Tout, 'The English Civil Service in the Fourteenth Century', Collected papers, iii (Manchester, 
1934), 214. 
10 
served by a brief episodic biography.^^ This concentrates almost entirely upon Hatfield 
in a local sense, though this is perhaps not surprising, as it was a product of the 
monastery. Raine wrongly attributed this eulogy to the monk William de Chambre. 
Offler has since illustrated how the true author was Prior Wessington, although it is 
believed he wrote this before he gained this office in 1416.^ ^ 
The eulogy is highly generic: 'a mosaic of literal borrowings from earlier parts 
of the Gesta'.^ ^ In order to create links to the past, and probably for the lack of 
remembrance and creative ideas, Hatfield becomes a hybrid of the good qualities of 
earlier bishops of Durham. As the monks needed to justify the descent from St. 
Cuthbert, they sought to laud even the most oppressive bishops. Clearly this eulogy's 
use in this dissertation is limited, as Wessington was writing over half a century after its 
scope, and was not focusing on Hatfield as a national figure. Whilst various other 
chronicles provide some helpfiil details, Edward Ill 's court and friends were not well 
served by chroniclers with 'sufficient personal contact...to give accurate assessments or 
vivid insights'.^^ Ultimately references to Hatfield need to be regarded with caution. 
Hatfield is the only medieval bishop of Durham with an extant register that is as 
yet unavailable in printed form, and this is surely explained by its frristrating nature.'*^ 
The register is incomplete, preventing the production of a priceless itinerary that could 
be all important in deciphering, for example, whether Hatfield was in fact at Crecy, as 
the chroniclers suggest. The register is mainly useftil for the ecclesiastical historian, 
rather than one predominantly looking at Hatfield as a royal servant. For example it 
lacks any material other than ordination dates for the period before 1350, with a second 
break occurring between 1355-59.^' Hatfield's survey of the lands of his bishopric was 
not undertaken until the end of his pontificate.'*^ As such it is only useful for this thesis 
in suggesting Hatfield's lack of desire to change the workings of the palatinate. Such a 
survey soon after his consecration could have provided a basis for reforming measures. 
R.B. Dobson, 'Contrasting Chronicles: Historical Writing in the Middle Ages', Church and Society in 
the Medieval North of England, 294. 
H.S. Offler, 'Medieval Historians of Durham', North of the Tees (Durham, 2000), 14-17. 
Ibid., 16. Script. Tres., 136-138. 
Dobson, 'Contrasting Chronicles', 288. 
Quote from W.M. Ormrod, 'The personal Religion of Edward I I I ' , Speculum, 64 (1989), 851. For 
details on chronicles see A.Grandsen, Historical Writing in England, ii (London, 1982). J . Taylor, 
English Historical Literature in the Fourteenth Century (Oxford, 1987). 
•"^  Hamilton-Thompson did make extensive notes on it for that purpose. I would like to thank Alan Piper 
for providing me with access to these notes. 
D.M. Smith, Guide to Bishops' Registers of England and Wales: A Survey from the Middle Ages to the 
abolition of the Episcopacy in 1646 (London, 1981), 268. 
W. Greenwell, Bishop Hatfield's Survey, Surtees Society, X X X I I (1856), vii. 
11 
39 
As a result this dissertation is generally the product of various calendars of 
documents, hopefiiUy enlivened by those scraps of information gifted by other sources, 
and fi-om the use of secondary source material. But, it is worthwhile noting at this point 
that, as Dobson notes, the personalides of episcopal figures of this period are 
notoriously difficult to penetrate even after a good deal of research.''^  
R.B. Dobson, 'The Authority of the Bishop in Late Medieval England: The Case of Archbishop 
Alexander Neville of York, 1374-88', Church and Society in the Medieval North of England, ed. R.B. 
Dobson (London, 1996), 186. 
12 
Chapter I - Hatfield's path to the episcopal 
throne of Durham. 
Part I - 1337: Hatfield's entrance into Edward Ill's paid 
service 
The Dictionary of National Biography asserts that Hatfield entered the king's 
service as a young man.'*'' Whilst Hatfield's career before the autumn of 1337 is 
unclear, and there is no definite indication of Hatfield's age at this point, it does seem 
reasonable to infer this. That Hatfield had a long pontificate of just less than 36 years 
(1345-1381) may suggest that he received promotion earlier than many of his fellow 
members of the episcopate. One factor that would slow the path of the majority of 
clerks into the king's service was the attendance of a university beforehand, however 
Hatfield's learning has long been doubted.'*^ 
On the 26 October 1337 Hatfield was admitted to the king's wages in the roll of 
marshalsea of the household, as a clerk of the king's chapel.'*^ This was the day he 
stopped being paid for supervising the king's works at Stirling. His promotion seems to 
be a reward for his activities in Scotland, particularly in co-ordinating the works at 
Stirling. Indeed after his appointment he moved to works at Bothwell. In 1337 the 
Scots had succeeded in destroying many of Edward's bases in Scofland. The tower of 
Bothwell had itself been almost entirely destroyed in March 1337, and most recently 
Edward's three most remote strongholds had been flattened.''^ Hatfield's tasks were of 
some import, and are entirely in keeping with the basic perceptions we have of Hatfield 
as a militarily minded man, and later a building benefactor. 
At Stirling, Hatfield was in charge of approximately 150 workers. This number 
was made up of masons, carpenters, and ditchers, who worked under various master 
craftsmen, and all received different levels of pay. It is interesting to note that whilst 
Edward did employ local men, some jobs were seemingly important enough to demand 
'** DNB, X X V , 154. 
Hatfield's learning is discussed below. Notably, the examples of Geofirey Chaucer and John Gower 
highlight how clerks could become cultivated intellectuals without having attended university [Tout, 
'English Civil Service', 212.]. 
Ferriby, fos. 215. Hatfield first received 20 shillings as royal robes payment in summer 1338, 
presumably winter robes had already been distributed by late October [Ibid., fos. 230v.]. 
•"Sumption, Trial by Battle, 179. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 123. 
13 
that men be brought up from England specifically. For example Robert of St. Albans, a 
master carpenter, came with 37 of his own men. For his efforts at the Stirling peel 
Hatfield obtained Is a day from 25 August to 26 October 1337. Further reward was 
given to the new royal clerk a month and a half later, when on 16 December 1337 he 
received the church of Staneford from the king."*^ Having just taken him into his 
employment the grant was to provide for Hatfield's maintenance. After Stirling 
Hatfield's attention turned to reconstruction work at Bothwell, where work lasted from 
20 October unfil 5 December 1337. The transition between the two sites would not 
have been difficult; both are found in the central part of the western lowlands, and it is 
possible that from 20-26 October the clerk ran both concurrently."*^ 
Edward's personal supervision of Bothwell until mid December would have 
given Hatfield plenty of time to prove his aptitude to his king.^° Indeed Hatfield's work 
north of the border surely gained him his more senior role in Edward's move into the 
Low Countries, half a year later; the planning of which necessitated Edward's move 
south before Christmas 1337. 
Hatfield had possibly come to the attention of the king's government during the 
court's long stay in the north, which was just coming to an end by early 1337, as 
Edward began to switch focus from Scotland to the continent." '^ More striking and 
intriguing is the visit to Hatfield's birthplace of Edward and his Queen over Christmas 
1336. The stay was not a happy one for the royal couple. Remaining in the north for 
longer than necessary was not generally in the king's inclination but this time Edward 
was left with little option; Philippa was heavily pregnant. She produced for him a son, 
William of Hatfield but the father's joy was swiftly extinguished as the prince soon died 
and was buried in York Minster." The coincidence of Hatfield's entrance into royal 
service a year later and this rare royal visit is interesting. It may indicate that though the 
king was saddened by the loss of his son, he was still able to note something special in 
the second son of a local knight. It is perhaps just possible that the Royal court even 
lodged with Thomas's family. 
Yet such a personal link is not needed to explain Hatfield's career path, as by the 
place of his birth Hatfield was an enfirely typical royal clerk. Hatfield originated from 
CPR, 1340-43, 559. 
Ferriby, fos215. 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 123. 
Chapters, iii, 60-1. T . F . Tout, 'The Household of the Chancery and its Disintegration', Collected 
Papers, ii (Manchester, 1934), 152. 
'^ W.M. Ormrod, 'York and the crown under the first three Edwards', The Government of Medieval York 
- Essays in commemoration of the 1396 Royal Charter, ed. S. Rees-Jones (York, 1997), 24. 
14 
'a region on the north bank of the Humber some fifteen miles wide and five or six miles 
deep',^ ^ which Grassi notes as having provided an especially high proportion of royal 
clerks since Edward I's accession. In fact as a Holdemess man, 'Hatfield was born, so 
to say, for chamber work'.^ "* Tout notes that the king 'always bestowed special favour 
on men sprung from manors on the royal domain',and Holdemess was a great 
chamber estate that had just been restored to the crown.Although direct links to 
Yorkshire clerks already established in royal service are not evident in Hatfield's case, 
this was also a common way into the civil service. Therefore there is no reason to 
suppose that neighbours or kinsmen were not additionally instrumental in securing for 
Thomas an administrative role in royal govemment.^ ^ Indeed chamber clerks Molyns 
and Bokeland, for example, were also Holdemess men.^ ^ In fact it is possible that for 
some time previous to his appointment as a clerk of the king's chapel, Hatfield had been 
working under either of these or another 'king's clerk' as a type of apprentice.''^  
By the end of June 1338 Hatfield was appointed 'as receiver of certain sums of 
money to be received for the expedition of certain secret business of the king, so that he 
render account thereof and answer thereof to the king.'^ *' The 'secret business' was 
simply the private affairs of the king, the term not then having such subversive 
connotations as today. Likewise the term 'to the king' means 'to the chamber'.*' 
Hatfield succeed William de Kilsby as receiver of the chamber, with Kilsby being 
promoted to keeper of the privy and great seals. Together the two would share the duty 
of mnning the household in the Low Countries and the administration in England. 
The speed of Hatfield's rise to receiver of the chamber is still perplexing, even 
though there are many possible interpretations of how he came to the king's attention. 
Having spent just over half a year in the king's service, his appointment came from 
outside the chamber. Therefore he was presumably not entirely groomed in its methods. 
However it is quite possible that he had previously gained much experience in the 
" J . L . Grassi, 'Royal clerks from the Archdiocese of York in the fourteenth century', Northern Histoiy, v 
(1970), 14. 
Chapters, iv, 257., [italics added]. 
" Tout, 'Civil Service', 204. 
Chapters, iii, 60. 
" Grassi, 'Royal clerks', 15. 
Foedera, iii, i, 982. 
Cuttino, 'King's Clerks', 396. 
^CFR, 1337-1347, 85. 
Chapters, iv, 257. 
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employment of some major territorial or spiritual magnate,^ ^ and this could explain why 
he was initially in Scotland in late 1337. 
One potential - but as yet unsubstantiated - linkage is with William Montague, 
Earl of Salisbury. Montague was placed in command of Stirling, and perhaps insisted 
on his own man being given responsibility for the works, only for King Edward to then 
take Hatfield into royal service. Salisbury may long have been a close friend of Edward 
Ill's, having been taken into the court circle of Edward II at 18, when his own father 
had died. He was certainly heavily involved in the coup of 1330, and seems to have 
remained a friend of the king until his death in 1344.^ ^ Montague's willingness and 
ability, to help his men into important royal positions is illustrated by the career of John 
Molyns, who was a knight of the chamber and had in 1337 been made surveyor of the 
chamber.^ '* Importantly Molyns was possibly another Holdemess man, and Tout 
describes him as Salisbury's protege.The suggested link between Hatfield and the 
Montague family is strengthened by the grant to Hatfield, of the benefice of Hadenham. 
William's brother Simon Montague, then bishop of Ely, made the grant some time 
between 1337 and 1344.^ ^ 
Still a comparison is most illuminating; the lauded William Edington, who had 
previously been a personal clerk to Bishop Adam Orleton, spent 1335-1340 as a simple 
king's clerk after switching employers.^ ^ Clearly Edward had seen something special in 
Hatfield either before and/or during his efforts in Scotland in 1337. 
Given that he later joined the episcopate Hatfield's appointment into the king's chapel is interesting. It 
raises the possibility that like Edington, Hatfield could have previously worked for a bishop. Hatfield has 
too frequently been dismissed as irreligious, mainly because of his warlike tendencies. We must strive 
not to impose our modem Christian interpretations on medieval minds; the two were not mutually 
exclusive. Nevertheless we should not read too much into Hatfield's assignment to the chapel. It was 
short in duration, and importantly, jobs of apparently religious name did not necessarily go to the most 
devout. For example, Philip Weston, a man with much the same out look as Hatfield, was king's almoner 
for a far longer period. 
" R. Douch, 'The Career, Lands and Family of William Montague, Earl of Salisbury, 1301-44', Bulletin 
of the Institute of Historical Research, xxiv (1951), 85-87. Douch rejects the suggestion of a breakdown 
in relations as portrayed by M. Galway, 'Joan of Kent and the Order of the Garter', University of 
Birmingham Historical Journal, i (1948). 
" Chapters, in, 89 
Ibid. 
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66 
" Chapters, iv, 203. 
Part II - 1338-44: Hatfield and Edward IIFs hopes for 
the chamber. 
Edward I l l ' s court has been seen as a loosely knit congregation o f different 
groups around the king. Nevertheless, the most important o f these groups was certainly 
the king's household, o f which the chamber formed the core.^^ Yet the household was 
not simply the focus o f the pomp of the king's domestic affairs; it was becoming 
increasingly important for his administration. Throughout 1338 Edward had been 
planning to finally move the theatre o f war to the continent after the failure o f the 
previous year.^^ So it was vital for him to surround himself with administrators who 
had proven themselves skilled organisers o f war. In such a situation the chamber was 
no different from any other department. Indeed it dealt wi th the king's most intimate 
business and when Edward was absent from England this was clearly the waging o f 
war. Hatfield's appointment, as receiver o f the chamber, came at the time the Walton 
ordinances were being drafted. It being but one o f a number o f personnel changes that 
the king made in the period either side o f the promulgation o f the ordinances.^'' 
Knowing he was about to leave his realm for a lengthy period o f time Edward needed a 
strong administration, and seemingly in Hatfield he had found a man whom he could 
trust. 
Nevertheless was Hatfield's entrance to the chamber merely chance? Was 
Edward simply filling the vacancy to be left by Kilsby's promotion with one from a 
pool of up and coming clerks? Or did Hatfield possess particular qualities that made 
him a perfect choice for the chamber? Such questions are almost impossible to answer 
with any great degree o f certainty. However a cogent case can be made to suggest 
Hatfield was seen as a 'chamber man'. 
I f he was nothing more than a 'very good clerk' why did he achieve such a 
position so quickly? Edward had other loyal and able servants whose store o f service 
credit would have been much weightier. In fact it is possible that Edward had long 
planned to reshuffle his administration when he was to head abroad, and had 'head-
hunted' Hatfield to a degree. Had the plans o f 1337 come to fruition, and Edward left 
England a year earlier Hatfield may have received his promotion then, from a position 
Vale, Edward III and Chivalry, 1. 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 145. 
™ Chapters, iv, 78. 
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outside o f direct royal service. Although it must be noted that such an argument 
certainly demands that before 1337 Hatfield be in the service o f a notable magnate: 
evidence for which we are as yet lacking. Whilst in times o f conflict Edward I I I wanted 
the chamber's efforts to be focused on war, he also hoped to keep it as a separate and 
private department. I f it was to remain his 'special instrument o f prerogative' despite 
the war he needed its receiver to be a man with whom he had developed an intimate 
relationship.^' Once again this seems to make Hatfield's sudden rise through royal 
ranks, to this position, all the more remarkable. 
To place Hatfield's role in the context o f its development, the history o f the 
chamber during the early part o f Edward I l l ' s reign needs to be addressed briefly. 
After its integral part in the tyranny of the Despensers, the chamber's revival did not 
begin until 1332-1333. Its true rebirth not coming until Wi l l i am de Kildsby's 
appointment as receiver in 1335. The chamber was once again provided with an income 
when it re-received much o f its former landed estate; as for example, the Burstwick 
estate in Holdemess was returned, and later the Isle o f W i g h t . A n indication o f 
Edward's wish to assert his prerogative claims were the attempts made to assign to the 
chamber, not the traditional exchequer, many o f the alien priories to be seized after 23 
July 1337. '^* Therefore by the time of Hatfield's appointment Edward had already 
succeeded in making the chamber 'an integral part o f the administrative machine.'^^ 
The question that is posed is whether the king was able to develop the chamber fiirther, 
and how far he was able to do this through his receiver, Thomas de Hatfield? 
Tout was o f the opinion that in intention the Walton Ordinances o f July 1338 
were Edward I l l ' s most important administrative act, as the king hoped to run the war 
through his household.^*^ They were drawn up before the move across the channel, to 
allow the king and his household clerks to control the chancery and treasury back in 
Westminster. The hope was to allow them to achieve the efficient mobilisation o f war 
resources fi-om home, without strenuous questioning.^^ Sadly the wording o f the 
'^ For quote see/W</., 289. 
For a more detailed account see Chapters, iv, 227-311. 
The profits of the lands were paid in to the chamber e.g. CPR, 1343-45, 23. 
Chapters, iv, 246-48. 
" Ibid, iv, 254. 
fbid.,m,69. 
" For detailed general discussion of the Walton Ordinances see Chapters, iv, 69-84. Chapters, v, 11-14. 
Tout, 'Conflicting tendencies', 231-232, 
ordinances is somewhat ambiguous.^^ However, one o f the more 'novel proposals' was 
that a certain chamber clerk, along with a skilled supervisor, should produce a counter-
rol l , for the warrants o f the keeper o f the privy seal which were to be necessary to 
validate chancery writs demanding out payments from the exchequer.^^ It was not 
stated that Hatfield was to have held either o f the positions available to chamber clerks, 
but it is highly possible. And this would further suggest that Hatfield was also regarded 
as an administrator, and not only as a loyal soldier with organisational skills. 
frnportantly the effect o f this ordinance would have probably been to make 
Kilsby and Hatfield check all payments made both at home and abroad.^° hi addition, 
according to Tout, the 10"' ordinance would have given the chamber additional control 
over the wardrobe.^' Ultimately the importance o f the ordinances should not be 
exaggerated, as the reality fel l far short o f the ideal, denying the chamber 'an even more 
eminent position than the important one which it actually occupied'. However they do 
help suggest Edward's plans to develop the chamber and hence his faith in Hatfield. 
The emphasis placed on the chamber in the ordinances, and especially the 
concurrency o f his appointment as receiver and the court's relocation to the 
Netherlands, raises the strong probability that Hatfield was made the custodian o f the 
secret seal from the inception o f his office.^^ The secret seal was the successor o f the 
privy seal, which had increasingly become the general, and importantly public, 
administrative instrument. For Edward the secret seal was his instrument o f personal 
affairs. As Tout puts forward, it is almost axiomatic that its custodian would be a 
member o f 'some high domestic household in constant attendance o f his person'^ **; from 
mid-1338 it is apparent that there was no-one who fitted this bi l l ing better than Hatfield. 
However contemporary documents do not corroborate this claim. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly given the nature o f the seal, neither Hatfield nor his successor Richard 
Burton, are noted in English sources as keeper o f the secret seal. Though after this 
85 
'subsequent receivers are regularly called clerks o f the secret seal.' The evidence 
before Hatfield suggests that during Edward IPs reign, and the early years o f his son's, 
Chapters, v. 262. 
''Ubid. in. 69. 
*'"/fcW.,iii,71. 
Ibid., 14. 
[bid, iv, 254. 
Ibid. 261-262. 
^Ubid,12. 
*5 Ibid, 262. 
the secret seal was held by a chamber secretariat. However it is unlikely that custody 
was then stringently ascribed solely to the receiver.^^ 
Without the later entries in papal records there could be no great suggestion that 
Hatfield took the secret seal to the Low Countries. Whilst Hatfield is not noted as 
custodian until a papal letter o f 1344,^^ the very recognition that he did at some point 
hold it makes it likely that he was custodian fi^om 1338. Indeed, as is noted below, until 
Bradestan's visit to Avignon in autumn 1343 Hatfield was probably considered by those 
at the papal court as nothing more than a royal clerk, albeit a troublesome one; only 
after this visit would they have been in a position to note him as custodian. So whilst 
this does not prove a date pre-1344, it does at least explain its possibility. Tellingly, 
1338 was a time o f rapid change and it is most likely that it was then, rather than at any 
point later, that Edward I I I decided to make one man custodian o f the secret seal. 
For the duration o f his time as receiver Hatfield was a constant companion o f his 
king during Edward I l l ' s time abroad.^^ Hatfield had the assistance o f 'the stronger 
section o f the chamber s taff in the Low Countries on Edward's first venture 1338-
1340.^'' In the summer o f 1340 Hatfield returned with a far less experienced and 
numerous body.^'' Clearly during this time the chamber was split; the home 
administration running the estates in England, and then sending out the moneys and 
stores to Hatfield.^' The job o f running the chamber in England was assigned to John 
Fleet, who was also responsible for the privy wardrobe. 
Hatfield may have been responsible for some significant innovations, even 
though his absence fi-om chamber service before he became receiver may seem to count 
against him being ascribed too integral a role in the detailed proposals made in the 
Walton Ordinances. It would be interesting to discover the authorship o f the petition to 
the king, drawn up on 9 July 1338, that requested, and achieved, the provision for the 
^Ubid.,26\. 
CPL, 1342-63, 11. 
See Norwell. Low Countries: July 1338-Feb. 1340, June 1340- Dec. 1340. Scotland: Nov. 1341- early 
1342. Brittany: Oct 1342-Feb. 1343. 
Chapters, iv, 87, 
Ibid., 114. A notable absentee was the colourful John Molyns. 
When Hatfield was in England he received monies under the griffin seal, which generally remained in 
England. For example 7 May 1343 the bailiff of the king's manor of Brustwick paid to Hatfield money 
owed to the king 'as appears by a letter of acquittance under the king's seal of griffin' [CPR, ]343-45, 
23]. 
'^^CPR, 1338-1340,257, 163. CPR,. 1340-43, 503. CCR, 1339-41, 138. In 1340 Fleet was referred to as 
'receiver of the chamber at the Tower of London' [Chapters, iv, 447.]. 
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gr i f f in seal to provide the sole warranty for all acts concerning chamber lands.^^ 
Maxwell-Lyte simply notes that a chamber clerk was responsible. Hatfield had been in 
office a little over a week, and it is therefore tempting to suggest an innovative role. 
The same attitude is revealed in this petition and Hatfield's later insistence on 
accountability only to the chamber and the king. 
It is the burning in 1344 o f Hatfield's chamber accounts that means we are left 
somewhat in the dark as to his exact activities in this important period, and it is to this 
event we must turn. It would be all too easy to simply assume that this illustrates that 
Hatfield was a favourite o f the king's and was using his position to reward himself in 
ways that would be unjustifiable should they become known. In fact the burning was 
the result o f the 'doctrine o f chamber unaccountability', whereby access to the king's 
most personal accounts was to be restricted to just himself and his receiver. It is 
important yet sadly highly diff icult , to ascertain the parts that Hatfield, Fleet, their 
predecessor's, and Edward I I I , all played in this doctrine's development, and most 
importantly use.^ '* Tout has seen the end o f Hatfield's receivership as the zenith o f the 
chamber autonomy with the burning o f his a c c o u n t s . H o w e v e r it is unlikely that 
Hatfield and his king would have shared his sentiment. What for Tout was the zenith 
was actually sj^mbolic o f Edward's admittance o f the fijndamental limitations o f his 
chamber. 
The 'doctrine o f unaccountability' seems to have been resurrected by Edward 
I I I , before Hatfield's time. His immediate predecessors Trussell and Kilsby were not 
called to account to the chamber auditors until well into Hatfield's time as receiver,^^ 
and in mid 1341 Fleet rendered his account for the period since 1324.^^ Therefore 
Hatfield was not setting a precedent in not accounting to the exchequer. Nevertheless 
Hatfield's insistence in not accounting was more forceful, particularly in a time o f 
extreme financial tension. 
Hatfield's case is unique in that it is noted that the accounts were burnt after 
audit. There is however a possibility that Trussell, Kilsby, and Fleet all had their 
accounts destroyed in someway as none o f them is extant. This interpretation may be 
strengthened by the subsequent problems experienced by Trussell, after he finally 
" Chapters, v, 188. Maxwell-Lyte, Documents Relating to the Great seal {\^onAon, 1895), 110.] 
See Chapters, iv, 286-289. 
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accounted in late 1345. Edward had ulfimately to make grants protecting Trussell and 
later his heirs, from the exactions o f the exchequer.^* This may indicate that by then the 
records were no longer extant, raising the possibility o f their purposefiil destruction. 
Alternatively, and perhaps more likely, is that this is simply an example o f the 
exchequer-chamber bickering, wi th the accounts as yet being extant but Edward just 
determined to keep them hidden. Importantly had Trussell's accounts been burnt like 
Hatfield's only a year earlier, surely the king would have stopped exchequer pressure by 
informing them that the accounts had been destroyed. Though fragmentary, much of 
Hatfield's successor, Burton's, accounts have survived. And Edward indeed had him 
render them to the exchequer.^^ From this it would be easy to over estimate Hatfield's 
importance, given that his accounts were burnt, however by Burton's receivership times 
had certainly changed. 
In fact the burning and noting o f 1344 should be viewed as an early indication 
that the chamber was struggling to meet Edward's expectations; expectations that by 
Burton's time had been modified. In 1344 the king had already realised, and admitted 
to himself, that he would ultimately have to make the chamber less secretive in order to 
wage successftil large-scale war. Consequently he sought to prevent problems in future 
years by destroying Hatfield's accounts immediately upon his relinquishing o f the 
office, and most importantly making this known within his administration. In light o f 
this there could be no question that they should later go before the exchequer. Tension 
between the exchequer and the chamber had long existed, but the issuing o f notifying 
mandates to the other administrative departments appears unprecedented.'"^ 
Edward's financial position in late 1344 appears to bear out the hypothesis 
outlined above. Edward had planned to personally lead a campaign into Brittany but 
this had had to be abandoned, largely due to problems in raising money in time to 
finance it. Parliament could not be convened until June 1344, and the money it was to 
provide would not arrive until November; too late for a major campaign. The 
government seems to have admitted that campaigning that year was doomed by late 
August."" Parliamentary taxes were now the ingredient vital to Edward's logistics, 
their failure to arrive in due time ended the prospect o f campaigning. Vitally, wi th its 
current limitations the chamber could not cope. How fervently Edward I I I had initially 
Chapters, iv, 299. 
Chapters, iv, 288. 
'°VP/?, 1343-45, 371. 
See Sumption, Trial by Battle. 434. The wardrobe accounts for this period are sadly not extant, 
denying us a clearer picture. 
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desired to mould the chamber into a special instrument o f prerogative and a new war 
department is debatable. Nevertheless from the mid-1340s Edward started to abandon 
his dream. The task o f the raising the enormous capital needed to maintain the war 
effort could not run hand in hand with the secrecy, which both the king and his clerk 
apparently demanded for chamber dealings. Clearly for it to provide such vast financial 
concessions, parliament demanded to be kept well informed o f how its money was 
being used.'"^ 
Though they are explained by the financial situation and are in no way as 
sinister as they could appear at a casual glance, these events do highlight the close bond 
that had developed between the king and his trusted servant. After 1344 Hatfield's 
subsequent promotions reveal that Edward read the situation correctly; he did not blame 
the problems on his receiver. Without such a bond one feels that Edward could have 
made Hatfield a scapegoat, i f not impeaching him at least labelling his receiver so in his 
own mind, in order to absolve himself from any feelings o f failure. Instead through the 
mandates Edward was expressing his affection for Hatfield openly. 
An insight into why Edward felt he had to make this gesture in 1344 is found 
three years previously, in mid-Apri l 1341. Hatfield had had 'all his goods and 
chattels... taken... by the Sheriff o f Dorset by virtue o f the king's order under the 
exchequer seal because Thomas did not come before the treasurer and the barons at the 
exchequer to render account for the money and jewels received by him in the king's 
chamber'."'^ This initial order appears to have been made by the exchequer not the 
king, as Edward later demanded that Hatfield should now have, 'restitution thereof his 
special f a v o u r ' . A s there is no indicafion that Hatfield had in any way fallen out with 
his king, even temporarily, this order highlights the levels to which hostility between 
exchequer and chamber could go, even in a period o f national crisis. 
It is not clear to what extent Edward insisted on Hatfield remaining accountable 
only to him and how much impetus came from his clerk, who did clearly stand to 
benefit f rom it as a result. Tout was o f the opinion that much of Hatfield's accounts 
'would hardly bear off ic ia l scrutiny','"^ suggesting perhaps that Hatfield sought and 
gained undeserved protection f rom his king due to the affection Edward held him in. 
'"^ Chapters, iv, 289. 
'"^ CPR, 1340-43, 254. It was not uncommon for sheriffs to assist their superior, the exchequer, in 
hostilities against the chamber. Another example is the assistance of the Sheriff of Hampshire in 1344 in 
an attempt to get a ferm paid into the exchequer by the alien prior of Appledurcombe, that had previously 
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This interpretation would suit a reading o f the Apr i l 1341 order as an apparent change 
o f mind on the king's behalf'"^ However Tout seems merely to have made an inference 
directly from the unwillingness to account, as there seems to be no information 
available to attest this. That Hatfield was neither singled out, nor even mentioned in 
the attacks o f Stratford in 1341, counts against Tout's suggestion o f suspicious dealings, 
though his could perhaps also be explained by the privacy o f the office. In maintaining 
unaccountability Hatfield surely gained some leeway in his transactions but anything 
more sinister is neither evident nor probable. Hatfield was in no way being singled out 
for specialist treatment during this period, as, for example, in late 1341 Fleet was 
notified to only to account to k ing . ' ° ' 
'"^ CPR. 1340-43, ISA. 
Ibid, 256. 
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Part III - Hatfield's activities in the Low Countries, 
1338-40 
Despite the burning o f the accounts some idea o f Hatfield's role in chamber 
workings during the periods spent in England can be gleaned from the chancery rolls, 
especially regarding monies received. Alien priories provided some income, for 
example in May 1339 the chamber was to receive, £66 13s f rom the prior o f 
Appildercombe in the Isle o f Wight for the last Easter term.'°^ Hatfield was paid £40 by 
the abbot o f Nottele in January 1341.'"^ Edward also sought to provide an income for 
the chamber by rendering unto them the goods o f outlaws, for example on 7 October 
1342 Hatfield received wool f rom two outlawed wool merchants ."° John de Molyns's 
fal l fi-om grace in 1341 provided the chamber with his 'lands, goods and knights' fees 
and liberties', for a t ime . ' " Fines for appropriation could also be received, as on 21 
June 1342 Hatfield received £20 f rom the prior and convent o f Wenlock, paid to 
facilitate their appropriation o f the churches o f Stoke St. Milburgh and Madele."^ 
Hatfield appears not to have generally conducted audits but during a period back in 
England in July 1341 he was put in charge o f auditing Molyns's accounts. Given the 
situation it was perhaps felt that the task was serious enough to demand the attention o f 
the head o f the chamber. 
Some idea o f Hatfield's role on the continent fi-om 1338 to 1340 can be pieced together 
fi-om the available resources. Although fi-om a later period Burton's fi-agmentary 
accounts still provide insights to what Hatfield's role would have been."'* When 
abroad, like the wardrobe, the chamber was almost entirely focused upon the expenses 
o f war; in fact there seems little to distinguish the two. Though clearly carrying out 
most o f his activities through the chamber, Hatfield's name appears in the wardrobe 
account o f Wil l iam de Norwell, for the period 12 July 1338 to 27 May 1340. This 
shows how clerks were not steadfastly restricted to one department, although it is 
generally not clear why certain o f Hatfield's activities were conducted through the 
wardrobe rather than the chamber, as they appear to have been o f much the same nature. 
' ^ ' C C / ? , 1339-41, 138. 
CPR, 1343-45, 74. 
"°CPR, 1340-43, 534. 
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For long periods Hatfield is absent f rom Norwell 's account book, but the winter 1339-
1340 saw Hatfield making regular payments, especially in November and January. It is 
likely that due to a short-term emptiness o f the chamber coffers, Hatfield was making 
payments through the wardrobe that he would have normally made through the 
chamber. Edward's financial problems necessitating financial juggling within his 
administration. Later evidence shows that Hatfield was involved in inter-department 
borrowing. An undated prest o f £113 6d in Norwell 's accounts suggests that Hatfield 
had received money from the wardrobe but that this was not enough."^ Later, in the 
war wages and restoration o f robes section o f the next wardrobe account book, Hatfield 
is noted as being owed the vast sum of £1025 15s o f the king's money by the 
wardrobe."^ Alternatively, the increase in the number o f his entries in the wardrobe 
account could simply be a product o f raised diplomatic machinations. The more public 
nature o f the negotiations at this time resulting in Hatfield's use through the less 
secretive department. Yet the public negotiations o f winter 1339-1340 were far from 
unique so it is surprising that there are not other such periods for Hatfield. 
A t this time Edward was involved in a series o f negotiations with allies, both 
existing and potential, who were also negotiating with each other; the culmination being 
the alliance o f 3 December 1339 made between Van Artevelde and the Duke o f 
Brabant, which saw Artevelde being drawn away from Philip V I into Edward I l l ' s 
camp. Sadly few details o f the diplomacy are to be gained f rom extant sources."^ 
However Hatfield seems to have played some active part in the negotiafions, as on 4 
November he paid Artevelde's brother. Master John, £9 for coming to Antwerp with his 
brother's letters. The next day a herald o f Germany was presented wi th 45s for rumours 
revealed to the king, whilst on 20"* Lord Shenk, who came for secret negotiations from 
Austria, was given £67 10s; i t appears that Hatfield may have received these men 
personally. However other payments paint Hatfield as little more than a 'purse-boy'; 
for example John, hunter o f the Duke o f Brabant was paid 4s 6d for coming with his 
dogs to hunt near Brussels, and on 4*** and 12"^  Hatfield paid the minstrels that 
entertained the court. It seems most probable that chamber shortages have given us a 
more detailed glimpse o f a little o f Hatfield's normal role during negotiations in the 
yVorwe//, 456. 
£ i 6 / 2 0 ^ , fos. 123. 
H.S. Lucas, The Low Countries and the Hundred Years War (Ann Arbor, 1929), 340-365. 
" « / 6 W . , 3 6 1 . 
All payments from Norwell, 262. 
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Netherlands. However, how far these entries reveal the fu l l extent o f Hatfield's 
involvement is unclear, and how typical they were is also impossible to assess. 
Edward I I I was greatly impoverished at this time, and Hatfield was one o f many 
attempting to raise finances in the Low C o u n t r i e s . S o m e o f the tasks given to 
Hatfield do, however, bear out the idea that whilst he did much that was common to all 
clerks, Edward did hold his receiver o f the chamber in particular esteem. Hence the 
inventory o f jewels for which Norwell was responsible notes Hatfield as receiving a 
golden eagle by oral order o f the king, '^' two golden cruets, and a golden chalice with 
paten'^^ amongst others, the intention presumably being that he mortgage these jewels 
to raise ftinds. In August 1339 Hatfield was in charge o f ten armed men who 
transported a large amount of jewels to Germany to mortgage them for money the king 
owed. He received £28 8s 2d in total, for all costs on the sixteen day trip. Recorded 
costs were the wages o f the escort, a wallet to carry the jewels, horses with sumpter 
saddles on which to truss the cargo, linen and cords to tie the parchment in which some 
jewels were to be wrapped, two coffers to carry them, and the payment o f messengers to 
carry letters.'^^ The value and make up o f the jewels is not specified but the provision 
listed above indicates that the journey was a major undertaking. 
It is possible that the jewels included the Great Crown that Hatfield paid 2,400/ 
to John de Lentele in February 1339 to redeem.'^'' Hatfield received this as 16,000 
florins from the Bardi and Peruzzi, and gained the crown via Paul de Monte Florum 
who had initially loaned the crown to de Lentele for £4,050. These dealings with the 
major financial players o f the time highlight Hatfield's importance; as do the large sums 
involved. 
The Great Crown was destined to be repledged to the archbishop of T r i e r . I t 
is noted that Hatfield was bound to account to the king in Germany that he had received 
the crown and he is recorded as having done so.'^'' There are a number o f problems with 
Hatfield taking the crown to Edward in Germany. Hatfield's wages reveal that he was 
not away from court during the account period except from the trip to Germany in 
E . B . Fryde, 'Financial Resources of Edward III in the Netherlands, 1337-40', Studies in Medieval 
Trade and Finance, ed. E . B . Fryde (London, 1983), 1142-1216. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 127-73. 
Norwell, 392, C V I I . 
^'-Ibid, 403. 
Ibid. 232, L X X X V . 
'^^ Ibid. C X I I - C X I I I , 416. 
' " C f / ? , 1338-1340, 371. Fryde,'Financial Resources', 1165. 
^-^ Noi-well, C X I I I . 
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August 1339, '" and the first half o f 1339 saw Edward residing in enforced idleness in 
Antwerp. Indeed after September 1338 Edward did not visit Germany again.'^^ 
Therefore it seems unlikely that Hatfield took the crown in February to Edward in 
Germany; there is no evidence for either o f them visiting Germany at that time. Instead 
a copying error is likely, with Hatfield accounting to Edward in Antwerp. 
Having taken possession of the crown Hatfield must surely have been a strong 
candidate to be trusted with its transportation to Trier. A task o f such magnitude would 
certainly explain the size and detailed planning o f the August 1339 escort. However 
this would not fit particularly well with the proposed scheme drawn up on 28 February 
1339 between Edward I I I and Archbishop Baldwin, where by the English king promised 
to hand over the Great Crown and £16,650forthwith as security for subsidies previously 
promised.'^^ Yet aside from the delay in the crown's passage there are compelling 
reasons to associate Hatfield's trip to Germany with this ultimately wasteful scheme. 
Hatfield had previously had dealings with the archbishop and his associate Vyvyno, a 
Jewish money lender o f Strasbourg.'''^ 
In addifion though Norwell simply refers to 'jewels', he records that they were 
to be mortgaged for money the king owed. Elsewhere, though sadly not clearly dated, 
Hatfield is noted as having paid a grand total o f £4,875 to the Lombard merchant, and 
member o f the Leopard o f Asf i , Gabrieli de Monte Magno, in return for the delivery o f 
many jewels to the important royal clerk Paul de Monte Florum and himself '^ ' 
Hatfield must have retained many of these jewels, collecting them together until he had 
a suitable amount to present to Baldwin as security, just ifying the sixteen day trip to 
Germany. The need to gather resources with which to reduce the £16,650 owed to the 
archbishop would explain the delay between February and August in transporting the 
Great Crown. 
Some impression o f the huge amounts o f money that Hatfield must have become 
used to dealing in, and the hectic and presumably apparently endless nature o f the 
clerk's schedule, is gained from the order that Hatfield would have received no sooner 
Ibid., 337. 
'^ "^  In the autumn of 1338 Edward III spent under a month in Germany treating with Lewis the Bavarian 
[Lucas, Low Countries, 288. H.S. Offler, 'England and Germany at the beginning of the Hundred Years' 
War', Church and Crown in the Fourteenth Century: Studies in European Historical And Political 
Thought, ed. A . l . Doyle (Hampshire, 2000), 611-620.]. 
Fryde, 'Financial Resources', 1165. 
Hatfield is noted as receiving £848 14s from the wardrobe with which to repay, through Nicholas de 
Galeys of Antwerp, the archbishop of Trier and Vyvyno, in order to redeem jewels {Norwell, 447]. Also 
in 1339 Hatfield payed Vyvyno £1,695, via Walter de Chaungeour of Bruselles, to reedem more jewels 
[Ibid., 449]. 
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than he had returned fi-om Trier. On the 22 August 1339 at Oudenaerde Hatfield, along 
with John de Molyns and the king's chamberlain, Henry de Ferarrs, were charged with 
collectively raising 40,000/.'^"^ Such a loan demand was anything but unique'^^ and 
should be seen as a staple task o f Edward's clerks in the Netherlands. 
The exact details o f Hatfield's dealings are elusive, yet his actions throughout 
this period show him heavily involved in the machinations o f Edward's financial 
dealings; he received loans, distributed money to get pawned goods back and then 
possibly used these to get more loans. The responsibility o f working with men such as 
Paul de Monte Florum, and being in charge o f a large amount o f jewels highlight his 
considerable importance, whilst at the same time provide little genuine insight into how 
he may have been different fi-om his peers. However whilst the series o f repayments 
Hatfield made to Thierry, Lord o f Valkenburg'^'' in the autumn of 1339 may appear to 
illustrate the more mundane role o f royal clerks, placed in context they reveal Hatfield's 
essential diplomatic and logistical role during the autumn of 1339. 
On the 25 September Hatfield paid 2,000 ecus (£450) via Lord Gerard o f 
Aldenhowe, prior o f Abberdas, at Aspre. On 8 October Hatfield met Theodoric in a 
field near Greyker and paid him 500 ecus (£112 10s) directly. Two days later the same 
amount was handed over through another middleman, a clerk Godesal.'^^ Payments 
such as these were essential to allow the alliance o f English and Flemish forces to 
advance into enemy territory. The locations o f the meetings were deep into the invaded 
lands; the impression being that Hatfield had to keep riding between different allied 
forces, making these hurried payments to maintain unity as many became increasingly 
disillusioned by Edward I l l ' s woefiil financial predicament. That the next year 
Valkenburg wrote Edward, what the king himself described as a 'most a c i d i c ' l e t t e r , 
highlights not only the potential for extreme disharmony between the allies, but also 
something o f the type o f man Hatfield was dealing with. Wi th a little imagination it is 
easy to see that these were far from mundane errands. Hatfield appears to have been 
rushing here and there, desperately trying to cajole a sceptical foreign knight into 
remaining in the field, wi th the knight continuously stalling until he received a further 
Ibid., 443. 131 
^^^CPR, 1338-1340, 392. 
Lucas, Low Countries, 306. 
'''' Thierry (Theodoric, Dietriech) Lord of Valkenburg (Falcomont, Falkenburg) and Montjoie (1332-
1346) was a petty low county prince, and trusted councillor of the count of Guelders, he received fief-
rente and payment for the military and political assistance he provided Edward [Lucas, Low Countries, 
218. NorweU,XC\,CX\\\.l 
Norwell, 419. For similar transactions also involving Hatfield see Ibid., 25, 76, 424, 440. 
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concession. The perilous situation is fiirther revealed by Hatfield's sending o f f officials 
back to Brussels 'pro denariis ad opus Regis querendis'. '" 
A convincing portrayal o f the vast scope o f Hatfield's activities can be presented 
by the inclusion o f a few more examples. Wi th the help o f Kilsby, Hatfield was partly 
responsible for maintaining the king's supply o f horses in 1339, as they are recorded as 
paying a prest o f 1,407 ecus in advance to John Gemache, a serjant o f arms from La 
Flamgenerie.'''^ It is possible that this payment is linked to the English plundering 
during September and early October 1339. On 9 October both English and French were 
arrayed for battle at Flamengerie but neither were prepared to take an offensive role, 
and battle was not joined. 
Also in 1339 Hatfield made a number o f payments to ships' captains as their 
vessels were taken into royal service.''"' Edward's 'administration o f impressment was 
extremely haphazard'*'*' pre-1340, and the failure to supply enough ships seems to have 
lead Hatfield to search for ships to be taken into royal service. The problem was so 
severe that at Brussels on 3 November 1339 the king instructed Hatfield, amongst 
others, to contract yet another loan, £20,000, to increase the size o f the fleet.''^^ As in 
modem conflicts, espionage played an integral part in medieval warfare, so it is 
unsurprising that the military minded Hatfield seems to have been entrusted the charge 
of a spy, Alard de Lisle, who was paid 44s in 1340 for secret negotiations in Flanders, 
to find about the French court. '''^ 
That in July 1338, just before the embarkation to the Netherlands, Hatfield was 
already trusted to collect £5,000, a huge amount o f cash, reveals that Hatfield did not 
grow into the task he had been assigned. This was no task for a simple clerk; three carts 
were demanded, each having to be pulled by five horses, with a guard o f ten archers, to 
transport this money, apparently a product o f the wool company loan, from Norwich to 
Walton-on-the-Naze.''*'* From his creation as receiver Edward I I I placed a great deal o f 
trust in both Hatfield's loyalty and military ability. It is worth noting here that like all 
Sumption, Trial by Battle. 360. 
Fryde, 'Financial Resources', 1174. 
™ Norwell, 437. 
Lucas, Low Countries, 333. 
Norwell, 434, 436, 437. 
J.S.Kepler, 'The effects of the battle of Sluys upon the administration of English Naval Impressment, 
1340-1343', Speculuum xlviii (1973), 70. 
CPR., 1338-40, 395. Kepler, 'Effects of Sluys', 71. Hatfield was again involved in December 1339 




o f Edward's clerks, Hatfield was heavily involved in the wool scheme that was 
proposed to buy alliances and finance allied offensives into France.'''^ 
Hatfield was in England wi th his king during the spring o f 1340, and on the 22 
June, just before the fleet sailed back to the continent f rom Shotley, he was paid £154 
14s 1 Id , the fifth highest o f the clerks, for his service abroad.''*'' On Edward's return 
the financial situation was still grave despite the sea victory at Sluys, on the 24 June 
1340. In reflection o f the desperation o f the situation the administration f rom 1340 was 
less organised than the early days o f the Netherlandish campaign. Whilst the chamber, 
along with the treasury, wardrobe and chancery mostly remained across the channel, as 
did the household, Edward needed his receiver o f the chamber even though only his 
most valued chamber officials accompanied Hatfield for the second time.'"^ 
However Wil l iam de Kilsby's central role in government from 1338-1340 as 
keeper o f the privy seal affords us some perspective on the importance o f Hatfield's 
position. Kilsby held both the privy and great seals in the Low Countries, and Tout feels 
we should view him as some sort o f 'prime minister', a third minister of state after the 
chancellor and the freasurer, wi th an important say in the direction o f policy. I f Kilsby 
was the dominant minister, Hatfield's role is more diff icult to ascertain, indeed it is hard 
to say with any degree o f certainty exactly who had what voice in the Netherlands. 
Unlike Kilsby, there is nothing to indicate that Hatfield was given an official position as 
a member o f the select inner council.''*^ Kilsby's presence was demanded because writ 
o f privy seal had become the means by which the daily transacdons of king's council 
had come to be carried out. When more general meetings were called the likes o f 
Norwell and Hatfield, surely joined Kilsby and the king's faithful lay advisors, forming 
the larger king's council 'on whose advice the king was to rely'.''*^ And though during 
this period only Kilsby, o f the clerks, had a fu l ly active voice, it is hard to believe that 
Edward would not have consulted his trusted servant on many matters and valued any 
opinions offered.'^"^ 
'"^  For examples of Hatfield's wool dealings see CCR. 1339-41, 364, 388, 525, 544, 546, 555, 571, 575. 
Ibid. 1341-43, 313. For the best general survey see E . B . Fryde, 'Edward Il l 's Wool Monopoly of 1337: A 
Fourteenth Century Royal Trading Venture', in Fryde, Studies in Medieval Trade and Finance. 
CCR, 1339-41, 525. 
^"''Chapters, iv, 117. 
Ibid., 99. For slightly different personnel see Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 155. 
'''^  Tout, 'Conflicting tendencies', 231. See also Chapters, iv, 88-90. Chapters, v, 14-15. 
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Part IV - The crisis of 1340-41 
The question o f Hatfield's involvement in the crisis o f 1340-1 is perhaps integral 
to an understanding o f his career before Durham.'^' The crisis represented the release 
by Edward I I I o f over three years o f fioistration with his home administration. It erupted 
in the short-term aftermath o f the failure, as the king would rightly have viewed it, at 
Toumai. After the success at Sluys and with his first French city almost at its knees, the 
failure o f his financial policy Mly revealed itself Yet despite his dissatisfaction Edward 
still waited a ftirther two months in Ghent vainly hoping that he would receive ftinds 
from his ministers at home.'^^ So Edward's hasty refreat home at the end o f November 
1340 is a little puzzling, as the circumstances had apparently not changed 
significantly.'^^ 
Luckily here the chronicles help our understanding. Avesbury has the king 
noting the pressure placed on him by his companions, and has Archbishop Stratford 
later highlighting the fo l ly o f listening to young men; Murimuth supports this 
commenting on the ascendancy of Edward's young councillors.'^'* Though Edward was 
himself only twenty-six and it is possible that Hatfield was not more than a decade 
older,'^^ the contention was that the councillors were youthful in years o f service not 
necessarily in actual age. In this lies the fundamental issue o f the crisis, and the one that 
largely explains how before this Hatfield had risen so rapidly; Edward was gradually 
asserting his wish to rule through ministers he had himself selected rather than those 
who had, so to speak, come wi th the job. ' 
A t seventeen and having being forced to overthrow the regime of Mortimer and 
his mother, insecurity prevented Edward from starting his reign with a personalisation 
of his c ivi l service. Though there is some contention as to the degree, by the time 
Hatfield became receiver o f the chamber in 1338, Edward appears to have been well on 
For the best account, and the basis of my interpretation, of the crisis see N.M. Fryde, 'Edward I l l ' s 
Removal of his Ministers and Judges, 1340-1', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 48 (1975). 
See also R .M. Haines, Archbishop John Stratford: Political Revolutionary and Champion of the Liberties 
of the English Church ca. 1275/80-1348 (Toronto, 1986), 278-328. B. Wilkinson, 'The Protest of the 
Earis of Arundel and Surrey in the Crisis of 1341', EHR CLXXXII (1931). Chapters, iii, 88-135. 
Sumption, Trial by Battle, 363-64. G . L . Harris, King, Parliament and Public Finance in Medieval 
England to 7i69 (Oxford, 1975). 
'^ ^ Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp,2\5.¥ryAs,'RQmovd\ of Ministers', 151, 153. 
'^ ^ Fryde, 'Removal of Ministers', 154. 
'"/ive^^urv, 332, 327-29. Murimuth, 118. 
'^ ^ For a discussion on Hatfield's age see below . 
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his way to uniting his young nobility behind him, after years spent fighting together 
against the Scots.'^ ^ The success at Sluys in 1340 made the channel English by almost 
negating French piracy,'^^ however its greatest importance was surely the further 
strengthening the king's position, as his efforts were finally being rewarded; three 
letters written by Edward after the battle illustrate how he took the victory as the 'sign 
from God he had anticipated'.'^^ 
In such a climate it is easy to believe that the continuous influence in Ghent, 
particularly of Kilsby but also men like Hatfield, could have convinced Edward that it 
was time to rid himself of the 'old guard' who had failed him when even God was on 
his side.'*'" As Fryde notes, though important, the constitutional issues focused on by 
Tout and Wilkinson were not the cause of the crisis; rather they were Stratford's skilful 
defence when faced by Edward's impeachment.'^' 
Importantly there is little evidence of Tout's wild purge, motivated by 'petulant 
fury' on the king's behalf'^^ Rather the Toumai failure, though it had greatly infuriated 
Edward, had merely acted as a catalyst to the desire he had already, quite naturally, 
illustrated by his promotion of Hatfield amongst others, to mould a warlike 
administration from men whom he could trust and who saw him as his, as opposed to 
simply royal men. Hence the importance of the crisis in analysing Hatfield's path to 
Durham is not so much through his part in proceedings; indeed as we shall soon see, 
little of his role can be ascertained. Rather, the main root of the crisis also explains 
precisely why and how Hatfield could achieve such an intimate role in Edward's plans 
without having served a long apprenticeship under the experienced statesmen of his 
father's reign. 
By returning to a link proposed earlier between Hatfield and Salisbury this point 
can be reinforced. For Salisbury was considered Edward's greatest supporter, having 
accompanied the young prince Edward in his attack on his mother's supposed lover, 
Roger Mortimer at Nottingham castle in 1330.'^ "' I f indeed Hatfield had begun his 
A. Ayton, 'Edward III and the English Aristocracy at the Beginning of the Hundred Years War', 
Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France, ed. M. Strickland (Stamford, 1998), 176-
77. Sumption suggests the nobility lusted for the 'ritual celebration of battle' [Trial by Battle, 181.]. 
'^ ^ Kepler, 'Effects of Sluys', 70. 
'^ •^  Rogers, iVar Cruel and Sharp, 198. 
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XII. Such was Edward Ill's mistrust of his chancellor that he feared he wanted him killed, a fear 
compounded by the 'allusions', of Stratford - who had played a part in his father's end - 'to the 
deposition of unjust rulers' [Fryde, 'Removal of Ministers', 153, 155.]. 
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career away from royal service but under Montague he would have had the perfect 
connection credentials to become, as he subsequently did, one of the king's most trusted 
servants. 
Though he stood to gain nothing personally in terms of promotion as a result of 
the crisis there can be no doubt that Hatfield would have had great interest in events. 
Hatfield may not have been as anti-Stratford as Kilsby for example, whose 
'extraordinary vindictiveness' stemmed partly from his hatred of the Stratford family 
due to its previous support of William Zouche in the battle for the archbishopric of 
York.'^"* But he was clearly, by virtue of his efforts abroad, a member of Tout's 
organised and exclusive court party who 'aspired to dominate the ministry at home, 
looking upon it as mainly useful for providing the money which the king was to spend, 
and expecting it to carry out implicitly all orders received from abroad.'^ ^^ Hatfield 
would have been in no doubts that he was one of the prime culprits to which Stratford's 
pejorative against those who 'now make themselves governors and counsellors, more 
than their estate doth warrant','^^ was directed. 
No source notes Hatfield amongst those who initially arrived with Edward at the 
Tower on 30 November 1340, yet there is some disagreement as to this party's make up, 
so his absence is not a certainty.'^'^ Nevertheless i f the account of Edward tricking his 
allies by fleeing when supposedly out riding is accepted, it is quite possible that Hatfield 
may have been absent from his king conducting other business. Even though the king 
had lost his faith in his home administration over a long period, the actual decision to 
leave Ghent was made suddenly, maybe even spontaneously, the result being that most 
168 
of his followers were initially left behind, along with Philippa and their children. By 
5 January 1341 Hatfield was certainly in England, as he is noted as having received 
payment in the chamber from the Abbot of Nottele.'^^ Importantly, however, the 
chronicles do not name Hatfield in the subsequent manoeuvring, clearly not regarding 
him as a major protagonist on a par with Kilsby, or laymen like William Bohun, earl of 
Northampton, or bannerets Reginald Cobham and Walter Mauny. 
Ibid., 159. Quote from Chapters, iii, 126. 164 
Chapters, iii, 90. 
Haines, Stratford, 289. 
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Nicholas de Cantilupe, Cobham, Northampton [Chronicon Galfridi le Baker de Swynebroke, ed. E. 
Maunde Thompson, (Oxford, 1889), 72.]. Strangely Baker omits Darcy and Mauny, who are both, 
along with the above mentioned, included in Murimuth's account. 
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It is the very nature of Hatfield's role as receiver of the chamber, which may at 
once both suggest that Hatfield did play an important part in events, but also explain his 
absence from the chronicles. One interpretation could be that he was present at 
parliament in late April 1341 but that his more intimate role as receiver perhaps had 
failed to provide him with much of a public reputation, leading chroniclers to neglect 
him. That Murimuth was a royal councillor beforehand and maintained his office 
afterwards, thus being exceptionally well placed to report the crisis,'^" must count 
against this. Even when it is considered that his account fails to offer the genuine 
insights one would hope for from one so well placed; the author simply aspiring to 
produce a chronicle within the established conventions of the time. Alternatively, it may 
therefore be argued that Hatfield played little part in the crisis, though such a suggestion 
goes entirely against the picture of Hatfield so far assembled, and is as a result far from 
compelling, though there is the weak possibility that Edward allowed him to be 
distracted by the problems he was having claiming the prebend of Beer and 
Charminster, which may have necessitated a long trip to the south west almost as far as 
Portland Bay, and will be discussed below. 
Most convincing is the interpretation that his office necessitated a less 
conspicuous, yet probably none the less integral, background role. The lasting 
impression is that Hatfield, though sharing the views of friends such as Kilsby, played 
out his role in the crisis entirely behind the scenes. Edward seems to have left most of 
the active dealings in the April parliament and earlier at Canterbury, to others, most 
notably Kilsby, keeping himself and ultimately his receiver of the chamber in the 
background.'^' 
Through his apparent reconciliation with Stratford in the April parliament, 
Edward seemed to accept the need to prevent 'occasion for dissension in parliament','^^ 
but this was no sacrifice of leanings to despotism. Edward 111 may have had unrealistic 
expectations of his ability to run the war through his court party in the Low Counfries 
but he was not in this sense trying to be his father's son, he had no wish to emulate the 
rule of his father and the Despensers. Stratford strove to portray the king as a despot 
but the archbishop's agenda is all too clear, nevertheless constitutional historians have 
often accepted his words all too easily. The superficial reconciliation that concluded the 
crisis did not return Stratford to prominence, though it was not until the end of 1348 that 
CPR. 1340-43, 74. 
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he lay entombed in his cathedral.'^"' By this time many of those men brought in by the 
crisis, such as Edington and Thoresby, were flourishing in Edward's administration, and 
Thomas de Hatfield had been bishop of Durham for over three years. 
It is quickly worth noting how the victory was soon to turn sour for the court 
party's leading protagonist, William de Kilsby. The keeper of privy seal retained his 
office until mid-1342, when it is unclear i f he was dismissed or r e s igned .Ye t what is 
clear is that the vindictiveness of Kilsby's assault had stained him in the eyes of much 
of the wealthy warrior class; he stood in the way of the unity so essential to the 
maintenance of war. Hatfield's background role left him untainted, and able to achieve 
ecclesiastical preferment, whilst the previously ascendant Kilsby, though not entirely 
humiliated, had to be content with a pilgrimage and a war.'^^ 
^'^^ Ibid., 1,29. 
He died still Archbishop on 13 August 1348 [British Chronology, 211.]. Fryde, 'Removal of 
Ministers', 161. 
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Part V - The pinnacle of his civil service career: Hatfield 
as privy seal keeper. 
I f his activities as receiver of the chamber are frustratingly obscure, then the 
dearth of information regarding his time as keeper of the privy seal is almost infuriating. 
It is safe to say that we know almost nothing of Thomas de Hatfield in this role.'^^ The 
dating of his keepership remains clouded. A papal letter of 12 October 1344 lists 
Hatfield as keeper of the secret seal,'^' however for the purpose of dating the inception 
of Hatfield's privy seal keepership Tout appears to have taken this as the papal clerks 
meaning the privy seal, even though he had earlier used this very same letter in his 
discussion of Hatfield as keeper of the secret seal.'^ ^ Tout's reasoning is clear as 
sources suggest that John Offord vacated the privy seal post some time after 29 
September 1344. 
Yet Offord had clearly been unable to conduct his usual office for some time, as 
he was in reality the most dominant member of the embassy of the bishop of Norwich 
that left for Avignon at the beginning of August 1344, not ultimately returning until he 
fled in March the next year. '^ ^ Whilst Offord may have been keeper in name, it is clear 
that some one would have had to carry out his tasks at Westminster, less clear but 
highly probable is that this man would have been Hatfield. When the situation 
necessitated that Offord remain in France into the winter, the move must have been 
taken to end Hatfield's association with the chamber, presumably to reduce his 
workload. This decision would probably have been reached sometime in November or 
early December 1344 when the chamber accounts audit was first o r d e r e d . A n entry 
on 10 November states that Hatfield was to be audited from 12 July 1338 unfil '1 
November last'. Given the potential for strife with the exchequer discussed above, 
Edward would surely have wanted rid of the accounts the moment Hatfield left the 
position. Whatever the dating of the official hand over, by 11 December news that 
Hatfield was at least acting as replacement for Offord seems to have reached Avignon. 
On this day Hatfield was referred to as 'king's secretary', the term commonly applied to 
^''^ Chapters, v, 20. 
' " C P L , 1342-62, 11. 
Chapters, iv, 261-261. v, 20. 
Sumption, Trial by Battle, 437, 444. 
'"^  10 November 1344 [CPR. 1343-45, 420.]. 4 December 1344 [Ibid, 371.]. 
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privy seal keepers.'^' Sadly, the chancery rolls offer no help as Hatfield is only 
mentioned twice as keeper, both in 1345.'^ ^ 
The growth in the number of chancery writs that were made on the information 
or testimony of Hatfield from mid-1343 illusfrates Hatfield's importance and increasing 
closeness to his monarch, and suitability for his new role.'^^ The termination of his 
office is clearer as on 3 July 1345 John Thoresby replaced Hatfield, bishop-elect of 
Durham, and on 23 June Walter Wetewang as keeper of wardrobe was ordered to pay 
Hatfield wages in arrears for his service as keeper of privy seal.'*'' 
So what can be made of the half year that Hatfield held this office? Papal letters 
show Hatfield with an increasing role to play in international politics. Hatfield's 
closeness to the king is fully borne out by the requests to exert influence on the king. 
Hatfield's relationship with Avignon will be more ftilly addressed later but here it will 
suffice to note that after Bradestan's visit to the papal curia at the end of 1343 Hatfield 
was no longer considered a papal enemy. The 11 December 1344 letter saw Clement V I 
write to Hatfield as one of numerous top officials including earls and bishops, and the 
king himself, requesting them to receive the visiting papal nuncios favourably.'*^ As 
early as October Hatfield was being commended by Clement for his labours touching 
the reformation of the peace; Hatfield being heavily involved in communication with 
Offord in Avignon.'*^ In fact it is highly unlikely Hatfield was genuinely working for 
peace. A military minded man, he almost certainly shared Edward Ill 's desire for a 
'decisive battle, where the will of God could be shown', having been so close 
previously at La Capelle in 1339.'*'' Therefore Edward refused to bow to Offord's 
numerous letters home asking for instructions, the clerk fearing that his king was failing 
to notice the real potential for peace.'** 
It is not clear i f Hatfield also received the custody of the great seal as both 
Offord and Kilsby had;'*^ Offord would certainly not have possessed it in France. That 
Hatfield's tenure of the office was entirely spent in England almost certainly counts 
against him having the great seal. Only war conditions abroad demanded that the 
CPL, 1342-63, 12. 
6 April 1345 [CCR, 1343-46. 511.] and 23 June 1345 [Ibid., 536.]. 
^"SeeCFR. 1337-47, 334. CCR. 1343-46, 162. CPR. 1343-45.144, 152,217. 
^^'^ Handbook British Chronology, 91. CCR, 1343-46,536. 
CPL. 1342-62, 12. 
'''Ibid, 11. 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 216. 
Sumption, Trial by Battle, 442-43. 
'''^Chapters, iv, 112. 
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'keeper of the privy seal became the second chancellor'therefore there is no reason 
to believe that the chancellor, Robert Sadington would have relinquished his grasp on 
the great seal. Doubtless his time as keeper of the privy seal was something of a 
change for Hatfield, as since he joined Edward's service he had been his almost 
constant companion. After becoming keeper of the privy seal he almost certainly would 
have followed the pattern of his predecessors in spending most of his time with the 
council, and therefore out of court, as his staff acted as its secretariat.'^' Supporting 
this, a letter of 23 June 1345 about pay, hints that Hatfield was often out of court, 
though there are no details of what dates the enquiries ordered found Hatfield as having 
been absent.''^ 
Ultimately Hatfield's appointment was little more than an intermediary measure. 
However this was in no way because Edward III did not consider his man suitable for 
the task. As will be strongly suggested below, it appears that the king already had a 
particular task in mind for his trusted servant. With the ageing Bishop Bury sick, 
seemingly terminally i l l , Hatfield was being groomed as his replacement. This would 
perfectly explain why Hatfield relinquished the privy seal as soon as he had fully 
secured Durham; he was merely filling in whilst he literally waited for Bury to die. The 
privy seal was undoubtedly a stepping stone to the episcopate but not an essential 
one;'^ ^ had Bury succumbed sooner Hatfield would surely have advanced to Durham 
from his position as receiver of the chamber. 
'''Ibid.,y, 55. 
^'^^ Ibid, 15-20, 59. 
CCR, 1343-46. 536. 
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Part VI - Hatfield's pursuit of ecclesiastical patronage, pre-
1345 
Ecclesiastical patronage became available to a clerk once he had induced a 
prelate to give him 'first tonsure'. Beyond this there was generally 'little need to 
assume more clerical responsibility than prudence required.'"'' This was perhaps lucky 
for Hatfield as it has long been assumed that he lacked religious devotion. However 
this negative interpretation is largely explained by the comments of his metropolitan in 
1363. Archbishop Thoresby suggested that as Bishop, Hatfield's life was 'dissolute, to 
the scandal of the church, to the danger of souls'.'^^ Yet this is hardly an especially 
reliable source, as it was clearly a politically motivated diatribe. Sadly, but 
unsurprisingly, there is no great evidence available for the early part of his career. 
Although he entered Edward Ill 's service in the king's chapel, he did not remain there 
long. Between July 1338 and May 1339 he paid the king's almoner 12 gold florins and 
54 shillings, for alms for the poor.'^^ More insights are found in his later life. Yet it is 
hard to know i f his devotion to St. Catherine the Virgin and St. George was long 
running, or even genuine.'^^ By the end of his life he had long been thinking of how he 
could avoid the pains of purgatory. But how much religion had concerned him when 
death did not loom so large is open to debate.'^ ^ Ultimately that his eulogy makes no 
claim for him being devout suggests that i f he was not dissolute, his religion was at best 
fairly conventional, much like his king's.'^^ 
Whatever his beliefs Hatfield certainly decided to become a member of the 
clergy, and therefore put himself in a position to receive ecclesiastical patronage. As he 
was not the first bom male heir, he stood to receive little in a society based on 
primogeniture. Therefore the church was probably his only path of advancement and 
upward mobility. Ecclesiastical patronage was also highly valued by those already part 
of the elite. As the clergy were supposedly celibate, their positions did not become 
hereditary unlike lay offices. Hence the importance of ecclesiastical patronage cannot 
be overestimated, as it constantly allowed the king, and his elite, to provide for and 
reward their current crop of civil servants, without incurring personal losses. This 
Tout, 'English Civil Service', 198. 
CPP, 1342-1419, 472. 
^'^^ Norwell,2\\. 
Barker, 'Death and the Bishop', 36-7. 
'"^ Ibid., 36-40. 
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method of reward is often helpfiil in affording historians insights, allowing them to 
chart the more obscure earlier stages of an administrator's career. 
Hatfield is noted in early 1342 as being the rector of Tarring, in the diocese of 
Chichester,^°° now found in West Sussex. However of the date of this appointment the 
sources are silent, although we do know that the rectory was still in his hands in late 
1343.^ *" Most likely Hatfield had by 1342 already held Tarring for sometime. 
Rectories were basic ecclesiastical benefices and usually represented the first rung on 
the ladder of promotion. As rector Hatfield would not have had to be resident at 
Tarring. Although it is not impossible that he would have chosen to be so, more 
probable is that through the burden of providing and maintaining a perpetual vicar, who 
was compelled to residency, he would have personally avoided the burden of the cure of 
souls. The system was geared by far to benefit the patronised clerks; the profits to be 
made from the gaining of a rectory, in general, far outweighed those involved in 
maintaining a vicar.^"^ Therefore the clerk was paid for, but vitally not distracted from, 
his main task. 
Insights into when and from whom Hatfield may have gained Tarring are 
offered by consulting the careers of other bishops. Hatfield's predecessor in Durham, 
Richard de Bury, illustrates the potential for a rectory to be received very early in a 
career. Bury had taken hold of the rectory of Sawbridgeworth, in the diocese of 
Canterbury, sometime before 1312, and until 1327 this was probably his only 
ecclesiasfical preferment.^°^ The appointment of Thomas Langley, a later bishop of 
Durham, as rector of the church of Radcliffe, in Lancashire, shows the importance of 
connections. Langley received the rectory in August 1385, from James Radcliffe, a 
member of a local family with which Langley would never sever his l i n k s . O f 
Hatfield's family connections little is as yet known but the geographical distance from 
his birthplace may well point to an alternative connection. The comparatively short 
distance from Salisbury might well be further evidence that Hatfield was a protege of 
Montague. Whatever the exact links, the examples above suggest rectories were usually 
granted by men other than the king, before clerks entered royal service. Hence it is 
almost certain that another master first groomed Hatfield before he started to serve his 
W.M. Ormrod, 'The Personal Religion of Edward III', Speculum, 64 (1989). 
CPL, 1305-42, 555. 
™' CPL, 1342-62, 88. 
-"^  R. A.R. Hartridge, A History of Vicarages in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1930), 129. . 
Martin, Bury, 32, 36. 
^ " " R . L . Storey, Thomas Langley and the Bishopric of Durham, 1406-1437 (London, 1961), 3. 
monarch, especially when the speed of Hatfield's rise once in the civil service of 
Edward III is considered. 
As noted above Hatfield received the church of Staneford, in Lincoln diocese, 
almost upon entering royal service.^ "^ ^ Then in July 1338 Hatfield was sent to Richard 
Bintworth, the newly consecrated bishop of London, to receive a yearly pension 'by 
reason of the bishop's new creation until he shall provide Thomas with a suitable 
benefice.'^''^ Edward was fiirther rewarding his new receiver of the chamber in advance 
of his services in the Low Countries. Here Hatfield was benefiting from indirect 
patronage from his king, who by such means was able to provide for his clerks without 
even reducing his personal supply of ecclesiastical patronage.^ ^^ This was not 
uncommon; Bintworth presumably owed a debt to Edward III for royal assistance in 
securing his election on the 4 May 1338. There is no evidence in the chancery rolls 
telling whether Hatfield was swiftly provided with a benefice. I f not he would have 
sworn an oath of fidelity to the bishop and been added to the waiting list of pensionary 
clerks. 
Hatfield received another Lincoln church in Market Overton, almost a year after 
Staneford, whilst he was serving Edward on the continent.^°^ 1340 saw the grant of the 
custody of the Hospital of St. John's, Portsmouth, on March 15,^'° along with the first 
mention of the problems over the presentation of the prebend of Beer and Charminster, 
in the church of St. Mary's in Salisbury, in mid May.^" The grouping of these two 
grants is illuminating, as from mid-February to the end of June 1340 Hatfield was back 
in England with his king. With his patronage closer to hand, Edward sought to dispense 
some of it to those who had been diligently serving him in the Netherlands. Though 
various entries into the chancery rolls reveal that the home government was being 
instructed to find benefices for Hatfield amongst others, it is clear from the dates of 
grants made that there was little substitute for the personal weight of the king and his 
hungry servant. '^^  
CPR. 1334-38, 559. 
^°^CCR. 1337-39. 516. 
W.A. Pantin, The English Church in the Fourteenth Century (Cambridge, 1955), 33-34. 
Bintworth was elected on 4 May, and consecrated on 12 July 1338 [British Chronology, 239.]. 
CPR, 1338-40, 163. 
Ibid, 440. 
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'^^  1338 June 20, July 3, October 19 (also Philip de Weston) [Ibid, 97, 106, 158]. 1341 March 12 (also 
Philip de Weston and John de Wynewyk) [CPR, 1340-43. 150.], October 28 (also John de Wynewyk) 
[Ibid., 332.] For instance in March 1341 the mandate decreed that John de Etton was to be given the first 
void benefice 'as soon as the king's clerks, Philip de Weston, John de Wynewyk and Thomas de Hatfield 
have been preferred.' In addition on 30 June 1338 Hatfield is noted individually as to receive the 'first 
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From the evidence of patronage available in the chancery rolls, Edward III was 
quick to reward Hatfield for his major efforts in his service. The Lincoln prebend of 
Liddington, in the church of St. Mary's, was granted on 8 April 1342, two months after 
Hatfield stopped being paid for his service in Sco t l and .^ In May 1343 a few months 
after the king and his servant returned from Brittany, Thomas collated the prebend of 
Wolminster in the church of St. Andrews, in Wells.^''' On 27 June of that year Hatfield 
was granted his fourth known piece of Lincoln patronage, and the second rich St. 
Mary's prebend, that of Buckden, which was soon to be the cause of strife.^'^ Finally 
17 December 1343 saw Hatfield collated to Fridaythorpe in the church of York. 
Importantly these last three bits of patronage came in the last eight months of 1343, at a 
time when chancery entries made on his information apparently suggest his exerting of 
an increasing influence.^'^ Too stringent a link between event and reward should not 
be implied, as the balancing of ecclesiastical patronage was a skilled and time-
consuming task, with the king always seeking to reward royal servants. However it is 
obvious that lulls in governmental activity would help thoughts to focus on the 
distribution of patronage; general orders to find a suitable benefice could only achieve 
so much. 
Hatfield in fact is likely to have held far more patronage than these entries 
suggest, as far from all royal grants were recorded, and there were other sources of 
patronage. Upon his election to the see of Durham he also had to relinquish the 
canonry and prebend of St. German, in Aberwily; the canonry of York; the church of 
Walsokne, in the diocese of Norwich; and the canonry and prebend of St. Paul's in 
London.^'^ In addition a note in a papal letter of mid 1344 reveals that Hatfield had at 
sometime held the finits of Hadenham, a case which is discussed below,^'* and there 
may well have been other similar benefices that he been forced to relinquish previous to 
his provision to Durham. 
These entries found only in papal records show that Hatfield was not simply 
benefiting from royally held patronage but also from papal provision. Petitions in 
favour of a candidate were sent to the pope, and the more important the petitioner, the 
void deanery prebend or other ecclesiastical benefice in the king's gift which he will accept.' [CPR, 1338-
40. 106,]. 
'^^  E36/204, fol. 99. CPR, 1340-43, 399. 
E36/204, fol. 103v. CPR, 1343-45. 16. 
^'^ CPR, 1343-45, 42. 
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more likely the success of the provision. The petitioner could of course be a member of 
the royal court; indeed Edward's influence in achieving some of Hatfield's papal 
provisions is most likely. Between 1342 and 1366 the king is known to have requested 
49 prebends and dignities, and 20 lesser benefices, of which a total of 41 were for his 
clerks. Alternatively another royal source is possible, with this number being far 
surpassed by both the Black Prince and Lancaster. '^^  
The details of Hatfield's accumulation of ecclesiastical benefices helps complete 
his background, yet fails to distinguish him from other major medieval royal clerks who 
all sought their advancement in a similar way. For example Bishops Bateman, Hatfield, 
Edington, Gynwell and Wyville had all been members, albeit non-resident, of the 
chapter of Lincoln Cathedral.^^" By way of comparison the vast scale of ecclesiastical 
preferment that Bury collated from 1330 to 1333 is worth noting.^^' For example in 
1330 he received the prebends of Wenlocksbom, Penryn, Beauminster, Wells and St. 
Botolphs, in addition to a period as archdeacon of Salisbury. However to say that Bury 
was a more valued clerk because he appears to have gained more benefices would be 
foolhardy. A fiill comparison with the contemporary Kilsby has the potential to be 
more informative. Kilsby, a native of Northamptonshire, gained royal patronage from 
1328 onwards but it was not until January 1335, when he was made receiver of the 
chamber, that there was a large increase in the scale of provision.^^^ This reveals that 
Kilsby, unlike Hatfield, had long been in royal service. However the fuller picture is 
not easy to piece together. Only some of the clerks' benefices are known, and the 
incomes from these are hard to gauge, and additionally it is not clear what rewards were 
received elsewhere. So, though useful, Hatfield's accumulation of ecclesiastical 
patronage does not let us assess to any degree of accuracy, his importance in relation to 
other prominent clerks of his time. 
Most notable in studying Hatfield's gathering of patronage are the problems he 
encountered in the strife over papal provisions. He was involved in three fairly serious 
disputes; over the prebends of first Beer and Charminster, then Buckden and also 
^'^ CPL, 1342-62, 171. 
Pantin, English Church, 49. For discussion of the complex processes involved see ibid., 48-51. 
Aberth, Lisle, 12. 
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Hadenham, which offer some insight into both his character, and also his growing place 
and importance in national and international affairs. 
Before attempting to link together the often perplexing paths of events in these 
disputes, they must be placed in context as they were as much a product of the time, as 
of Hatfield's character. The problem of who had the right to present to a benefice was 
not a new one, and is beyond the scope of this survey.^ "^* Yet what needs to be noted is 
that from the early 1340s it became the source of major confrontation in England, 
between the king and papal provisors who had the support of ecclesiastics in certain 
dioceses.^ "^* The traditional problem of papal provisions was exacerbated by promofion 
of the French royal servant, Pierre Roger, to pope in mid-1342, a fact that Clement V I 
astonishingly later admitted. 
There are a number of reasons why Clement's moves were antagonistic and 
resulted in the Ordinance of Provisors in 1343. Clearly papal provisions threatened 
Edward Ill 's cherished ability to use ecclesiastical patronage to reward his clerks, yet 
this was again nothing new. It has traditionally been suggested that the genesis of the 
ordinance of 1343 lay with parliament, the king already being armed with the suitable 
legal remedies with which to combat the problem.^ ^*' That the commons were 
concerned about the situation is clear but it should come as no surprise that the English 
population were especially sensitive at this time. It was a time of war, and there were 
general expectations of an increase in the intensity of hostilities, and the writings of 
William of Ockham illustrate - surely correctly - that the English saw Clement as biased 
against them in his d e a l i n g s . I n such a climate it is not surprising that there were 
heightened fears that papal provisions were causing the fruits of English benefices to 
flow out of England, and across the channel, only to sustain the armies of her enemies. 
Hence John XXII's numerous provisions, predominantly to Italians, during a later, and 
relatively peaceful, passage of the Hundred Years War resulted in far less outcry than 
Clement VI's. Clement's main error was to give the richest benefices to Frenchmen, at 
a fime when Anglo-French tensions were fast rising. For example, particularly galling 
See for example Pantin, English Church, 30-115 [esp30-80]. 
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were the favours shown to Talleyrand de Perigord, and the benefices of up to 1000 
marks given to two Cardinals Gerald Domar and Aymar Robert.^ ^^ 
However Palmer seems justified in arguing that 'the prosecution of the conflict 
was not an appeasement of the Commons but a direct expression of royal policy.'^^^ 
Easter 1343 and the ordinance do not mark the commencement of Edward's conflict 
against the pope over provisions. In 1342 he had written informing the pope of the right 
of his courts to adjudicate on matters concerning English benefices.^ ^*' Indeed that since 
1340, Hatfield had experienced troubles in his dispute over Beer and Charminster would 
surely have greafly angered his master, as would Kilsby's problems over the 
archbishopric of York; importantly Edward's chosen method of rewarding two of his 
most trusted servants was being denied him. So whilst also presumably sharing many 
of the fears of his subjects, in addition Edward had had one of his most valuable sources 
of patronage challenged. Hence he was more than merely appeasing parliamentary 
concerns. As Palmer notes 'the parliamentary petition [that led to the 1343 Ordinance] 
was useful for strengthening the king's hand in dealing with domestic ecclesiastics and 
with the pope',^^' but it did not mark the start of the problem. 
Once the ordinance was proclaimed, Edward appears to have used his important 
and powerfiil royal clerks to test both his own ecclesiastics and pope Clement. Indeed 
Hatfield was granted the Buckden prebend just two months after the list of abuses was 
drawn up. Edward needed men who because they maintained themselves from his 
patronage, would fight determinedly for the king's right to present. Therefore in this 
sense it was Hatfield's loyalty to the king that drew him into his disputes with Avignon, 
as he was compelled to adopt an aggressive stance. Yet from what we can tell, Hatfield 
was a determined man and would have doubtless been pleased to have, from his 
monarch, such licence and cover to further his own goals. Hatfield was not directly 
involved in the most infamous cases of the time, such as that of the deanery of York, 
which caused parliament to specifically request that someone able to resist Talleyrand 
be granted it.^^^ But he was involved against many of the important papal adherents of 
the time, for example, William de Saxeby who was importantly Talleyrand's proctor.^ ^^ 
A.D.M. Barren, 'The Ordinance of Provisors of 1343', Historical Research (the Bulletin of the 
Institute of Historical Research), Vol. LXIV (\99\),26A, 271. 
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Prebends were benefices in a cathedral chapter, granted to support a member of 
that chapter through the income of a manor belonging to the cathedral. Prebends were 
highly sought after because they could be held in absentia and in pluralism. The dispute 
over Beer and Charminster first occurs in the records on 13 May 1340, three years 
before the ordinance of provisors.^'''' The king issued a prohibition to all ecclesiastical 
persons from proceedings in derogation of his right to present to the prebend, which he 
had lately recovered in his court against the bishop of Salisbury and collated to 
H a t f i e l d . T h e prohibition was Edward's response to the claims made by both the 
bishop and the Pope. No printed record of the case exists, but it is clear that it is part of 
the general policy of the English monarchs in the early years of the fourteenth century, 
whereby a benefice left vacant and then presented by the crown, was regarded as having 
fallen into permanent royal gift, with the king's courts then being used to reinforce this 
new policy.^^^ 
The prebend was vacant in 1337 because Robert de Stratford, who had held it, 
was consecrated as Bishop of Chichester.^ ^^ As a result Robert de Wyville, bishop of 
Salisbury,^^* had claimed the right to the advowson as bishop, and subsequently 
provided for his brother Walter, who was already his treasurer of Salisbury. Pope 
Benedict XII provided for Master Robert de Turre de Adria, an alien, who was presently 
a canon of Salisbury.^ "*^ This provision was, according to a royal writ of February 1341, 
made as the result of a deceitfiil petition from Adria, in which he wrongly claimed to be 
a royal clerk in the king's s e r v i c e . T h i s letter implies that the king would order direct 
action to be used 'for a convenient remedy against this malice'. Presumably this gave 
licence for Hatfield, who was in the country, to use his military muscle to intimidate 
Adria who was 'disturbing' the royal servant by holding the prebend. 
CPR, 1338-40. 509. 
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Adria was soon to become a papal writer and his later death at the apostolic 
see^ "" suggests he was very much a papal adherent. Supporting this interpretation are 
the activities in the locality of Master William de Derby, Reymund Messager and 
Master William de Saxeby, which had resulted in the order for their arrest a few months 
earlier, on January 18 1341.^ "*^  Further details about Derby and Messager are not 
forthcoming but the later was surely of French origin. Though seemingly English, 
Saxeby is revealed as an important papal adherent, with a specialist knowledge of 
judicial procedure. He is noted as later having a number of benefices in provision from 
the Pope. In 1343 he was proctor to five papal cardinals, including the important 
Talleyrand de Perigord, Cardinal of St. Peter's Chains, who defeated Philip de Weston 
in the highly controversial dispute over the deanery of York, and was noted by 
Murimuth as a great enemy of the king's in the papal court.^ '*^ Whether these men were 
ultimately arrested is not ascertainable, but they seem to have had no personal quarrel 
with Hatfield, rather they highlight the operation within England of powerful forces, 
working against the king and in support of papal rights. 
In autumn 1342, the situation was complicated further when the prebend was 
confirmed by the new pope Clement VI , upon another notable papal servant. Master 
William de Veyarco.^'''' The papal letter notes that Veyraco was to gain the prebend 
because of the delay since the original vacancy, a decision evidently made by the late 
Benedict XII some time before the his death on 25 April 1342. Clearly the thinking was 
that a stronger man was needed to defeat Hatfield. Such a papal move was becoming 
increasingly common regarding disputed benefices. When a position was left vacant for 
too long or the incumbent not ordained within a certain time, the pope claimed the 
benefice as his to provide.^''^ This evidently spurred Adria into more decisive action, 
and caused Clement to drop Veyraco, as before the end of 1342 the archbishop of 
Canterbury, and the bishops of London and Salisbury, were ordered to cite Hatfield to 
appear at Avignon i f he had violated the sequestration of Beer and Charminster.^ '*^ It 
CPL, 1342-62, 204. 
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was also stated that Adria was litigating at Avignon, against Walter Wyville, over this 
benefice. 
Deciphering this already confusing dispute is not helped by the possibility of a 
copying error. Virtually the same order is entered on the same date for successive 
years, 1342 and 1343.^ "*^  The details are the same except that the later importantly notes 
that Adria had achieved three sentences against Wyville, and is also stronger in its 
suggestion of Hatfield's guilt and that he, should therefore, be compelled to come to 
Avignon. Ultimately I have interpreted the entries as correctly dated, the explanation 
being that Clement VI waited a year for his reluctant English ecclesiastics to act against 
Hatfield, before once again compelling them to do so.^ "*^  Clement was not successful as 
a further year later, in autumn 1344, Hatfield still detained the prebend; the papal line 
now being that Veyraco had obtained the benefice from Benedict XII and Adria, who 
had since died, had claimed it due to a papal reservation.^^° 
In this 1344 letter the almost ridiculous situation was further clouded by the 
death of one George de Salut.^^' Salut had supposedly claimed that Robert de Stratford 
had despoiled him of Beer and Charminster, and was alive when the benefice was 
granted Veyraco, the effect being to make the cases of Veyraco, Wyville, Adria and 
Hatfield void. This was presumably simply another intrigue - whether based on fact or 
not - conceived to allow Clement the option of choosing another papal candidate for the 
prebend, should Veyraco be thwarted. Thankfiilly after this the case disappears, and by 
1348 the prebend can be simply described as 'void by the death of William de Veyraco, 
Papal Chaplain' with no loose ends.^" 
Interestingly Edward III had not directly challenged the right of the Pope to 
make the provision but rather claimed, it seems quite rightfully, that as Adria had been 
duplicitous his petition should be invalid. Edward's hope in his notification was not 
only the - perhaps vain - hope of turning the Pope against Adria, but also to convince 
his own ecclesiastics that he had acted correctly. This helps illustrate something of the 
home context that these disputes were conducted in. The problems of dual loyalties for 
many English ecclesiastics is borne out by the threatening letter Edward III wrote to his 
'-''Ibid. 
1342 [Ibid.l 1343 [Ibid., 88.]. 
Ibid, 88. 
^^'^ Ibid, 149. 
Salut had also received a prebend of York but had been deprived of it by John de Offord, the king's 
chancellor. Salut was a papal chaplain and seems to have been involved in a number of disputes 
concerning his Pope's rights [Ibid., 182, 255-256.]. 
CPL, 1342-62, 257. 
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trusted servant Richard de Bury, then bishop of Durham, in May 1343?^ "* Bury also 
enjoyed good relations with the papacy, having served on a number of embassies to 
Avignon, and was willing to stand up to his monarch regarding the rights of the church. 
In 1343 Bury was willing to join forces with the bishop of Salisbury against Edward, 
because he had just himself been defeated in a similar dispute over the right to present 
to the church of Greencroft.^^'' Edward's letter noted that Hatfield had 'canonically 
obtained possession' of Beer and Charminster, but still papal bulls had been shown to 
Bury, aiming to subvert this. This was no idle threat; Bury was warned that i f he did 
not back down he would have his temporalities seized. 
It may be tempting to link to the benefice dispute the actions, sometime in 1344, 
of a gang, including John le Kembre, the bailiff of the town of Dorchester, who entered 
Hatfield's fi-ee warren at Charminster in order to hunt. They carried away game, in 
addition to assaulting and badly injuring one John Couting, who was Hatfield's servant, 
and had presumably challenged them.^ ^^ However no suggestion is made to indicate 
that this was anything other than a conventional act of medieval felony and lawlessness, 
against an advantaged clerk, by those who were less privileged. Importantly Hatfield 
would surely not have failed to utilise the opportunity to incriminate papal adherents, 
were there any possibility of a connection to the dispute over Beer and Charminster. 
By looking at the Buckden dispute aspects of the Beer and Charminster case 
become clearer. The diocese of Lincoln was the location for many important disputes. 
As Palmer notes Bishop Thomas Bek's opposition to Edward III over provisors was 
'overt', leading to 'substantial disorder'.'^ ^^ Edward was therefore again asking Hatfield 
to operate in an important arena. Soon after the ordinance of provisors, on 27 June 
1343 Hatfield - already involved in litigation over Beer and Charminster - was 
presented with the prebend of Buckden, in the Church of St. Mary's, of Lincoln.^'^ By 
20 July the council had had to appoint an officer to imprison in Newgate anyone 
challenging the king's right to present to Buckden.^^^ Edward III had secured this by 
defeafing, in his king's court, the bishop of Lincoln, who had also claimed the right. A 
privy seal writ of 25 July 1343 informs us that the king had at some point been misled 
CCR, 1343-46, 118. 
Martin, Bury, 244. 
CCR, 1343-46, 118. 
-^^CPR, 1343-45. 419. 
Palmer, English Law, 41. 
CPR, 1343-45, 42, 
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50 
by false suggestion to ratify the provisor Master Hugh de Walmesford, but upon 
reaHsing his mistake had collated Hatfield to the prebend.'^ *'" 
The threat of incarceration did not subdue Walmesford who attempted to hold 
the prebend in defiance of the king, and neither was Hatfield a man to submit without a 
fight. This was to be quite literally the case; as before the end of 1343 Hatfield and his 
followers reportedly arrested the probably ageing monk,^^' as he set off to Avignon.^^^ 
The despoiling of gold, silver, books, muniments and other goods to the value of 100 
marks, reveals something of the probable nature of his arrest?^^ However Walmesford 
was not left in royal hands for long as some papal supporters forcibly rescued him.^ *''* 
Walmesford's testimony of the event was apparently serious enough for Clement VI to 
threaten the culprits with excommunication. The investigation of the matter was then 
entrusted to Lincoln's chancellor, subdean, and to Master Simon de Islep, who was a 
canon there. After viewing their findings Master Bernard de Novodompno, papal 
chaplain and auditor, was to hear and terminate the matter.^ ^^ Thus there is little doubt 
that this was a very serious dispute. 
However as it is not clear i f Hatfield was ever excommunicated, it may be 
questioned whether Walmesford embellished his version of events somewhat. 
Nevertheless given Hatfield's warlike nature his participafion in, or at least 
authorisation of, such a callous attack is certainly quite feasible. Later as bishop of 
Durham Hatfield had to apply to Edward III for a formal acquittance over his supposed 
involvement in an attack upon Thomas de Salkeld, titular bishop of Chrysopolis and 
assistant to the Archbishop of York.^^^ Indeed Hatfield may well have made such a 
move against Adria in 1341, but this has not left its mark on available records. 
Furthermore, there is some suggestion that Hatfield may have been involved in 
criminal activity in the past. It is not impossible that the Thomas de Hatfield mentioned 
in May 1321, as having been part of a brutal felony, may have been a very youthful 
later-to-be-bishop of Durham. Building upon this possible suggestion of a criminal 
past is the oyer and terminer commission of February 1339 sent to exact justice against 
Ibid.. 108. Whether Hatfield had been momentarily ousted or only came into the picture afterwards 
cannot be concluded from the writ. 
Walmesford is noted as having died at the Apostolic see in autumn 1344. He had also held the 
canonry and prebend of St. Chad's, Shrewsbury [CPL, 1342-62, 149.]. 
^^^Ibid., 138. 
Ibid. 
Palmer, English Law, 42. 
^^-CPL. 1342-62, m. 
BaneW, Papacy, 190. 
^''^ CPR. 1317-21,606. Hatfield's age is discussed below. 
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amongst others, a certain chaplain Thomas de Hatfield, who was alleged to have broken 
into one William Moton's close, at Wimington, and carried away his goods?*"^  As the 
name Thomas de Hatfield would not have been uncommon, too much should not be 
made of these suggestions,^ ^^ yet criminal churchmen were not unheard of during 
Edward Ill 's reign.^ *^^  We cannot be exactly sure when the felony noted in the 1339 
commission is alleged to have occurred, and by February of that year our Hatfield had 
been in royal service for over a year, and could perhaps have expected to be named as 
king's clerk. It could also be argued that having already obtained a number of benefices, 
this is unlikely to have been our Hatfield, as he would have had less need to resort to 
illegal activities for his livelihood. Alternatively, a more compelling interpretation is 
perhaps that Hatfield would have felt protected by his new status, as the examples of 
Molyns and Bradestan, two men with whom he was associated, help highlight. 
Ultimately it is likely that there was a skirmish of some description, as 
Walmesford's subsequent rescue indicates that he to had some stout and hardy 
supporters. What reason was there for such an altercation? The papal excommunication 
letter states that Walmesford was on the way to the apostolic see, and the evidence that 
he died a year later at Avignon may be seen to corroborate this. Yet it is hard to tell i f 
Walmesford's desire to leave England existed in advance of his arrest. It is most 
unlikely that the English monk was fleeing to France with the fruits of the prebend, in 
order to supply Philip VI's armies. Though he may simply have been taking them away 
for his own use and the reclaiming of this income may have been Hatfield's motive. 
Although it was stated that a hundred pounds was taken, this cannot be taken as an 
accurate reflection of the value of goods actually purloined. But it does however 
suggest that the monk may have been travelling with many of his possessions when he 
was arrested. However this does not necessarily mean that he was on his way to 
Avignon at this point. Yet regardless of Hatfield's action the situation was becoming 
increasingly hostile for papal adherents. Indeed most likely is that Walmesford had 
simply decided in advance to return to the safety of Avignon and litigate fi-om there. 
Hence, most probably, the arrest was initially just part of Edward's policy of keeping 
English disputes in England, but it then escalated due to the nature of the parties 
involved. 
CPR, 1343-45. 274. 
A glance at any fourteenth century English record illustrates that Thomas was a common name at this 
time. Also Hatfield appears to have been far from unique as a place name. For example Edward III had a 
manor at Hatfield in the south. 
-™ See Aberth, Lisle. 
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Whatever the true nature of the arrest, it is clear that the importance of 
Hatfield's potential excommunication would not have been lost on the Pope. It can 
therefore be interpreted as something of a calculated move on Clement's part. By 
threatening Hatfield's very salvation, something to which he was later to devote a great 
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amount of time and money, the pope was making a most forcefiil attempt to drive one 
of Edward's most trusted servants into breaking his monarch's demand that no English 
ecclesiastic submit to A v i g n o n . I f he wanted to rid himself of this threat Hatfield was 
cited to appear before the pope within three months. 
Nevertheless the supposed excommunication failed to conclude the issue in any 
way. On 30 August 1344 Edward sent out almost the same order as he had a year 
previously to arrest those questioning his rights over Buckden,^ '^* and though 
Walmesford promptly died, as the case of Beer and Charminster shows there was no 
hope that this would allow Hatfield to emerge victorious. Clement did not disappoint; 
swiftly providing to Buckden, Master Thomas Fastolf D.C.L., and auditor of the papal 
p a l a c e . T h i s is an example of the typical papal practice of surrogation, whereby a 
claimant replaced another who had died or tired of the struggle. 
Hatfield's final benefice dispute case was over Hadenham. In mid 1344 Hatfield 
was noted in a papal letter as having held the finiits of Hadenham in the past - the 
implication being that this was no longer the case - though no dates are recorded.^ ^^ 
Problems occurred after the king had recovered the presentation of the benefice from 
the bishop of Ely, due to a vacancy.^ ^^ Edward III presented John de Martham, who 
after a time died. This was presumably not during a vacancy, as the then bishop of Ely, 
Simon Montague,^^' took his chance to assert his right to present. That his choice was 
Thomas de Hatfield is reflective of the time, i f it was not at the behest of his monarch it 
See Barker, 'Death and the Bishop'. 
Palmer, English Law, 36. 
CPL. 1342-62. 138. 
Ibid., 407. 
CPL. 1342-62, 183, The letter notes that there was still a suit between Hatfield and Walmesford. 
BaneW, Papacy, 177. 
'"CPZ., 1342-62. 171. 
For insights into this case I am particularly indebted to Palmer's brief outlining of the case, due to his 
use of documents unavailable to me [Palmer, English Law, 311.]. 
"™ Simon Montague was brother of William, later Earl of Salisbury, who was possibly Hatfield's master 
before 1336. Montague's pontificate in Ely ran from June 1337 until his death in June 1345, having been 
translated from Worcester, having been bishop there since 1334 [British Chronology, 222.]. 
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was clearly a pacifying move, made in recognition of past problems and to express 
support for Edward in a time of tension with the episcopate.^ ^*' 
However a certain Henry de Harwedon was already in possession of Hadenham. 
Though somewhat predictably in light of the attacks noted above, the forcefiil royal 
clerk, Hatfield, soon drove him fi-om the benefice. It is not stated that Harwedon was a 
provisor but it seems highly probable given the current climate, especially as an inquest 
of November 1345 later found that Harwedon was attempting to recover Hadenham 
from the king in the papal c o u r t s . B e f o r e 1344 Harwedon had gained restitution 
against Montague and the prior of Ely was then, as a result, instructed to restore 
Hadenham to him. Ultimately Hatfield's role in this case was limited, and during 
1344 his interest in his three disputed benefices seems to have wavered. 
Until 1344 Hatfield can only be seen as a true papal enemy. His threatened 
excommunication in late 1343, was simply the nadir of a series of antagonistic moves 
against the papacy, yet this very soon began to change. At the start of 1344 the pope 
wrote to Thomas de Bradestan on a number of issues, amongst these was his acceptance 
of the recommendation of Thomas Hatfield, which had been made by Bradestan, 
seemingly on behalf of the king. After this the threat of excommunication seems to 
disappear, and Hatfield is simply noted as being involved in litigation over Buckden, 
and Beer and Charminster, even though the pope continued to endeavour to make 
provision of the prebends elsewhere.^ ^" Having fought so hard for these benefices 
Hatfield allowed them to fall out of his hands. This was because he expected greater 
reward, and in order to achieve this it was essential that there at least be the pretence 
that he was no longer an enemy of Avignon. 
Ultimately Hatfield's disputes were exacerbated by his nature but were also very 
much a product of their context. Hence the dispute over Buckden, which was 
For a detailed general assessment of the situation, see Palmer, English Law, 28-53., and Barrell, 'The 
Ordinance of Provisors of 1343'. 
CPR, 1343-45, 88, 399. 
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something of a test case for the ordinance of 1343, came to a head more quickly and 
violently than that over Beer and Charminster, which had its genesis before the 
antagonisms after Pierre Roger's election. 
55 
Part VII - Training for Durham: Hatfield's military 
career pre-1345 
As noted above it is in a military sense that the choice of Hatfield as bishop of 
Durham makes the most sense, and therefore it is important to assess his credentials as a 
soldier when he started to be considered for the position. Thomas de Hatfield has been 
described as the bishop Odo of his age,^ ^^  and clearly thought of himself first and 
foremost, as a warrior. Though his burial effigy depicts him in his episcopal vestments, 
this was entirely in keeping with the rest of the English episcopate, and as such should 
not be seen as a representation of self-image.^^^ More instructive is Hatfield's striking 
round seal that depicts himself as a knight arrayed for battle on his warhorse.^ **^  
Traditionally bishops, like women, used oval seals, but this appears not to have rested 
well with Hatfield's warlike n a t u r e . A f t e r entering Edward Ill 's service Hatfield 
spent most of his time both home and abroad with his king.^^^ Therefore it is possible, 
by using the chancery rolls and wardrobe accounts, in addition to Edward's known 
movements, to build up a picture of Hatfield's military career from 1337 until 1345. 
Hatfield is revealed as a more than competent soldier, in all senses of the word, even i f 
it is perhaps hard - from just these documents - to truly separate him from other 
militarily minded clerks also employed in Edward Ill 's civil service. 
The first evidence of his military career is Hatfield's employment reconstructing 
castles in Scotland in late 1337. It is not certain whether he had taken an active part in 
the campaigning that preceded this. Given the importance of the rebuilding tasks it is 
likely that Hatfield had some previous experience through the 1330s. I f the link to 
Salisbury can be substantiated it would make this all the more likely, as Montague spent 
much of this period fighting in Scotland.^^" It is possible that Hatfield then remained in 
Scotland during the winter 1337-8, although his lack of pay suggests he returned south 
with Edward's court. February and March saw offensives in Scotland under the 
'^^ ^ Highfield, 'The English Hierarchy in the Reign of Edward III', 135. 
Barker, 'Death and the Bishop', 15. 
Ibid., 11. 
However Hatfield's seal was not unique at this time amongst the episcopate. It was the 'first of the 
round privy seals used by the bishops of Durham' [W. Greenwell and C.H. Hunter-BIair, Durham Seals 
(Newcastle, 1911), 460.] but Bury had some round seals [I would like to thank Alan Piper for this 
information.]. 
For example see for the period 22 July 1338 to 4 Oct 1339 Hatfield was only paid for one absence of 
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command of Arundel and Salisbury, culminating in the siege of Dunbar, that achieved 
little and was abandoned by the start of June.^ '^ Yet evidence for Hatfield's 
participation is lacking. The ascripfion to him of a warlike nature indicates that he 
would have wished to be involved, should the king's administration have been able to 
cope without him. But that Hatfield had just entered the king's service would surely 
have necessitated his presence in the south, and it is indeed possible that he had an 
important role in planning the Walton ordinances. 
A role for Hatfield in the terrible plundering and wasting on Edward's French 
campaigning through September and October 1339, is supported by the payments made 
at places deep into enemy territory that have been detailed above. Plundering of enemy 
lands and actions directed against non-combatants, appear horrific to the modem mind, 
and totally out of keeping with chivalric ideals of what it was to be a medieval soldier, 
but this was not the case. They were essential to attempt to draw armies into battle and 
to lift sieges. Writing on such measures employed by Henry de Grosmont, Duke of 
Lancaster, Bamie comments that 'such acts were justified by contemporary laws of war 
and were in no way thought to detract from Henry's chivalry.'^^^ Hatfield would have 
surely become well versed in this aspect of warfare, as it was at the forefront of 
Edward's tactics, for example being used effectively when Hatfield campaigned with 
Edward III , in France in 1345 and 1355, and in Scotland in 1356. 
I f the tactic could guarantee misery of local inhabitants for the next few years, it 
could not always guarantee its main aim in a pitched battle, and this was something of 
which Hatfield would become all too aware. Hatfield was denied a major battle when 
Philip declined to join battle at La Capelle on 23 October, even though both sides were 
already arrayed. Hatfield was most likely being in the centre with King Edward and his 
household. '^'^  His disappointment would have been particularly keenly felt as he had 
achieved an important personal milestone in being raised to barmeret in the traditional 
pre-battle honours.^ '^* 
Hatfield's administrative abilities were surely put to good use in the organisation 
of sieges, yet these were ultimately to fail to provide him with the pitched battle he 
Sumption, Trial by Battle. 234-237. 
J. Bamie, War in Medieval Society: Social Values and the Hundred Years War 1337-1399 (London, 
1974), 59. 
Sumption, Trial by Battle, 288. 
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Ferrers, Robert Ufford the younger, Maurice Berkley [Norwelt, 325-355. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 
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surely longed for to prove himself. At the end of September 1339 he was surely outside 
Cambrai when the siege failed to bring the French king to battle, and then surely played 
his part when the English and their allies responded by spreading out to create a fast 
moving 20 mile wide fi-ont, with the aim to maximise destruction. Hatfield was most 
likely with Edward III , and the Earl of Derby, who followed the course of the Upper 
Scheldt Valley. Their sole major resistance came fi'om a garrison of Honnecourt Castle; 
a ful l scale pitched battle being avoided as Edward sought a more definitive 'trial by 
battle' involving his adversary, Philip VI.^^^ A year later in 1340 Hatfield was involved 
in another siege, this time of Toumai, where the countryside was also savaged in an -
again ultimately futile - attempt to draw the French into trying to relieve the siege. 
In summer 1340 Hatfield sailed with Edward's fleet back to the continent, and 
thus was surely heavily involved in the naval battle of Sluys on 24 June. The fighting 
was described as 'ferocious and horrible' by Froissart, ships becoming locked together 
and hand-to-hand combat ensuing, which involved all onboard. This assessment of the 
battle is borne out by Edward himself receiving a thigh wound, that necessitated two 
weeks rest aboard the Cog Thomas?'^^ Such a battle would have allowed Hatfield to 
prove himself but would not have offered the chance for the pomp and ceremony of 
which his eulogy suggests he was so fond; at Sluys there was surely no pretence that 
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medieval warfare was anything other than a horrific bloodbath. 
As will be clear fi-om the examples already listed, though Hatfield's probable 
presence can be remarked upon, it is most difficult to move fi-om this to assess just how 
valuable this presence actually was. Despite the evidence assembled, it is not 
impossible that Hatfield could have been little more than a desk clerk, who though 
skilled at the organisation of war, was perhaps merely competent in combat situations. 
Nevertheless some impression that this was not the case may be provided by the 
growth of his retinue, though this could arguably have been an attempt to cloak his 
inadequacies in majesty. In the first two months of 1340, Hatfield received £14 13s 4d, 
to pay for himself as a banneret, the 13 squires he commanded, and their 44 horses.^ ^^ 
Philip Weston had only 15 horses, but these were for himself, a knight and two squires 
Sumpdon, Trial by Battle. 278-281. 
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only, indicating perhaps that Weston was less interested in having a body of men to 
lead. The retinue of William Kilsby - whose willingness to fight is highlighted by his 
death in 1346, in the disease ridden camp outside Calais, when he had already lost his 
official place in government - serves to put Hatfield's retinue at this point into 
perspective. In early 1340 Kilsby had a mighty 102 horses, and employed another 
banneret, two knights and 28 armed squires.^"" Before returning to the continent in the 
summer of 1340, Hatfield is noted as receiving a further £154 14s 1 Id for his refinues' 
service abroad.^ '*' For the second period of service abroad in 1340 he received £72, 
when most of those named received approximately £10, though the magnates were paid 
considerably more, Reginald de Cobeham, for example, received £400.^°^ 
In 1341 an expedition was plarmed in detail, the most likely destination being 
Flanders, and though Hatfield cannot be clearly identified on the extant scheme 
manuscript, it is likely that this is due to its condition.^"^ On 18 July in order to finance 
his retinue of 16 esquires, 3 knights, and himself as banneret, along with 100 mounted 
archers, Hatfield was promised 27 sacks of wool from Co. Kent.^ '^* The wool grant was 
made due to cover wages for the forty days of service. Once again the make up of 
Hatfield's retinue was much the same as Weston's. After the failure to take an army to 
the continent, Edward directed his attention to Scotland in the winter 1341-2. Hatfield 
served as a banneret, with 2 knights and 11 squires, for 54 days, from 25 November 
until 13 January 1342,^°^ in Edward's 'barren show of f o r c e ' . I t is highly possible 
that he was part of the force of 11 household bannerets who relieved Stirling, as having 
worked there he would have known the area.^°^ 
^""/A/Vf., 386-387. 
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For 185 days service in Brittany, lasting from 15 August 1342 unfil 15 February 
1343, Hatfield received £235 IQs."*^ ^ His retinue consisted of himself as banneret, 3 
other knights and 16 squires. For clerks serving as bannerets a retinue of approximately 
20 appears standard, although Hatfield can perhaps be seen as the most important, at 
least militarily, as he had more knights in his pay.^°^ The commencement of Hatfield's 
paid service coincides with Northampton's embarkation from Portsmouth; apparently 
placing him in the advanced party that achieved such glory in freeing the channel of the 
last of the Genoese galleys that had plagued the English from 1338, and in addition 
relieved Brest.^'^ However suspicions are immediately raised as the King had remained 
in England, and as keeper of the secret seal Hatfield had never sfrayed far from his side. 
Indeed, as Ayton has noted, here Edington's wardrobe account book 'seems a most 
imperfect guide'.^" 
In fact it seems certain that Hatfield remained in England until autumn when he 
left with Edward and the main part of the army. Given their vital administrative role in 
raising troops, supplies,^and their transports, Edward could i l l afford to let his clerks 
campaign before all the organisation for the main army was complete, no matter their 
military aspirations or expertise. A letter included in Jean le Bel's chronicle illustrates 
how Hatfield was one of the clerks in charge of this organisation.""^ Kilsby is known to 
have sailed with Northampton, but his star was fading. He had been replaced as keeper 
of privy seal, and was therefore no longer shackled by his administrative role.^''* 
Hatfield had previously also revealed himself as a skilled organiser prior to conflict in 
1341. Hatfield appears to have had a large part in the collecrion of wool, not only for 
his own force but also for others. On 10 November he was ordered to de-arrest 8 sacks 
of wool of those which he had arrested at the house of William Curtsey, which were 
said to be part of the 200 sacks of County Essex assigned to William and Walter de 
E36/204, fol. 103v. £4 1 Is having been deducted for 81 days during which one of the squires was 
absent. 
As in 1341 Hatfield had the same ratios (1 banneret, 3 knights, 16 squires) within his contingent of 20 
men-at-arms. Weston was himself banneret, and had 2 knights, 19 squires. Edington was a banneret, and 
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Kilsby. There is no sign that this was a major dispute. It is simply a case of Hatfield 
reluctantly returning what was no longer needed for the campaign.^ 
Once in Brittany in 1342, Edward's force made swift progress until it reached 
Roche-Periou, a garrison of Charles of Blois, yet no siege was necessary to secure 
surrender. Logistical problems at Vannes were followed on 29 November 1342 by an 
unsuccessfial attempt to storm the town, therefore another long siege now had to ensue. 
Once again Hatfield surely participated in the brutal plundering of the hinterland, but 
neither side truly cared, at this time, for a pitched battle. The result was the treaty of 
Malestroit, sealed on 19 Jan 1343, which stated that a truce was to last until 29 
September 1346, '^^  and this uUimately marked the end of Hatfield's soldiering before 
he became bishop. 
"'CC«, 1341-43. 313. 
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Chapter II = 'If the king had asked for an 
ass, he would have received his wish, this time'. 
Thomas de Hatfield's gaining of Durham's 
episcopal throne 
When Bishop Bury died on 14 April 1345, Edward III had already taken steps to 
ensure that the vacant see of Durham would be filled quickly with his loyal keeper of 
the privy seal, Thomas de Hatfield. This was not an unexpected vacancy, which would 
have caught anyone unaware. Bury was fifty-eight years old, and building on the 
evidence in the bishop's eulogy, Denholm-Young has suggested that for much of the 
last three years of his life he may have been a i l ing .^When Edward wrote to Clement 
V I on the 12 April 1345, simply recommending Hatfield,^he must have received news 
that Bury's last breath would now certainly be soon drawn. It will be argued that some 
agreement or knowing, no matter how vague or fi-agile, had already been reached with 
Clement V I as to the destination of the see of Durham. It is telling that Edward felt 
neither the need to specify what he was recommending his servant for, nor waste time 
waiting for Bury's death to be confirmed. 
In fact Hatfield seems to have been seriously groomed as a future member of the 
episcopate for at least a year and a half As noted above, on 2 January 1344 the pope 
had accepted an earlier general recommendation of Hatfield, which had been presented 
by Thomas de Bradestan and the king.^'^ And although this was possibly more 
specifically aimed to free Hatfield from the immediate threat of excommunication, few 
could have doubted that Edward I I I would have wanted to make Hatfield a bishop. 
Indeed though we cannot be certain whether Edward had already earmarked him as the 
next bishop of Durham, the king must have been struck by Hatfield's suitability to fill 
the northern border palatinate, which was, in all probability, conveniently soon to fall 
vacant. 
This first recommendation was made as Bradestan developed a rapport with 
Clement on his visit to the Roman court in the autumn of 1343, as an ambassador to 
'^^  Sumption, Trial by Battle. 405-407. 
Denholm-Young, 'Bury', 154. Martin, Bwy, 259. The nature of the illness is unknown. 
Foedera, iii, 35. 
^'"^ CPL 1342-62. 4. 
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work for an Anglo-French peace.^^° Bradestan was not a major figure by birth, yet he 
seems to have enjoyed a close personal relationship with Edward, after playing a large 
part in Mortimer and Isabella's fall.^^' But importantly this was no simple favour for an 
unknown clerk. Bradestan was heavily connected with the chamber and therefore must 
have worked closely with Hatfield. In 1328 he was noted as scutifer in the royal 
household, and soon after his return to England he was made Chamberlain, holding the 
office until 1345.^ ^^ 
The 2 January 1344 letter informs us that Clement V I had entrusted Bradestan to 
bring papal letters to Edward. It praises him for 'what he has done to increase the 
king's devotion to the Roman church', and desires him to send news fi'om England.^ ^^ 
Clearly both Clement and Edward were using Bradestan as a bargaining tool, as after 
the request for news comes Clement's acceptance of Hatfield's recommendation. The 
suggestion is that the two were linked: by accepting Hatfield the Pope surely hoped to 
foster better Anglo-Papal relations. Clement was left with little choice but to accept 
Bradestan and Edward's recommendation. Whatever his reservations about Hatfield, 
they had to be sacrificed for the great objective of peace in northern Europe. For 
despite his connections with France, Clement's desire for an end to the Anglo-France 
conflict seems genuine.^ "^* Judging by the Pope's subsequent attempts to use Hatfield as 
a potential way to influence the king, Clement probably decided that in Hatfleld he 
could either have an enemy close to Edward, or a man who felt to a degree indebted to 
the Pope. 
How far this worked is debatable, even though on 12 October 1344 Clement 
commended Hatfield for his labours touching the reformation of peace, and urged him 
to continue them.^ ^^ This part of the campaign by Clement V I saw similar letters sent to 
the Earl of Derby, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and John de Gonouzell, in the first 
days of October 1344. The pope had realised that John Offord's delegation had limited 
scope to broker a peace treaty, so he sought to influence Edward through those 
See CPL, 1342-62, 2. On this trip Bradestan asked for and was granted the right to a portable altar, and 
to receive plenary remission upon the hour of his death [Ibid.. 144, 146. CPP, 1342-1419. 22.]. He also 
petitioned for and was granted benefices for Master Thomas de Bredon and John de Welboum [CPP. 
1342-1419, 22, 39.]. By 1345 the Pope noted that a hundred days in purgatory could be negated by 
visiting one of Bradestan's three chaplainces in the Chapel of St. Michael's, in his home township [CPL. 
1342-62, 169.]. 
Waugh, England in the reign of Edward III, 160. J. Vale, Edward III and Chivalry: Chivalric Society 
and its Context, 1270-1350 (Woodbridge, 1982), 61. 
Ibid. Chapters, vi, 46. 
CPL, 1342-62, 4. 
See Wood, 'Clement'. 
CPL, 1342-62. 11. 
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immediately around him. Importantly by this time Hatfield was acting as keeper of the 
privy seal in Offord's absence and was deeply involved in Anglo-papal diplomacy. 
December 1344 saw Hatfield amongst many top officials, earls, and bishops who were 
requested to receive favourably the two papal nuncios, who had come to discuss the 
Anglo-French situation and also the Ordinance of Provisors.^^^ Hatfield was then 
amongst those informed, by a letter sent on 30 January 1345, that the pope had not sent 
the nuncios to 'publish processes and fulminate sentences in England', as rumour had 
suggested. The pope hoped that the receivers of the letters could 'induce the king by 
peaceful means to revoke novelties attempted against the church.'^^^ 
Between Bradestan's departure for Avignon and Hatfield's eventual provision to 
Durham in 1345, only Hereford and Norwich of all the English and Welsh bishoprics 
became vacant. Hereford fell vacant on 11 January 1344. That on 23 February 1344 
John Trilleck was able to gain the see by election^^^ suggests that it was not especially 
valuable or politically important.^^^ Trilleck's subsequent career is in accordance with 
his more traditionally religious appointment.^^" Both Hatfield and Edward would have 
regarded Hereford as neither a fitting use of Hatfield's abilities nor a satisfactory 
reward. 
Norwich may have been viewed as a slightly more appealing possibility, when it 
became vacant upon the death of Anthony Bek on 13 December 1343. A papal 
provision on 23 January 1344 gave Norwich to William Bateman, and led Edward to 
object to the pope.^ '^ However, although Bateman had served the pope for a time,^^^ 
the English king's problem with him appears to have been in no way personal. Indeed 
Bateman had followed a traditional path to Edward Ill's episcopate^^^ by undertaking a 
large amount of royal service. Bateman has been described as 'the most notable of the 
'-^ CPL. 1342-62, 12. Barrell, 'Ordinance of Provisors', 275. 
CPL, 1342-62, 15. Letters were also sent to Edward ill, his queen Isabella, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, William de Kildesby, the Earl of Derby and his steward, and the Earl of Lancaster. 
^'^^ British Chronology, 230. 
This is the last known election that was not subsequently quashed by provision [Highfield, 'English 
Hierarchy under Edward III', 123]. 
His register suggests he took a keen, and indeed resident, interest in the pastoral well being of his 
diocese, whilst also maintaining a hall at Oxford, that later became New College [Ibid., 125]. 
British Chronology, 243. Aberth, Lisle, 16. 
Highfield, 'English Hierarchy', 117, [auditor of causes in the papal court] 121. 
Bateman along with Hatfield, Edington, Gynwell and Wyville had been a member, albeit non-resident, 
of the chapter of Lincoln Cathedral [Aberth, Lisle, 12.]. 
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royal envoys in the negotiations o f the first decade of the French war',^^'' and there is 
every reason to believe that Edward would have been happy with Clement's choice, 
except for the very fact that it was Clement's choice/^^ Nevertheless Edward had long 
set out his stall on papal provisions, and any very minor inclinations that he might have 
had to accept this particular papal provisor, would surely have buckled in the early 1344 
climate o f parliamentary pressure regarding Clementine provisions.^"^^ Yet nothing 
suggests that Edward ever had any plans to place Hatfield in Norwich. 
It is most tempting to suggest that Edward and Hatfield were almost waiting for 
Bury to die f rom as early as Bradestan's papal mission, i f not before. As noted above 
the bishop of Durham was increasingly being thought o f as a guardian o f the north. 
Martin suggests that in his efforts regarding Scotland, Bury may ' in many 
respects...even surpass the contributions of. . . [his] greatest predecessor, Anthony 
Bek'."^ Yet though we have no direct evidence o f dissatisfaction fi-om the king 
himself, it seems clear that Bury was finding it increasingly diff icul t to live up to 
Edward's expectations. Whilst as late as August 1344 Edward commanded Bury to 
gather together five hundred Durham hobelers and send them to Newcastle to help repel 
any Scottish invasion, as is noted above, Bury had by this time fallen back to paying o f f 
the Scots.^^^ Though Edward's plans for the northem frontier were largely defensive, 
this does not mean the north would not benefit fi-om a more active bishop o f Durham. 
Bishop Bury had himself been something o f a pacifist, bemoaning the destruction that 
war inflicted upon books, which he so highly valued."^ However Bury was a skilled 
administrator and had therefore been more than adequate in organising the defence o f 
the north,^'*" yet as Hatfield was an all round soldier, he was surely expected by Edward 
to surpass even Bury's efforts. 
The nature o f the situation had helped Bury during his first years as bishop o f 
Durham. In 1333, the year before his consecrafion, the battle o f Halidon H i l l had been a 
Highfield, 'English Hierarchy under Edward III', 129. For a full review of Bateman see A.H. 
Thompson, 'William Bateman, bishop of Norwich, 1344-55', Norfolk and Norwich Archaeological 
Journal, xxv (1935-37), 102-37. 
Later tensions between the two were a product of the provision, and Bateman's debt to Clement 
[Palmer, English Law, 48-52.]. 
'^ ^ Aberth, Lisle, 16. Seven days after Bateman's provision at Avignon, on the 30 January 1344 Edward 
issued a proclamation against provisors to be made throughout England [Barreil, 'Ordinance of 
Provisors', 271.]. 
Ibid., 151. 
Martin, Bury, 150-51. Campbell, 'England, Scotland', 211. 
Martin, Bury, 265. 
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most decisive English victory. Indeed it seemed that Edward would have needed few 
more military initiatives in Scotland, as his puppet Balliol appeared secure.^ "*' A t the 
time o f Bury's appointment, Edward was still focusing upon Scotland and launched 
destructive campaigns, in 1334, 1335 and 1336.^''^ As the presence of the government 
administration in York indicates; the north was the centre o f operations, rather than 
some peripheral frontier. This does not mean Bury's appointment to Durham did not 
recognise the importance o f defence. In fact Martin portrays the need for Bury to act as 
a 'guardian o f the north', as the primary reason for his promotion, and this may well be 
the case. However the situation was vastly different from that a little over a decade 
later. With so many other warriors in the north Edward surely envisaged Bury having 
to do little more than the, admittedly vital, behind the scenes role. 
The switch o f focus to France in the late 1330s changed the role that the bishop 
of Durham would ideally play. As Edward's interest in the north dwindled so did his 
fortunes: as Rogers notes 1336-1346 was a particularly 'terrible' time for the north.^'*^ 
The Balliol position in Scotland crumbled and Scottish raids severely limited the 
potential to trade, helping cause great economic hardships in combination with 
burdensome war taxation, and recurrent livestock disease. Some instances o f poverty 
must be treated with scepticism, as applicants sought to use the raids as an excuse to 
extort financial aid from the government. However the overall impression is o f 
destruction, i f not quite on a scale to match that o f Robert Bruce's raids, during the 
turbulent reign o f Edward 11.^ '*'' Hence the situation in the north in 1344-5 was rather 
different f rom that just over a decade earlier. Therefore as Bury fell increasingly i l l , 
Edward I I I must have been pleased that he had an obvious candidate for bishop of 
Durham, in the apparently more dynamic military man, Thomas de Hatfield. 
At the end o f the thirteenth century, one o f Hatfield's illustrious predecessors as 
bishop o f Durham, Anthony Bek, is reported as upsetting a number o f knights who 
suggested that ' i t is not for you, bishop, to teach us about knightly matters, when you 
should be saying mass'.^ "*^ It is highly unlikely many men would have felt this in regard 
to Hatfield, his military career was distinguished and his retinue sizeable. In fact 
For example, see his hectic program of duties between March and November 1340, which included the 
raising of troops and collecting of subsidies [bid., 269-70.]. 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 61. 
Ibid., 28. 
C.J. Rogers, 'The Scottish Invasion of 1346', Northern History, xxxiv (1998), 52. 
See J. Campbell, 'England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War in the Fourteenth Century,' The 
Wars of Edward III - Sources and Interpretations, ed. C.J. Rogers (Woodbridge, 1999), 211. J. 
Scammell, 'Robert I and the North of England', EHR, cclxxxviii (1958), 385-402. 
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Hatfield's appointment should perhaps be seen as an attempt to invigorate the northern 
lords, by giving them a real warrior as their bishop, and in doing so show them that he 
had not forgotten the north as a result o f his efforts in France. It was also something o f 
a warning to the Scots who would surely learn f rom their spies and general rumour, o f 
the difference between the dying Bury - who had been wi l l ing to pay them o f f - and the 
formidable Hatfield, the impact o f which should not be understated. 
Negotiations in England in the spring o f 1345, between Edward I I I and the two 
papal nuncios, saw some improvement in Anglo-Papal relations.^'*'' In a letter to 
Clement sent on 23 February 1345, Edward 'allayed a number o f fears based on a 
misconception o f events o f the parliament o f 1344,'^ '*^ whilst stating that he did not 
wish to sacrifice his own rights. Soon after the nuncios' return to Avignon,^'*^ on 5 
Apr i l 1345, the pope promised to make less use o f his right to provide than he had since 
his accession.^''^ Although both were still at pains to emphasis their rights, Clement and 
Edward displayed in early 1345 an apparent wish to adopt a less antagonistic attitude to 
each other. 
The letters sent from Avignon during this period show Hatfield heavily involved 
in the proceedings. For example, as noted above, in the papal letter o f December 1344 
Hatfield - who is described as 'king's secretary' - is listed among many top officials, 
earls and bishops, who were requested to receive the nuncios favourably and encourage 
the king to listen to them.^^" Hence, with Bury increasingly unwell it is almost certain 
that some sounding out o f papal attitudes would have occurred regarding a prospective 
promotion o f Hatfield to the palatinate o f Durham. To neglect to reach some form o f 
agreement, albeit it probably little more than an unwritten understanding, would have 
been extremely naive in the circumstances. Bury's condition strongly indicated that the 
major see o f Durham, would provide one of, i f not, the first episcopal tests o f the 
current 'working' relationship. Notably, that Edward simply recommended Hatfield in 
Apr i l 1345 offers weighty support to this interpretation. 
"^•^  C M . Fraser, A History of Anthony Bek: Bishop of Durham. 1283-1311 (Oxford, 1957), 231. 
"^"^  Pantin, English Church, 83-85. Aberth, Lisle, 16-17. Barrell, 'Ordinance of Provisors', 274-5. 
'^'^  Barrell 'Ordinance of Provisors', 275. Barrell notes in this article how Edward III mainly used the 
1343 ordinance rather than the later statutes. Most of whose measures the king did not in fact take up. 
The nuncios were licensed to leave on the 22 February 1345, [Barrell, Papacy, 196.] and so surely had 
reached the pope in advance of the 5 April. 
Barrell 'Ordinance of Provisors', 275. 
^'"CPL, 1342-62, 12. 
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Yet i f this was the case then why on 23 Apr i l 1345 did Edward I I I grant conge 
d'elire to the Durham chapter after Bury's death?^^' Would Clement V I not have seen 
this as an immediate breach o f faith? Before these questions are addressed the details o f 
the election w i l l be discussed briefly. After his grant, royal pressure was applied to the 
chapter to elect Hatfield, the royal couple no doubt being especially determined to avoid 
the strife that had preceded Bury's appointment in 1333,"*^^  and the problems that 
ultimately ended in the failure to gain for Wil l iam Kilsby, the Archbishopric o f York.^^^ 
Murimuth's chronicle suggests that the Durham monks had Hatfield forced upon 
them.^^'' Although there is no evidence indicating that the Durham monks proposed an 
alternative candidate, a letter o f Queen Philippa's to Prior Fossour indicates just how 
heavily leant upon the whole locality seems to have been.^ ^^ Two days in advance o f 
her husband's granting o f conge d'elire, the Queen wrote to Fossour, noting how 
already the king, Richard Talbot,^^^ and Robert Chickwell^" had sent letters to the 
priory, which were presumably all in support o f Hatfield. The tone o f Philippa's letter 
is polite but makes clear that the monks were expected to accept the nomination o f 
Hatfield: the Queen noting that Fossour and his monks 'should not ignore this in 
anyway and accomplish i t and answer these our p r a y e r s ' . C l e a r l y Edward was only 
wi l l ing to grant allowance to the monks to conduct their election once he was satisfied 
that they would elect his candidate. As Barrell points out, there is no other cogent 
explanation for Hatfield's eventual election on 8 May 1345,^^^ as there was 'no reason 
/ 
CPR, 1343-45, 455. 
In what was surely an embarrassing episode for Edward, Bury had to be imposed by papal provision in 
1333 over Robert Graystanes, himself a member of Durham Chapter, who had already been consecrated 
after being elected by his chapter on 15 October of that year [Martin, Bury, 117-27. Barrell, Papacy, 194] 
After Edward granted licence for the election, twelve of seventeen canons of York picked their dean 
William de la Zouche, on 2 May 1340, the rest Kilsby, the king's choice. This lead to appeals to the 
pope, and a commission by the king against Zouche, however the kings best efforts ultimately failed, and 
his most loyal servant was left frustrated [Ibid., 198]. 
^^'^ Murimuth, 171. 
Durham Chapter Muniments, Misc. Ch. 5375. As far as 1 am aware the letter is so far unused by 
historians, and I would like to thank Alan Piper for making it known to me. Hatfield is not mentioned in 
name, and additionally there is no year dated on the letter close, however as it is dated 21 April it must 
concern Hatfield's election. 
Richard Talbot was an important northern figure. During the late 1330s and early 1340s he was 
commander of the Berwick garrison [Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 168.]. He had became 'Lord of 
Mar' after Halidon Hill in 1333, and as one of the Disinherited who accompanied Balliol into Scotland. 
In 1337 he helped besiege Dunbar, and was later a captain at the battle of Crecy in 1346 [see Rogers, War 
Cruel and Sharp, 70n, 78, 79n, 80-1, 217. Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 24, 42, 58, 274n.] 
Robert Chickwell was a royal clerk who stood to gain the prebend of Fridaythorp if Hatfield secured 
Durham, ulfimately both were successful [CPP, 1342-1419, 93.]. 
DCM, Misc. Ch. 5375 
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why the bishop-elect would have been well known in any other capacity to the 
monks'.'^'' 
Nevertheless there is little reason to think that the monks would have been too 
greatly perturbed by the proposal o f Hatfield, especially as they could have had little 
hope o f securing their own candidate. Just less than thirty-six years later, Hatfield's 
eulogy paints his relationship with his monks in glowing terms, without ever attempting 
to make any claim that the bishop was a religious man. This is an interpretation 
vindicated by the work o f Harbottle on the bishop's second visitation, and the evidence 
o f combined building w o r k s . H a t f i e l d apparently managed to offer the necessary 
support and prestige desired fi'om a bishop, without interfering overly in their lives. 
Prior to the election there would have been the usual fears. However the monks were 
probably never under any illusions as to what kind o f man Hatfield would be, and 
therefore they would surely have hoped, and indeed suspected, that he would be too 
concerned with other matters to wage war on his priory, as Bek had done.^^^ 
Having been stung in the past, it appears that Edward was unwilling to leave 
anything to chance. Despite the probable 'understanding' over Durham that Edward 
had with the nuncios, and subsequent noises made by Clement, the English king 
apparently lacked a definitive statement from the pope himself that Hatfield would be 
provided to Durham. Ultimately by securing the election Edward I I I would not 
realistically have been hoping to conclude the matter finally. Elections were very rarely 
left to stand unaltered by the mid-fourteenth century. Given the wealth o f Durham, 
even in the atmosphere o f reconciliation, it could not be hoped that Clement V I would 
not assert his right and quash the election, in order to claim the right to levy the relevant 
taxes.-''' 
The election should not be seen as an antagonistic move on Edward's behalf, 
rather it was his final and most direct recommendation o f Hatfield. In getting his man 
elected Edward was showing Clement that Hatfield was accepted in the see, but more 
importantly he was forcing the pope into a comer. Wi th Hatfield already elected, 
Clement would appear the aggressor i f he made any alternative provision. However 
once he had called the election it was vital that Edward secure it. It was imperative that 
Barren, Papac;^ , 196. 
For eulogy see Script. Tres., 137-39. For the 1354 visitation see Harbottle, 'Hatfield's Visitation'. For 
building works see below. 
For a discussion of the general later medieval relationship see R.B. Dobson, Durham Priory, 1400-
1450 (Cambridge, 1973), 203-06 
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BancW, Papacy, 191 
he avoid giving Clement the initiative by having to ask the pope to appoint Hatfield, by 
papal provision, over the product o f an election, which he had himself sanctioned, as 
had indeed occurred in Durham in 1333. 
On 9 June 1345 Edward's various recommendations bore final fiaiit as Hatfield 
was provided to the see o f Durham, by Clement V I . The pope, as Edward had done, 
asserted his rights, providing Hatfield to Durham stating that the election by the chapter 
was made ' i n ignorance o f the papal reservation.'^'''* Ultimately, it was important that 
Hatfield was first elected, as this would give him power locally. Within England, and 
especially the Northeast, the fact that the election was quashed would have been largely 
irrelevant because the man on the episcopal throne was the one elected in chapter. 
Whilst on an international level neither the pope nor the king would lose face; within 
their arenas they had both upheld their rights. 
Hatfield's provision is the first time the, until now silent, chronicles offer some 
indication as to events o f his life. Clement is reported to have quipped, after his 
cardinals expressed reservations over Hatfield's provision, that ' i f the king had asked 
for an ass, he would have received his wish, this time'.^''^ This quote is used in the title 
o f this work, as it may suggest that Clement did not think Hatfield deserving o f 
Durham, and that the pope may have only consented because o f the Anglo-Papal 
situation in 1345. Clearly the tale o f the monks o f St. Albans may be merely 
apocryphal. The chronicle also details Clement's cardinals apparently pointing out that 
Hatfield was o f ' l i ttle consequence and a l a y m a n ' . T h i s has long fed a school o f 
thought that Hatfield was entirely unsuitable to jo in the episcopate, especially as it is 
apparently corroborated by the attack o f the Archbishop o f York in 1363.^^^ Although 
the cardinals may have actually alleged, as the St. Albans chronicle relays, and perhaps 
even believed, that Hatfield was o f ' l i ttle consequence', such an assessment would 
simply have been wrong. The pope had since 1344 fi-equently used Hatfield to try and 
influence the king, which was surely recognition o f his importance and position close to 
the king. 
CPL. 1342-62. 202. 
Chronicon Angliae, 20. 
Ibid. For two basic recent discussions of Clement's comment see Barreil, Papacy, 190, and Palmer, 
English Law, 315. 
For Thoresby's attack see CPP, 1342-1419, 472. For two basic recent discussions of Clement's 
comment see Barreil, Papacy, 190, and Palmer, English Law, 315 Aim. 
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However evidence regarding Hatfield's educational suitability is frustrafingly 
inconclusive. His name does not appear on any university documentation and though 
papal clerks recorded him a master in some o f their dealings, this could be explained by 
the inferences o f the papal clerks.''^^ For bishops who were not graduates were most 
atypical in this period. As is noted below, Thoresby's vitriolic attack must be viewed in 
the context o f a turbulent relationship between metropolitan and unwill ing suffragan. 
Yet less clear are motives o f the St. Albans monks for falsely portraying Hatfield as 
ignorant. It is possible that the comment reflects some latent bitterness from a century 
before hand when there had been a hard fought case over the church o f Overconscliffe, 
between the then bishop o f Durham and the eventual victor, the abbot o f St. Albans.^^^ 
Yet even so there had been a number o f Durham bishops since, including the infamous 
Beaumont, whose learning was also doubted, who appear to have escaped such 
comment. Therefore that Hatfield was picked out, has rightly been taken as an 
indication that the monks' account was perhaps not entirely baseless. 
Hatfield is not noted as having taken a suitability examination, which he would 
have been due for as a non-graduate and was demanded of the two other infamous 
uneducated bishops later in Edward I l l ' s re ign." ' But whether this failure to examine is 
explained by the reconciliation 1345 or by Hatfield, in fact, being a graduate is 
impossible to tell. Understandably Highfield has used the evident lack o f books in 
Hatfield's w i l l to further indicate his lack o f leaming.^^^ Just before his death in 1381 
Hatfield completed the foundation o f Durham College, Oxford, perhaps seeking to give 
others a chance to experience the education he was denied, however the link does not 
necessarily fol low, and indeed Bury must take some of the credit for the foundation."^ 
Ultimately a definitive conclusion is hard to reach; yet Hatfield's own failure -
along with that o f his eulogist - to draw attention to his education, is perhaps telling, 
especially given the innuendoes made by various people during his lifetime. 
Nevertheless Hatfield's role in Edward's administration suggests that even i f he was no 
Grandisson, Trilleck, Gravesend or Gilbert - who are all known to have studied in 
'^'^  Highfield, 'English Hierarchy under Edward III', 131-2. 
•^^^ Lapsley, Palatinate, 244. 
""^  For Beaumont's learning see K. Edwards, 'Bishops and Learning in the Reign of Edward H', Church 
Quarterly Review, cxxxviii (1944), 62-4. 
Pantin, English Church, 50. There are two noted cases of problems with examinations in this period. 
Bishop Stretton only passed on his third attempt, being provided in April 1360, 16 months after his initial 
election. John Buckingham in 1362 was requested to come to Avignon by Urban V to Avignon for 
examination, however Edward said he could not spare his keeper of the privy seal, and Buckingham was 
ultimately passed by three abbots in Ghent [Highfield, 'English Hierarchy under Edward HI', 132]. 
Highfield, 'English Hierarchy under Edward III', 132. 
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Paris^^'' - he was a man o f no small ability, capable o f performing a wide variety o f 
duties. For instance Lisle, who had not collated numerous benefices before his 
provision, later struggled in his running o f Ely as he was not experienced in the running 
of estates."^ In contrast, Hatfield had gained much patronage over a period o f time and 
had also been involved, to a limited extent, in the running o f Chamber lands, due to his 
position as receiver. As he appears not to have received a degree from a university, 
Hatfield was not a typical member o f Edward I l l ' s episcopate but this does not appear 
to mean he was unsuitable. 
Despite the patronage disputes and most notably Hatfield's threatened 
excommunication, it is hard to see that those at Avignon would have held an altogether 
negative interpretafion o f the bishop-elect in 1345. Hatfield had had a great deal o f 
contact wi th Clement regarding English relations with both France and Avignon. And 
though it is possible that Clement and his advisors were beginning to feel they would 
get little end-product from Hatfield, because he was too much a royal man and would 
not feel indebted for any papal assistance in his promotion, he was far f rom a worthless 
political contact. 
Nor should we think that Hatfield was held in low esteem because o f his warlike 
nature, an opinion that seems to be held by many historians. The distinction, in the later 
medieval mind, between the religious and warlike should not be overemphasised, as the 
examples o f Henry de Grosmont and the early medieval archbishops o f Cologne help 
reveal.•'^^ The 1138 ban on clerics taking up arms agreed in the Council o f Westminster 
could be ignored by the fourteenth century, as any study o f the pay rolls o f English 
armies o f this period w i l l swif t ly illustrate. And even though most clerics did not fight, 
the statute o f Westminster 1285 included an attempt to oblige the clergy to bear arms in 
times o f need.""^ Whilst it is worth pointing out that Hatfield did not wait to be obliged 
and clearly the extent o f his aggressive military participation set him apart f rom most o f 
his ecclesiasfical peers, he should not be thought o f as some abhorrent anomaly in the 
later medieval European episcopate. 
Barker, 'Death and the Bishop', 31-2. 
Highfield, 'English Hierarchy under Edward III', 131. 
Aberth, Lisle, 14. 
For how Henry de Grosmont, Duke of Lancaster (1310-1361), married deep Christian chivalry with 
ruthless brutality see J. Bamie, War in Medieval Society: Social Values and the Hundred Years War, 
1337-1399 {London, 1974), 59-65. 
A.K. McHardy, 'The English Clergy and the Hundred Years War', The Church and War, ed. W.J. 
Sheils, Studies in Church History, 20 (London, 1983), 174 
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Tellingly neither Clement nor Edward could have been under any illusions that 
in the sees o f Carlisle, York and Durham it was impossible for a bishop to avoid 
military matters. Although Clement V I hoped to promote peace in Christendom, he 
perhaps also realised that a strong defender o f northern England could help stabilise the 
region and remove one potential front in the current Anglo-French conflict. Indeed, as 
noted above, this aspect o f the role as bishop of Durham appears to have been valued at 
Avignon, as it was used in 1318 by Edward I I as he attempted to sell his choice o f 
Beaumont to the pope. In common with the other Avignon popes, Clement V I 
displayed no real interest in utilising the Scots to help broker a general peace in Western 
Europe. And as such he was probably happy to see that the Scottish threat might be 
neutralised, preventing them from creating problematic discord between his two greater 
concerns: France and England. 
Had Hatfield had less to offer, the Durham vacancy could have provided a far 
greater test o f the atmosphere o f reconciliation between king and pope. Barrell wonders 
i f the 'sudden improvement in relations...was perhaps instrumental in Hatfield 
receiving provision to Durham on 9 June.''^^ Clearly there is much truth in Barrell's 
observation. However by early 1345 Thomas de Hatfield had already recovered f rom 
his threatened excommunication, to a position o f some grudging respect at Avignon. 
Though much o f Hatfield's fortunes were inextricably linked to Anglo-Papal relations, 
the situation was not the sole reason for Clement's acquiescence to Edward's 
recommendation. In fact, had Anglo-Papal relations not improved in time, and had 
Clement decided to use the Durham vacancy to antagonise Edward, the situation may 
well have provided the only major reason why Hatfield would not have been appointed. 
In July 1345, only a few months after Hatfield's provision to Durham, Thomas 
de Lisle was consecrated Bishop o f Ely at the papal palace in Avignon. '^° In his 
provision Clement was overriding the election o f prior Alan Walsingham, and the fact 
that the chapter secured the election seems to suggest a lack o f royal interference. This 
raises a number o f issues o f importance relating to Hatfield's own appointment. Aberth 
notes that Lisle possessed 'rather meagre credentials in royal service', and is o f the 
opinion that the new bishop o f Ely owed his appointment to the pope being paid back 
BaneM, Papacy, 2\0. 
''^Ibid., 196. 
Aberth, Lisle, 10. 
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^^^Ibid., 16 
for allowing, an unsuitable, Hatfield to j o in the episcopate.^^^ This draws on the 
established school o f thought, which surely has its genesis in the chronicle evidence and 
Lisle's subsequent problems with Edward I I I . 
It is true that Edward did not protest as he had done a year and a half earlier 
when Bateman, a far more loyal royal servant, had been given Norwich by the pope. 
There can be no doubt that the spirit o f reconciliation explains this difference. But it 
does not mean, therefore, that there was any pre-arranged deal decreeing that the next 
vacancy would provide Clement with his turn to appoint one o f his own men, nor even 
that Clement was determined to promote Lisle. Here it is important to look at the 
details o f the case. 
Though Clement first overrode the election on 7 July 1345, i t was not unfi l the 
15"^  that a formal bull o f provision was sent to Archbishop Stratford.^^^ Was this delay 
caused by Clement's need to consider whom to provide to the bishopric? The death o f 
Bishop Simon Montague on the 20"^ June 1345 had been relatively sudden and 
presumably caught both Edward and Clement unprepared. This would offer 
explanation as to why Edward permitted the election but did not lean on the chapter. 
Crucially Montague did not slide slowly into his grave like Bury, so unlike wi th 
Hatfield there was no possibility for discussion beforehand; this was to be the first 
major test o f the current reconciliation. The actions o f both men are in keeping with 
this interpretafion. Clement probably took Edward's inactivity as a sign o f goodwill; 
the king was not forcing the issue, rather he was acknowledging that the pope would 
want to quash the election to secure taxes. Nevertheless, Edward had clearly left the 
ball in Clement's court. 
The pope ultimately chose Lisle, whose later problems with Edward might paint 
him entirely in papal colours. In his letter to Edward I I I , Clement V I explained his 
selection o f an Englishman for Ely as being 'chiefly because he ought to be agreeable to 
you, most beloved son, because we have continually found in him a faithfial promoter 
and fervid zealot o f your honour and well-being.'^^'' How far was this political 
positioning, and how far was Clement genuinely trying to satisfy both sides? Although 
it is far from certain, the impression is o f a pope understanding the delicacy o f the 
situation and looking for a man agreeable to both parties. It is highly likely Clement felt 





the king, and indeed Edward would surely have been wi l l ing to give a little because o f 
the situation, and particularly in light o f his contentment wi th Hatfield's appointment. 
However, this must not be overplayed. 
This was no imposition o f extremes; Edward did not abhor Lisle in mid-1345, 
and nor did Clement appoint Hatfield entirely against his w i l l . Lisle would not have 
been top o f Edward's list but Clement's choice would surely have heartened the English 
king; it could have been a lot worse. Neither man would have been under any illusions 
that this was to be a great fiiendship, there was far too much at stake in a number o f 
arenas. Yet by striving not to antagonise each other, both king and pope could be 
satisfied with the men achieving positions o f power within the English church. It was 
not Edward's turn to accept an 'ass', in Lisle, due to the circumstances, and hence 
Lisle's appointment sheds light on Hatfield's. The reconciliafion between pope and 
king does not appear to have resulted in 'alternate picks'; instead efforts were made to 
make choices agreeable to both. Hence Clement's reported quip, ' i f the king had asked 
for an ass, he would have received his wish, this time', would appear to have been 
offered in jest, i f it was uttered at all. It belies the pope's understanding o f the subtleties 
involved in his current reconciliation wi th Edward, and the place o f Hatfield within this. 
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Chapter III - Repaying Edward Ill's faith: 
Hatfield as bishop of Durham, 1345-57 
Part I - Consecration, counsel and the Scots: Hatfield in the 
second half of 1345 
On 1 July 1345 Hatfield was included amongst those to counsel Lionel, the 
king's son, regent in the king's absence,^^^ as Edward headed for Flanders to rectify the 
situation there. There was little question o f Hatfield accompanying his king to Flanders, 
and indeed he had been increasingly spending time away from his king due to his role 
as keeper o f the privy seal. Also, more importantly, until late 1345 Hatfield was still 
busy with the routine o f becoming bishop. Though by Edward I l l ' s departure to 
Flanders Hatfield had already secured the temporalities, he was yet to be consecrated. 
Hatfield had received the temporalities on 2 June,^ *^ his provision having been 
confirmed by the archbishop of York, on the previous day."*^ ^ However his consecration 
did not fol low immediately. There is some inconsistency amongst the chronicles 
regarding the dating o f his consecration; Murimuth places i t on 7 August 1345, whilst 
prior Wessington's eulogy notes it as early as 10 July.^^^ 
Murimuth's suggestion, that it was not until early August 1345, that the 
archbishop o f Canterbury consecrated Hatfield at Otteford, appears most apt in light o f 
the available information. The Dictionary of National Biography states that the Durham 
chronicle is accurate but no evidence is provided for this; the assumption probably being 
that a Durham source would be most accurate for a Durham bishop."'**^ However, as 
noted above, the chronicle was not written for over half a century after the year o f 
consecration. Importantly until 5 August 1345 - when he received the wherewithal to 
coin sterling at Durham - Hatfield was still noted as hishop-elect in the chancery 
Along with the Archbishop of York, Bishops of London and Chichester, Henry of Lancaster, John de 
Warenne, the chancellor, treasurer, prior of Rochester, Master Simon de Islep, William Trussel and 
Andrew Ufford [ C ^ , 1343-45, 487. Foedera, iii, i, 50.]. 
Registrum Palatinum Dunelmense, ed. T.D. Hardy, Rolls Series, iv, 364. The order for the restoration 
was made on 24 May {Foedera, iii, i, 40. CPR, 1343-45. 473.]. 
DNB X X V , 155. 
Murimuth, 172. Script. Tres., 137. 
DNB,xx\, 155. 
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rolls,^'^° whilst from 10 August 1345 he is referred to as bishop.^^' Due to the lucrative 
nature o f the mint, the 5 August 1345 order would seem to fit, as recognition that 
Hatfield's consecrafion was most imminent.^^^ 
The delay between the receiving o f the temporalities and the eventual 
consecration could be largely explained by problems over who was to conduct the 
ceremony, although such a delay was hardly a t y p i c a l . I n July Hatfield petitioned the 
pope asking for, amongst many other things, licence to defer his consecration for a 
period o f three months beyond the due time, allowing him to hold the benefices he had 
at the time o f his promotion.^^'^ The new bishop gained most o f what he sought; yet this 
particular licence does not appear to have been granted.^^^ Hatfield appears to have 
been seeing just how far the pope was wil l ing to go, perhaps adding support to the 
interpretation that he was not so badly thought o f at Avignon by this time. This request 
was probably motivated by greed, but was also a safeguard to give him space to 
manoeuvre in his dealings wi th the archbishop o f York. 
Hatfield would not have been too concerned by the failure o f this petidon, 
because soon after he had sent it , he would have received faculty to be consecrated by 
any bishop, to whom he would in addition swear his oath o f fealty.^'"' This grant was 
made in spite o f there being strong evidence that Hatfield had already sworn such an 
oath to the archbishop of York. Archbishop Zouche's register notes that in 1345 
Hatfield swore to be his fai thft i l and obedient servant. And when, on 7 June 1345, 
the escheator o f Middlesex was ordered to deliver the temporalities in his bailiwick to 
the new bishop of Durham, it was noted that Hatfield's 'election has been confirmed by 
Wil l iam, Archbishop of York, and who has done fealty \ As metropolitan, Zouche 
would have expected to consecrate his suffragan, yet there had long been strife over this 
issue. For example, Bury had received the same licence as Hatfield, and was also 
On 27 June [CPR, 1343-45. 487.], 1 July [CCR, 1343-46, 541.], 5 August [Ibid., 542.]. 
See for example CPR, 1343-45, 545, 561., CCR. 1343-46, 607., CFR, 1337-47. 447. 
For the Durham mint see Lapsley, Palatinate, 282. 
Consecrations, had to be conducted within a year but did not necessarily follow quickly after 
provision; it was not uncommon for a period of half a year to elapse between the two [for examples see 
British Chronology, 203-280]. 
''"CPP, 1342-1419. 100. 
For example Hatfield requested and was granted licence to chose his confessor, to let the religious eat 
flesh at his table, to dispense people of illegitimate birth and create notaries [CPP, 1342-1419, 100. CPL, 
1342-62. 209-15.]. 
'Faculty to be consecrated by any catholic prelate of his choice in communion with the apostolic see, 
who shall receive his oath of fealty, according to the enclosed form, to be remitted to the pope; without 
prejudice to the right of the archbishop of York', [CPL. 1342-62. 214.]. 
BaneW, Papacy, 189. 
CPR. 1343-45. 477 [italics added]. 
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consecrated by John Stratford, archbishop of Canterbury.^'^ Ultimately far more 
research needs to be done on Hatfield's problems with York, and a clear understanding 
o f the events that lead to Hatfield's consecration in the south is potentially vital, as it 
stands to provide the genesis o f the individual relationship, against the background of 
the traditional problems. 
In addition to the process o f official ceremony, Hatfield clearly had to become 
bishop in reality, taking over the working o f the palatinate. However it is not yet clear 
how much time he spent in the north, and how far he was able to take a leading role on 
the regency council, and in the raising o f much needed loans for the war.''^^ Later in 
the year, after Edward's return, fears that the Scots were about to invade grew. The 
council, assembled in mid-October 1345, decided on 24 October 1345 that Hatfield 
should proclaim to the men of Northumberland, that they could bring their cattle down 
to the forest o f Galtres, in Yorkshire, for their protection, at no cost.''^' No longer 
needed to counsel the regent Hatfield was by now surely in the north, fu l f i l l i ng for the 
first time his role as a 'guardian o f the north', though there is little other existing 
evidence to confirm this.'*^^ Ultimately it was upon the western march that the Scottish 
raided; the incursion into the area round Carlisle began on 25 October 1345, and lasted 
less than a week. Though Edward I I I himself went north, he was back in London for 
the 17 December 1345.'* '^' Hatfield, however, remained in the north, as on 25 December 
1345, he was enthroned and inducted in Durham, in a composite process known as 
instalment.'*"^ On balance it seems that for Hatfield this was not a rare appearance in 
Durham, but part o f an actual stamping o f himself upon his palatinate, as its bishop, 
especially doing the 'guardian' job, which Edward had promoted him to do. 
Barren, Papacy, 201. For licence see CPL, 1342-62, 214. 
Hatfield was instructed, along with rest of the regency council [except the bishop of London, and 
Lancaster and Warenne], to engage himself in securing loans for Edward [CPR, 1343-45, 487.]. 
CCR, 1341-43. 561. 
Hatfield is absent from the Rot. Scot., though it is possible that he simply inherited the orders of Bury, 
his predecessor. 
Murimuth, 189. Anonimalle, 19. Sumption, Trial by Battle, 499-500. 
^^Murimuth, 190. 
"""^ Script. Tres., 137. Bek had also been installed at Christmas, and it is likely that this was done to save 
money by combining two major feasts on one day; as Prior Wessington later used this argument to try and 
persuade bishop Neville in 1441 [R.B. Dobson, Durham Priory. 1400-1450 (Cambridge, 1973), 228]. 
Bury was installed on 5 June 1333 by Prior Cowton in the presence of King Edward, Queens Philippa and 
Isabella, the king of Scotland, the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, five other bishops and seven 
earh [Script. Tres., 128]. 
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Part I I - 1346: Was Hatfield at the battle of Crecy? 
Though in 1345 the Scots had only raided for a week, the north was still in a 
perilous position. At the start o f February 1346 there was a great council at 
Westminster, though it is unlikely that Hatfield was in attendance as on 8"^  o f the month 
he seems to have been busy making his first visitation o f the priory o f Durham.'*^' 
However by the l l ' " Hatfield was involved in the process o f raising forces in the 
north.'*'''' A month later, on 8 March the defence o f the north was placed in the hands o f 
Hatfield, the Archbishop of York, Henry Percy, Ralph Neville, and Thomas Rokeby, 
who was sheriff o f Yorkshire. The situation was apparently grave, as on 27 March 
Maurice de Berkley came north to York to talk through plans and presumably quench 
the fears o f worried northern lords who felt the South coast was being given priority.'^^^ 
Almost four months later on 17 July 1346 a particularly 'gloomy and 
acrimonious meeting between representatives o f the government and the leading barons 
of the north' took place at Newcastle.'*"^ Hatfield is recorded as attending personally, 
rather than sending a proctor. Due to the severity of the situation the northern lords 
decided to write to those ruling in place o f Edward, informing them that the agreements 
made at Newcastle and York could not be honoured, as they had received no fiinds. The 
message was simple; i f those at Westminster failed to support the north financially, the 
barons could not guarantee effective resistance against the Scots. 
Durham Chapter Muniments, 2.7. Pontificalia. Ih. Secondary sources are somewhat at odds with this 
regarding this dating, though on balance the evidence suggests that proceedings would have run from this 
date, if not before. This dating is discussed in greater detail below. 
"•^^ Rot. Scot., 668. 
M. Prestwich, 'The English at the Battle of Neville's Cross', The Battle of Neville's Cross, 1346, eds. 
D. RoUason and M. Prestwich, Studies in North-Eastem History, ii (Stamford, 1998), 3. Sumption, Trial 
by Battle, 492. 
Calendar of Documents relating to Scotland, ed. J. Bain, iii (Edinburgh, 1887), 266-67. ['It was 
agreed... on Monday 17* July, at Newcastle-on-Tyne, between the bishop of Durham, the Earl of Angus, 
the seigneur of Percy, Monsire Rauf de Neville, the Sire de Segrave, and others, that the bearer be sent to 
London to represent to the Archbishop of Canterbury, the chancellor, treasurer, Monsire Geoffrey le 
Scrope, and others of Council, how the convents made with them at Newcastle and York were broken, as 
they had got no money, and Sir John Dellerker had interfered with what was assigned for defence of the 
March, to be paid them by the hands of Sir Robert de Spynay, appointed receiver by the council, who had 
also warranted payment to three of their number out of the 'Byvennale' of the bishoprics of York and 
Durham. If which was not paid, they would be discharged of their convenants. He was also to inform the 
council that the Seigneurs of Moubray and Segrave, Monsire Thomas de Rokeby, Monsire William de 
Feltone, and Monsire John de Stivelyn, and the garrison of Berwick, had told the above Seigneurs 
'courtement' that, unless they got payment of their money quickly in hand, they neither could nor would 
stay any longer. The Seigneur Segrave also said that his indenture bore that if he was not paid in three 
weeks after he reached Newcastle, he was discharged, and said 'brivement' that he would not stay 
longer.'] For quote see Sumption, Trial by Battle, 504. 
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The dating o f this meeting is vital as it indicates that contrary to the convention 
amongst chroniclers, and thus historians, Hatfield was not part o f the king's fleet that 
left Portsmouth on 11 July 1346.'*"' Bain has dated this document in 1346, though the 
manuscript o f the indenture is apparently not dated with a year. There is however a 
strong case to support this meeting as occurring in 1346. It is noted as having occurred 
on a Monday, and the 17 July in 1346 was a Monday. Such an indenture would also fit 
the problems being experienced by the north in this year. Clearly the noting o f 
meetings in Newcastle and York is not especially helpfiil in pinning the document to 
1346, as these were common locations for meeting to discuss northern defence. It is 
unlikely that the document was from 1345 as it refers to a bishop, not a bishop-elect o f 
Durham. The effect o f the victory at Neville's cross makes it less likely to be from after 
1346, as the situation in the north became less perilous. The absence o f the bishop of 
Carlisle may reflect either a north eastern bias or his relative lack o f importance. 
Alternatively it may fiirther support 1346 as the Scots had at this time moved into 
Cumberland, which would have occupied him at this point.""' 
If , as appears likely, this meefing did occur in 1346, was Hatfield present? 
Evidence suggests that Hatfield was in the south in early summer 1346, though the 
nature o f the evidence is a little problematic. We lack detailed pay records for the 1346 
campaign, and therefore exact periods o f service are sometimes hard to calculate.'*'^ 
Walter Wetewang's lost wardrobe accounts are the basis o f Wrottesley's Crecy and 
Calais but this record details all those men who served at any time from La Hogue to 
Calais, a period o f approximately a year and a half '" ' ' Equally it must be noted that 
securing a wri t o f protection reflected only the intention to serve, it being sought and 
received in advance o f the actual undertaking.'"'' Though there is evidence that Hatfield 
intended to depart wi th Edward, it does not necessarily mean that he actually did. 
It appears undeniable that Hatfield was at least in the south until almost the point 
o f departure, i f indeed he did not sail. From May 1346 men were receiving letters o f 
protection to serve in Hatfield's retinue, and these letters continued to be granted until 6 
""^ Murimuth, 199. Le Baker, 79. Sumption [Trial by Battle, 502.] assumes Hatfield was in with Edward, 
maintaining the rear as the army moved towards Rouen. The Anonimalle [19-20.] chronicle includes no 
details of who disembarked with Edward at La Hogue 
Sumption, Trial by Battle, 504. 
"'^  Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 423. 
""^ Ibid. G. Wrottesley, Crecy and Calais - from the original records in the public record office (London, 
1898). 
A. Ayton, 'The English Army and the Normandy Campaign of 1346', England and Normandy in the 
Middle Ages, eds. D. Bates and A. Curry (London, 1987), 258. For discussion of the problems and then 
value of the evidence available for the 1346 Campaign see Ibid., 253-268. 
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July, for the period until Christmas.'"^ Cleariy i f any decision was taken not to head to 
France at this point, it was a very last minute one. Evidence from other sources 
supports this. On mandates sent from Porchester on 2 July, regarding northern defence, 
Hatfield is a notable absentee.'*"' 
Even i f the only actual evidence we have that Hatfield sailed to La Hogue is 
found in the chronicles, there are many other indications that he did. hideed Rogers 
does not mention Hatfield as one of magnates, which he doubts actually served from La 
Hogue, though it is unlikely that he was aware of the issue of the 17 July indenture.'*'^  
Also important, is that when the northern lords were asked on 30 July to send proctors 
to parliament, the possibility of the bishop's absence from the north was recognised, as 
the summons was sent to Hatfield or his Vicar General.'*'^  Though this may well reflect 
the uncertainty at Westminster, given the problems in the north, as to whether Hatfield 
did in fact leave with the king; and as a result this cannot be in any sense conclusive. 
If, indeed, Hatfield did remain in England for a time, due to the perilous 
situation in Scotland a number of points would appear to count against his swiftly 
meeting up with his king in France. Firstly, the situation in Scotland remained tense 
until the end of July when a truce was sealed after Percy and Neville had chased the 
Scots back into the lowlands, hisightfiilly the witness list for the truce does not include 
the bishop of Durham.'*'^ Having decided to remain in England, why would he leave 
before the situation was sorted fully, at least in the short-term by a truce? One answer 
to this, which will be more ftiUy discussed below, is that Edward perhaps felt that he 
had far more to gain in France than he had to lose in Scotland. Perhaps had the 
indenture produced swift results, Hatfield may have been content that though he would 
not be there personally, he had 'done his bit' in helping to organise the defence 
satisfactorily enough to depart - a decision that Neville's Cross would vindicate. 
Yet more problematic is how Hatfield could have met the army in time for 
Crecy. The path taken by Edward III strongly counts against the notion of Hatfield 
joining him after La Hogue. Whilst his fleet sailed along the coast, the army -
especially after they left Caen on 31 July - left coastal areas and were increasingly 
"'^  Wrottesley, Crecy and Calais, 84-7, 97, 99, 101. 
Mandates sent from Porcesterto AB York, B Carlisle, Lucy, Percy, Neville, Umfraville, Segrave, 
Cantilupe, FitzHugh, Mowbray, Maule and not Hatfield [Rot. Scot., 672-73.]. 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 423. 
CCR, 1346-49, 146. 
"'^  Sumption, Trial by Battle, 504. Rot. Scot., \, 672-3. 
moving inland.'*^° Sailing down the Seine to meet Edward after 7 August would have 
been suicidal, as it would have meant passing Rouen, i f indeed craft could be found for 
such an inland journey. Somewhat more compelling would be that Hatfield sailed down 
the Orne to Caen. However the English army left Caen only two weeks after the 
indenture at Newcastle.'* '^ ft seems unlikely that this would have given enough time for 
Hatfield to have both completed all he needed to do in the north, and travelled the 
distances required, especially when possible delays for weather are considered, however 
it is not an impossibility.'*^^ Ultimately, an arrival at Caen before 31 July 1346 must 
represent the most likely explanation allowing Hatfield to be at both Newcastle and 
Crecy. 
I f it he did not meet Edward here it is almost impossible to see that he was at 
both events. Hatfield would have had little idea as to the exact location of Edward's 
army at any point as it moved through Normandy. Though the fires of the burning 
countryside may have offered some hint to his king's path, any move to meet up with 
Edward would have involved a ride of approximately 30 miles, through relatively 
hostile and unknown terri torysearching for the right army - i.e. not a French one.'*^ '* 
I f such a feat had been managed it would be surprising that it has gone unreported by 
the chroniclers of the chevauchee. 
After his letter sent from Caen, Edward III had hoped to meet up with 
reinforcements on 20 August at Le Crotoy, on the mouth of the Somme."*^ ^ Le Crotoy 
was proposed due to its suitability to disembark a large number of troops. However the 
reinforcements did not arrive until after Crecy, therefore when Hugh Despenser took Le 
Crotoy on 24 August no fleet was found, as it was still assembling in England. 
Importantly the king's newsletter from Caen mentions letters to be sent to the bishop 
[sic] of York, and other northern lords, but once again not the bishop of Durham. 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 239. 
Ibid., 252. 
""^^ Whether in this situation Hatfield would have sailed from Newcastle, Hartlepool, or returned south 
first to sail, is uncertain. Officially the first available day for Hatfield to sail would have been the 19*, 
because as part of his strenuous efforts to safeguard the destination of the fleet, the king had decreed that 
no ship leave England for eight days after his fleet [Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 223.]. Hatfield might 
well have considered himself in a position to ignore this however. 
Despite serving in Northern France before becoming bishop, Hatfield had not campaigned in this part 
of Normandy before. 
For a map of Crecy chevauchee path see Ibid., 238. For the attitude of the Norman people to the 
French at this time [Ibid., 237-8.] In addition to forces at Caen, the French King had moved to Rouen by 
the fime Edward left Caen [Ibid., 252.]. 
K.A. Fowler, 'News from the Front: Letters and Despatches of the Fourteenth Century', Guerre et 
Societe en France, en Angleterre et en Bourgogne. XlVe-XVe Siecle, ed. P. Contamine et al. (Lille, 1991), 
83-4. 
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Further evidence from the Wetewang accounts indicates that Hatfield was there 
for the entire campaign until Calais. A number of writs suggest that men served with 
the bishop of Durham fi-om La Hogue,''^ ^ and in 1352 Hatfield apparently certified that 
Fulk de Birmingham had served under him fi-om the date of passage to Normandy, and 
at Crecy and Calais.'*^^ Whilst here Hatfield does not state - although many of others 
referring to his retinue do - that he sailed to La Hogue, raising the possibility it was 
Caen, this is strong evidence that the bishop was at Crecy. In light of other evidence it 
is extremely unlikely that Hatfield was trying to create a myth that he was present, 
having in fact just missed it.''^^ 
This creates a problematic contradiction. There is little apparent reason to 
discount the 17 July document and that Hatfield would have wanted to be present at its 
sealing; other than the fact that his involvement in Newcastle at that time appears to 
stand in the way of almost all other available evidence. And it is now that the 
chronicles of the battle must be turned to. Importantly the Acta Bellicosa, which is 
considered most valuable of the lists detailing Edward's army, places Hatfield in charge 
of the rearguard."*^^  Jean le Bel places Hatfield with Suffolk and Northampton in the 
second battle, commanding 1,200 men-at-arms and 3,000 archers, and Recits places the 
bishop and Edward III behind the Prince of Wales, who lead the vanguard.'* '^^  Rogers 
has shown how the English arrayed in three battles, one behind another, flanked on 
either side by archers. This fits the chronicles' depiction of the young Prince doing the 
greater part of the fighting that day. Thus Hatfield - having 'deserted' his northern post 
- and his king would have spent much of the battle sitting on their shields, awaiting the 
outcome. 
The thinking behind this formation is brought about by a tale that forms part of 
Froissart's account. He claimed that when the king decided it was unwise to leave his 
son, the soon to be named 'Black Prince' - whom he wished to earn his spurs - too 
exposed, he selected Hatfield to take twenty knights to go and assist the sixteen year 
old."* '^ Whilst some French sources perhaps support this idea in general by claiming 
426 
Ibid., 172. 
Wrottesley, Crecy and Calais, 132, 139, 141, 143, 148, 160, 163, 164, 166, 172, 179. 
"^ ^ Very far fetched but perhaps possible, is that due to peoples' assumption that he was there, Hatfield 
decided not to disappoint people and stand in the way of a good story, maybe trying to convince himself 
These tales in turn feeding the various chronicle entries. Ultimately however Fossour's letter, see below, 
makes this unlikely. 
R. Barber, Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince (Woodbridge, 1979), 29. 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 266. 
A.H. Bume, The Crecy War {London, 1955), 181. 
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that the prince was captured for a time/^^ it is far from clear that Hatfield was his 
saviour. In fact even in Froissart's account - the only one to mention Hatfield in this 
capacity - it is not certain whether Hatfield and his knights rescued the prince, or 
whether the van had repelled the attack and was awaiting the next, by the time Hatfield 
reached the king's son. Hatfield is not noted elsewhere in relation to this feat, whilst 
Thomas Daniel was later credited and financially rewarded, by virtue of his replanting 
of the Prince's banner at some point during the battle.''^ ^ However, whether it is based 
in fact or not, Froissart's tale is important as it suggests that Hatfield's deployment 
away from the frontline need not be seen as a negative reflection of his abilities on 
behalf of his king. Rather, the bishop may have been kept back so that he could be used 
at a telling time, anywhere along the English line. 
It is worth devoting a couple of paragraphs here to commenting on, just how 
hard it is to truly gauge the skills of a warrior from the evidence available. Clearly 
Hatfield was a more than capable military organiser but can we infer that he had proved 
himself in previous skirmishes and at Sluys? On the evidence of the Calais roll, a 
massive aggregate total of 294 men served under Hatfield at some point from La Hogue 
to Calais, perhaps indicating that he was a warrior of some renown.''^ '* However with 
later reinforcements and shifts between retinues, it is difficult to make a great case for 
this in anyway reflecting his force at Crecy. I f Hatfield was indeed part of the 
rearguard, a sizeable force would be one reason to explain why he was kept back, in 
theory allowing him to help swing the battle at a suitable juncture, and hence the figures 
might not be entirely unreliable.'*^^ However they are broken down, the figures 
certainly provide some indication of just how powerful Hatfield had become. 
Nevertheless whilst we admittedly lack knowledge of his career before 1336, 
Crecy was to be Hatfield's first decisive battle on the confinent. As a result did Edward 
keep back his loyal servant and companion, because he feared he was really just a 
simple clerk, who though extremely adept at the organisational side of war, was 
unlikely to have the stomach for the melee? Is Hatfield's seal more symbolic of his ego 
""^^ No English source tells of the Prince's capture, not even the Life of the Black Prince by the Chandos 
Herald. It is therefore impossible to tell if the French were merely trying to suggest they held an 
advantage at one point, or if in fact there is some truth in their allegations [Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 
268-69 n. 171.]. 
"•^ Register of Edward, the Black Prince, ed. M.C.B. Dawes, i (London, 1930-33), 45, 48. 
It is noted Hatfield himself served as an Earl, and had in his retinue 3 Bannerets, 48 Knights, 162 
Esquires, 214 men-at-arms and 81 mounted archers [Wrottesley, Crecy and Calais, 198.]. 
Arundel had 304 in total, Suffolk 159, Huntingdon 224, and Hugh le Despenser 234 [Ibid.]. 
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and his wish to be more than a 'pen pusher', than his battlefield prowess? What 
evidence we do have, such as the journeys made with precious jewels and money in 
1338 and 1339, counts against this but is far from conclusive. 
Nevertheless the most important question still remains: how reliable are these 
chronicle entries in showing that Hatfield was simply at the battle in the first place? 
Jean Le Bel's account was written in 1356, a decade after the battle, in the knowledge of 
Bishop Hatfield's subsequent participation in the French campaign of 1355, and his 
chronicle was almost the sole point of reference for Froissart's writings later in the 
century. Le Bel's account of Neville's Cross reveals just how far wrong he was capable 
of getting things, whereas his account of the Picardy chevauchee in 1355 is a highly 
regarded source.'*^^  Rogers has described Le Bel's account of Crecy as 'well balanced 
and of high quality.'"^^^ Nevertheless Hatfield would not be the only man Le Bel 
incorrecfly places at Crecy; the young Earl of Kent did not arrive until Calais.''^ ^ 
Interestingly, a list of Edward's forces at Crecy found in the as yet unedited St. Omer 
Chronicle makes no mention of Hatfield.'*^^ This source appears to be related to the 
Acta Bellicosa. In keeping with the Acta, it notes the rearguard as being under Suffolk, 
Arundel, Huntingdon and Hugh le Despenser. However it does not mention Hatfield, 
instead adding Robert Morley and 'Le seignheu de Tringas le seigneur de Baruf. 
However, this St. Omer list appears to stand by itself in support of the 17 July 
document, and suggesting Hatfield was not at Crecy. Whilst the evidence of Le Bel and 
Froissart can reasonably be doubted, the weight of chronicle evidence still appears to 
indicate Hatfield was at the battle, ft is not easy to disregard the combined evidence 
from the accounts of Murimuth and Le Baker and, Acta Bellicosa and Recits. Surely 
these usually reliable sources are not all mistaken due to the bishop's known military 
credentials and a later presence at Calais. Nevertheless the St. Omer Chronicle is vitally 
important in suggesting the 17 July document should not be dismissed out of hand, and 
that more research into the manuscript might well be fhiitful. With this information in 
mind, we must be carefiil in entirely assuming that Hatfield did 'desert' the north in July 
1346. 
Rogers describes the former as 'almost valueless', but the later as 'excellent' [Rogers, Wars of Edward 
HI, X V . ] . 
™ Although it is 'somewhat less sophisticated than the first section of the work', [Ibid., 131.]. 
''^Ibid, 133. 
I would like to thank Michael Prestwich for informing me of these details, found in a chronicle that 
was previously unavailable to me. 
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Interestingly Geoffrey Le Baker has the bishop of Durham conducting the 
funeral of King John of Bohemia on 27 August 1346, the day after the battle.'*'*^ King 
John was highly regarded. This was not only because he had fought bravely in the 
midst of battle despite his age and blindness, but also, it is noted, because of his 
courteousness to the English, probably a reference to his efforts on behalf of the 
captured Salisbury and Suffolk in 1340.'''*' Had Hatfield carried out this service it 
would have been a great honour, as the event was surely something of a solemn 
celebration of chivalry. Also i f Hatfield was indeed a protege of Salisbury he may well 
have had a certain personal affection for the dead king. Nevertheless some caution is 
necessary. Only one source mentions this ceremony, and the bishop would seem the 
obvious candidate for Geoffrey le Baker to use to enliven his story. Without knowledge 
of Hatfield's career it could be inferred from this that Edward brought the bishop with 
him as something of a military chaplain. Yet from what we know of Hatfield, his 
religion was most likely simple,'*'*^ and his knowledge of liturgy probably functional at 
best. Would it have stood up to such an occasion unrehearsed? He seems to have 
baptised Thomas of Woodstock but he would have had time to prepare for this.'*'*'' 
One final suggestion can be made regarding the now unlikely possibility that 
Hatfield was at Newcastle and not Crecy. The first English ships were spotted in the 
channel just off Calais on the 4 September 1346, according to two French chronicles.'*'''' 
That Bishop Hatfield would have been amongst the first over to France would fit in with 
the idea that he was keen for battle, and felt finstration at the delays in the sailing of the 
reinforcement fleet. This date coincides with the list of pardons given by the king on 
the information of Hatfield,'*''^ and this may indicate that this was the day that these men 
commenced service in France under Hatfield, possibly adding some weight to the idea 
that the bishop only arrived on this day. Sadly the dating of enrolled pardons can be 
confusing, as it is not always clear to what the date refers.''''^ I f the 4"^  refers to the date 
the pardon documents were sealed, it would necessitate Hatfield and the king acting 
immediately on the bishop's arrival, which is most unlikely. Alternatively it could 
reflect the length of service of these men, coinciding very neafly with a possible date for 
'^^ Le Baker, 79. 
Rogers, Wars of Edward HI, 271 n. 187. 
^' See indications in Barker, 'Death and the bishop'. 
Avesbury, All. 
^ Sumption, Trial by Battle, 537. 
CPR, 1345-48, 488. Hatfield is also placed outside Calais on 8 September [Foedera, iii, i, 90.]. 
Ayton, 'Normandy Campaign of 1346', 259. 
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Hatfield's arrival. More compelling is that having fought at Crecy these men were 
pardoned for actual service, rather than in advance of it. 
A letter of John Fossour, prior of Durham, to his bishop informing him of the 
threat of Scottish invasion, appears at first to fiarther complicate an already confused 
picture, however it ultimately fits the interpretation that Hatfield left England on 11 
July.'*'*'' Raine places the letter in July 1346, and this has surely helped many confirm at 
a glance Hatfield's presence fi-om La Hogue. However, Raine's thinking is confused 
but understandably so; the letter is puzzling, with many of its details not appearing to 
add up. Nevertheless, it is possible to work through the letter and gain an understanding 
of it. Fossour's purpose in writing was to thank Hatfield for his news of English 
success in France and also inform him of the increasing threat of the Scots. Sadly the 
letter does not make it clear whether Hatfield was just relaying information or had 
himself participated in events in France, nor even to which success was being referred. 
The adulation which the news of success received from the prior, makes it likely that the 
success was Crecy, as Raine notes, yet this is at odds with his own dating of the 
document in July 1346. Hindsight pales the significance of successes before Caen in 
comparison to Crecy, but in late July they would have seemed the cause for such 
rejoicing. Nevertheless the timing does not ring true. 
Importantly Fossour makes note of the collection of the fiiiits of autumn, 
suggesting he was writing around harvest time. Additionally, that the prior makes note 
of rumours that Philip V I wished to provoke Scottish incursions, would suggest a dating 
not before late August, as the first letters sent by the French king to the Scots are dated 
in the middle of that month.'*'*^ This would fit the battle being Crecy, Fossour writing 
sometime in mid-September, by which time Hatfield was definitely outside Calais. The 
tone of the letter would fit this, apparently reflecting the fears of northerners 
immediately prior to the raid that ended with the battle of Neville's Cross. 
Fossour's dating of the incursion of the Scots into Westmoreland also has the 
potential to cause confusion. He notes that the Scots entered English lands on the feast 
of St. Peter in Chains, which is the 1 '^ August, but there is no other evidence that the 
Scots raided then. Importantly a copying error would explain this; Fossour or - much 
more likely - Raine noting 'Sancti Petri ad Vincula', where it should have simply read 
'Sancti Petri'. The feast of St. Peter is on the 29 June, which fits with the known 
incursion of the Scots into the Western March. Hence it seems that Fossour was 
Historical Papers and Letters from the Northern Registers, ed. J. Raine (London, 1873), 385-86. 
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actually referring to two separate raids, the one which had occurred in early July 1346, 
and the one which was about to be unleashed on the north in September. Importantly, 
that Fossour felt the need to inform the bishop of the early July raiding, very strongly 
suggests that Hatfield had not been in the north at this time and had not since returned. 
UUimately, because of the 17 July indenture it cannot be certain that Hatfield 
was at Crecy, yet all other evidence seems to strongly indicate that Hatfield did take part 
in the battle that would be the pirmacle of his career. Whilst the various chronicle 
accounts do provide vivid detail of the fighting, they are hard to reconcile, and thus a 
certain course of events is impossible to establish, and any great insights into Hatfield's 
career are hard to decipher. Yet i f Hatfield did indeed fight at Crecy, no matter i f he 
remained predominantly in the rearguard, the events would have left a distinct 
impression upon him, for many reasons. The battle was certainly one of great brutality 
and carnage, continuing late into the night, with fatalities on the French side being 
notably high. Some impression of the mayhem on the battlefield is given by Geoffrey 
le Baker's assertion that many French were crushed in the midst of their own army, 
never having reached the English positions.'*''^  More importantly after the frustration of 
being denied a decisive battle before his rise to Durham, Hatfield's satisfaction upon his 
installation - just under a year previously - would have been made all the sweeter by his 
presence with his king at such a hard fought triumph, and perhaps fiirther so by his 
leading of John of Bohemia's fiineral. 
Nevertheless even i f it is accepted that Hatfield was at Crecy, we are left with a 
frustrating uncertainty over exactly when he left England, which hinders any attempt to 
assess his activities in relation to his role as a defender of the north. The ultimate 
question is whether Hatfield left for France with the north in great peril? Because i f this 
was the case it would appear to contradict the interpretation that Edward long planned to 
create Hatfield as bishop of Durham, specifically in order to counterbalance the threat of 
the Scots. 
In 1345 Hatfield was made regent when Edward III went to Flanders, and does 
not appear to have been included in the plans for either of the abandoned campaigns to 
Brittany or Gascony.'* '^' This may have been caused by fears over Scotland, and 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 111. 
Le Baker, 84. 
For the planned campaigns of 1345 see Sumption, Trial by Battle, 472. 
Hatfield does appear to have played his part in the north. Whatever the case, the need to 
secure himself in his new office surely meant that campaigning in 1345 was not an 
option for Hatfield. Therefore 1346 is the first real test of the porfrayal of Hatfield as a 
defender of the north. In the early months of 1346 he seems to have carried out his task 
to good affect but by May, letters of protection suggest that, he had come south or at 
least soon planned to do so. 
In 1346 Edward had the choice of Gascony or northern France as the destination 
for his campaign. Though military preparation had dominated most of 1346, Sumption 
has suggested that the absolute final decision to sail to Normandy was not taken until 
approximately 20 June, when Edward apparently changed his mind from Gascony to 
Normandy.'* '^ This raises some doubts whether Hatfield had long planned to campaign 
due to the possibility of Gascony's distance. However it is possible that Edward had 
always leaned towards Normandy, and Hatfield knew or suspected this. Indeed, whilst 
Normandy had not yet assumed its fifteenth century importance to the English, it had 
strategic draws. It would in theory be comparatively easy to move troops and to 
maintain them either from across the channel, or to live off some of the most fertile soil 
in France. Also, and perhaps more importantly, looking back with hindsight after the 
events of 1346, Normandy presented an opportunity to wound the Valois, in one of its 
heartlands.''" 
Originally Edward had wished to lead a campaign in early spring 1346 but 
problems in raising both an army, and boats to transport them, pushed the date back to 
mid May.''^^ On 27 March Hatfield appears to have been at York discussing plans to 
defend the north once Edward headed abroad, but after this we are left in the dark until 
the meeting at Newcastle in mid July. It is possible that this March meeting saw 
Hatfield requested to join Edward abroad, the other northerners being assured that they 
would have the support to defend the north without him. Indeed the Scottish situation 
appears not to have caused great concern through the spring until after Edward had 
ultimately departed. Indeed the Scots had only raided for a week in 1345 before they 
ran out of supplies and had to return home, the English maybe expected nothing more in 
1346.^ ^^ 
Sumption, Trial by Battle, 497-99. 
A.E. Curry, 'Lancastrian Normandy: The Jewel in the Crown?', England and Normandy in the Middle 
Ages, ed. D. Bates and A. Curry (London, 1987), 239. 
Sumption, Trial by Battle, 489-492. 
Ibid., 499. 
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Though Edward's army had been encamped on the south coast since early June, 
poor weather prevented departure for just under a month and a half "^ ^^  Importantly 
Edward III boarded his ship and left Portsmouth on 28 June, and it is likely that Hatfield 
did the same. So though they did not leave the English coast for a fijrther two weeks, 
the ships were loaded and ready to sail to France."*^ ^ In this scenario therefore, whilst 
news of Scottish raiding into Westmoreland in early July may have reached the king 
before his passage to la Hogue, Hatfield would not have been in a position to leave his 
ship and disrupt the plans. This would have been especially been the case after waiting 
so long, and being in the knowledge that last year's raid only lasted six days. I f rumour 
of Scottish preparations had reached Hatfield before boarding on 28 June this may have 
prompted him not to sail with the king, returning instead to be at Newcastle on 17 July. 
The evidence of letters of protection for his retinue, dated until 6 July when he would 
have already have boarded ship, count against this.'* '^' As noted above, had he returned 
to the north, it is unlikely that he would have left before the truce at the end of the 
month, which in turn would stand strongly against him fighting at Crecy. 
The Scottish truce was to run until the end of September 1346. However there 
are indications that events, and the absence of so many Englishmen away in France, 
seem to have swiftly raised fears again, though the indications offered are once again 
frustrating. Between 19 August and 7 September 1346 Henry de Melbourne and 
William de Burton, two northern clerks, arrived in London informing the government of 
fears of Scottish restiessness.'*^^ It is possible that the arrival of the clerks provoked the 
order on 22 August 1346 for Henry Percy to send spies into Scotland. Though such 
espionage was part and parcel of medieval warfare, and the move need not have been a 
response to specific stimuli; it was surely a sensible move as only a month of the truce 
remained.'*^^ We know that Philip V I had written to David I I before Crecy hoping to 
force the English to return home, and that by this time the government back in England 
knew of the imminent danger to the north.'* '^^  It is with this knowledge that Hatfield 
would have sailed i f he were among the first reinforcements to arrive, having just 
missed the battle of Crecy. 
""/Wi/., 492-501. 
Ibid., 500. 
Wrottesley, Crecy and Calais, 101. 
"•^^ Prestwich, 'English at Neville's Cross', 3. 
Ibid. Rot. Scot., i, 674. As an example of espionage, Hatfield himself is noted as having had had 
contact with a spy during his stay in the Netherlands [Norwell, 266.]. 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 277. 
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Here it is worth discussing what motives the Scottish had for launching attacks 
in 1346, as it will help us to understand what Hatfield and Edward would have expected 
the Scots to do. As Grant ponders, noting the lament of an early fifteenth century 
Scottish prior, was there any need for the Scots to invade with such force in 1346?"*'' 
For most of 1346 such a move would not have been expected by the English. Grant 
notes that for most of 1346 the Scots had in a sense won the Anglo-Scottish conflict, at 
least temporarily. The English king had devoted his energies to war in France, as the 
removal of the flower of English chivalry to Calais suggests. Far from being hellbent 
on pacifying Scotland - as he had been in the I330's - security was now Edward's 
primary objective in the north. Philip's inifial letters to David in late-summer 1346 
were probably rejected by the Scots, who having raided in July had come to a truce, 
after being chased back across the border by Neville and Percy. 
However events in France threatened to change the situation, Crecy and 
Edward's declaration of his intent to take Calais cannot be underestimated. Traditional 
interpretations, such as Perroy's, have been turned on their heads by recent research. 
Crecy, was not victory grabbed from the jaws of defeat but the product of a calculated 
attempt to bring the reluctant French king to battle on English terms.'*''^  And Calais was 
not merely a way for Edward to flee France; he already had a suitable port in Le Crotoy, 
and ultimately spent a year securing Calais, whilst actually bringing more troops to the 
siege.'*^ '* The Scots would have seen how Edward had won a famous victory, and also 
that he intended to gain another one. Given the continued cajoling of the French it 
probably would have appeared to the Scots that the balance of power in northern Europe 
was tipping decisively towards England, and that this threatened to shatter the apparent 
Scotfish security. So whilst some confusion surely existed in David's mind, he 
probably felt he had to do something when an opportunity such as this presented itself 
Hence when he responded to Philip VI's request for assistance, David I I was not just 
honouring the auld alliance, rather in his eyes he was fighting to maintain it. By 
attacking, the Scots presumably hoped to prevent Edward picking off his enemies one at 
a fime. 
A. Grant, 'Disaster at Neville's Cross: The Scottish Point of View', The battle of Neville's Cross, 
1346, 15. 
For traditional interpretation see for example E. Perroy, The Hundred Year's War, translated by W.B. 





It is helpful to wonder what would have been the ideal result of the invasion of 
1346 for the Scots. David planned to invade deep into England, hoping to goad 
Edward to loosen his grip around Calais. Yet he surely had no realistic wish to claim 
swathes of northern England, as the Scots had had enough trouble keeping hold of their 
own lowlands. By the time major English reinforcements reached the north, David 
would have planned to have already disappeared across the border. Replete with 
plunder and content with the damage done to northern England, he would have hoped 
that Edward would only wish to regain his security and would resist the temptation to 
launch too destructive an attack into the Scottish lowlands. Ultimately the move proved 
disastrous, yet it is hard to overly criticise the thinking of David 11.'"'^  Hence, in July 
1346, even i f he had heard news of Scottish moves into Westmoreland before 
embarking, Hatfield would probably not have been desperately worried. To his mind 
there would have been little point in rushing back to the north. The attack would surely 
be over by the time he arrived and the Scots would have neither been able to, nor want 
to, launch another attack until the next summer. 
Less immediately excusable is Hatfield's apparent failure to return to England 
on being informed in early September that Scotland was soon to become a theatre of 
war once again. Neville's Cross and Crecy were separated by a month and a half, and 
fighting in both was feasible as John Neville, son of Ralph, illustrates.''^^ Yet, it is first 
necessary to ensure ourselves that Hatfield was not at the battle of Neville's Cross, for a 
number of chronicles again assign him a role. 
Jean le Bel's account has little basis in reality, and is easy to discount. The 
Hainaulter has the battie occurring outside Newcastle, not Durham, and lists Hatfield, 
along with the archbishop of Canterbury, the bishop Lincoln, and even the Queen, as 
illustrious protagonists.'*^^ As Froissart relies so heavily on Le Bel for this campaign, 
his assertion that the bishop of Durham was present is also worthless. The Meaux 
Abbey chronicle offers a damning picture of the bishop, suggesting he 'was staying in 
the south in a manor he owned',"^^ apparently disinterested in the plight of the north. 
Whilst it cannot be discounted out of hand, it does not ring true. Unless he was injured. 
Grant, 'Disaster at Neville's Cross', 18-19.. 
""^^ Prestwich, 'English at Neville's Cross', 8. 
The evidence suggests none of these were present [Ibid., 8-9.]. 
Chronica monasterii de Melsa a funditione usque ad annum 1396, ed. E.A. Bond, Rolls Series 43, iii 
(London, 1868), 60-2. Hatfield did have a number of southern manors, [M.W. Thompson, Medieval 
Bishop's Houses in England and Wales (Aldershot, 1998), 116.] including the one at Aldeford where he 
died in 1381. 
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it is most unlikely that a warlike man such as Hatfield would have been staying at a 
manor he owned, not trying to get to a potential battle. The chronicler was possibly 
taking the absence of the bishop as an opportunity to comment on the non-residential 
nature of much of the episcopate. 
Telling is the non-appearance of Hatfield in the comprehensive list compiled by 
the northern clerk, Thomas Sampson, whose account is seen as exceptionally valuable 
as it was written in the direct aftermath of the battle.'"'^ Most conclusively, had Hatfield 
been at the battle. Prior Fossour would not have felt the need to write to him reporting 
it.''^^ In conclusion, here is nothing to suggest that Hatfield was anywhere but outside 
Calais when the battle occurred, so the question that needs to be addressed is why he did 
not hurry back with concerned northerners such as John Neville? The answer appears to 
be found in a keen understanding of the situation on Edward's part. 
Edward III must have well known that to withdraw from Calais, either fully or 
partially, was to give Philip V I exactly what he wanted. Edward was loathed to bow to 
his enemy and equally he was not a man for half measures. He had quite literally set his 
stall out to win Calais and/or force the French to give him a second, and what he 
believed would be a decisive, pitched batfle. Therefore it is likely that Edward told his 
bishop of Durham to remain and trust in the measures he had himself helped maintain, 
which had long been in operation. Much of the 'flower of the good chivalry of England' 
was outside Calais, but the north was far from unprotected. Hatfield would have felt he 
was in the wrong place but he would have also realised that despite the vigour with 
which Edward III had fought to secure his provision to Durham, one man's absence 
would not leave an unbridgeable breach in the marches' defences. Of all those assigned 
to defend the frontier on 8 March, he was the only absentee. In addition Hatfield would 
have realised it was highly possible he would arrive in the north too late, and as such he 
was not to be distracted from his task in France. 
In attempting to decipher Hatfield's defence of Durham and the north in general, 
it is vital to think of what would have befallen the region i f the invasion had not been 
met and defeated at Neville's Cross. The evidence indicates that David II was in no 
position to plan a savage and wanton, annihilation and destruction of the north; though 
it is important to understand how those in the north would have feared this. Indeed the 
Durham monks are reported to have negotiated with the Scots before the battle. Perhaps 
469 Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 138. 
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they felt deserted by their new warrior bishop, and there were thoughts of paying off the 
invaders with a fee of £1,000.'*''' Along the same lines, Historia Roffensis states that the 
bishop of Durham had been sent letters by the Scots giving him an option to safeguard 
Durham, and his lands and manors, for 1,000 marks of silver. This chronicle is 
important as it additionally notes that an alternative option was offered, which was that 
the palatinate supply the Scots with enough bread with which to sustain their passage to 
York.'*'^ Further, the Lanercost chronicle, written in the north-west march, explains 
how the Scottish king 'strictly ordered that four northern towns should not be burnt, to 
wit, Hexham, Corbridge, Darlington and Durham, because he intended to obtain his 
victual from them'.'*^^ 
Though David apparently had aims to raid deep into England, these chronicle 
accounts are also a sign of how limited the Scots were in what they could hope to 
achieve. Edward was well aware of this, and at these critical times in 1346 and later, he 
seems to have displayed a clear understanding of the situation and how he could best 
achieve his aims. This allows us to reconcile Hatfield's use in 1346, and his role as a 
'guardian of the north'. Importantly the auld alliance meant that Edward's conflicts 
with Scotland and France were not independent but rather different fronts of the same 
war. The English king had devoted much of the early years of his reign to fighting the 
Scots, but by 1336 had failed to get the Scots to sign a peace agreement. Though the 
Anonimalle and Lanercost chronicles are surely correct to point to Scottish pride as a 
reason for the failure in 1336, Knighton's highlighting of French influence is 
significant.''^'' The Scots could be broken militarily but in the French they had an ally in 
whose interests it was to stop them withering completely.'*'^ Though it is unlikely that 
French assistance to the Scots ever amounted to much in real terms, the potential was 
always there and could help convince the Scots to fight on. 
The nature of Scotland's dependence was well known but Edward III seems to 
have had a clear understanding of his problems to the north. He knew that through swift 
raiding the Scots could inflict a substantial degree of damage, and this is why he wanted 
a man such as Hatfield to defend the north. However, whilst Scottish raiding created a 
''™ Raine, Letters from Northern Registers, 387-89. 
Ibid., 23. Knighton, ii, 41. Such payments were common under Edward II [J. Scammell, 'Robert I and 
the North of England', EHR, cclxxxviii (1958), 389-90.] and Bishop Bury had fallen into this by the end 
of his pontificate. 
"^ ^ Rogers, 'Scottish Invasion of 1346', 57. 
Lanercost, 346. 473 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 111. 
'''Ibid, 128. 
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lawless frontier, was bad for morale and drew finances and manpower away from 
France, this was by the mid-1330s the realisfic extent of its threat. Before this time 
Scotland was a vital arena for Edward to secure himself after the political and military 
humiliations of 1328."*^ ^ Hatfield's role as bishop of Durham was to allow his king to 
focus on France by securing his northern frontier. There would have been no 
suggestion that his 'job description' would have included solving the Scottish problem; 
king and servant knew the key to regaining suzerainty over Scotland lay principally in 
defeating France. 
It is also important to understand what Edward hoped to achieve when 
embarking on a campaign, in order to understand Edward and Hatfield's decisions 
regarding the bishop's movements in 1346. As Rogers forcibly highlights, in his 
conflicts, Edward III was constantly seeking God's judgement. Edward believed 
sfrongly in decisive baffles, therefore on his campaigns he was actively seeking a trial 
by battle, i f albeit always trying to use his tactical ability to provide his English army 
with a strong defensive position.'*''^ This belief in trial by battle was why Hatfield left 
England in July 1346; and was also, rather than the fear he would not have arrived in 
time, the decisive reason why he did not leave Calais in September. Believing that god 
was on his side Edward III was willing to gamble. Edward knew that France was where 
his dreams could be realised or left in tatters, and hence he wanted to unleash his ful l 
weight against the French. Edward rightly gambled that losses against the Scots would 
not drastically change the status quo that was developing in Anglo-Scottish relations. 
Admittedly, there was clearly only so much that Hatfield and his retinue could do to 
influence events in France, and with hindsight their actions seem neither to have been 
decisive at Crecy nor Calais. Yet twice in 1346 Edward appears to have realised that 
whereas in Scotland he had little to lose, in France he had much to gain; as such, when 
assessed from this standpoint, it is hard to fault Edward's use of his 'defender of the 
north'. 
It was the duty of Edward I I I and Hatfield to consider the bigger picture but how 
were events viewed in the north? Does the 'mythical' role of the monks in the battle 
offer any insights into how they perceived Hatfield's absence? Local tradition, recorded 
in the sixteenth century, tells of the vision of St Cuthbert to prior Fossour, the night 
'^Ubid,2S. 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 6-9. 
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before the battle.'*''* The patron saint told Fossour to use as a barmer, the cloth, which 
he had used when performing mass, and then proceeded to point out where the battle 
would take place. The banner then protected the monks from the Scots and gave God's 
assistance to the English. This tale is a reflection on the continuing role of St Cuthbert 
in looking after his monks and town.'*'^ As this tale is based on a local tradition, which 
was later recorded, it is possible to suggest that it may have had its genesis in a popular 
belief that Hatfield had deserted his people. Saints continued to play a role in life and 
could be offended i f not treated well, as is illustrated by the example of subprior Master 
Rypon's lament, concerning religious standards in Durham during the early part of the 
fifteenth century.'**" Had Hatfield's failure to do his duty as bishop, forced Cuthbert -
his most famous predecessor - to act in his place? Direct criticism is evident in neither 
the Rites, nor in either of Fossour's letters, neither of which mention the dream or St 
Cuthbert. Therefore the dream appears to be neither real, nor a tale concocted in the 
priory to make a point against their bishop. 
We can only guess how the bishop's absence was viewed by the common man 
or woman in the north-east. It would be surprising, however, i f in the region's 
alehouses and markets, jibes were not made bemoaning Hatfield's gallivanting in 
France, and how he had let the archbishop of York come and diminish his honour. 
Those better informed would probably have reflected on how the warlike bishop was 
serving his king in any way he could, i f also seeking to increase his own prestige and 
repute. In the end, Hatfield should not be overly chastised for trying to help Edward in 
France and unwittingly missing the battle, which would shape the destiny of the frontier 
for a decade."*' 
Nevertheless Fossour's second letter would have been a great relief to the 
bishop.'**^ Less pleasing would have been its mentioning of the role played by William 
Zouche, archbishop of York, though as yet the traditional tensions between Durham and 
A brief desription or briefe declaration of all the ancient monuments, rites and customes... within the 
Church of Durham before the suppression, ed. J. Raine, Surtees Society, xv, (1842), 20-22. 
Bume ['Battle of Neville's Cross', Durham University Journal, new series (1948-9), 105.] has 
suggested that this story could be real, but as Prestwich ['English at Neville's Cross', 14.] notes this is 
most unlikely. 
The tale is based on ideas that the dead could intercede in life [See P.J. Greary, Living with the Dead in 
the Middle Ages (Ithaca, 1994), chap. 5 and 6. Barker, 'Death and the Bishop', 7.]. 
He noted that 'it is commonly said that St Cuthbert sleeps... because we do not lend our devorions as 
we ought' [Dobson, Durham Priory, 31.]. 
After the battle David II and many Scottish noblemen were left in English hands, leaving Edward III 
entirely with the initiative, making Scotland almost no threat to England [Campbell, 'England, Scotland', 
214.]. 
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York had not been exacerbated enough to fully explode. Zouche, whom Hatfield had 
slurred by going to the archbishop of Canterbury for his consecration, had led the army 
that had defended the seat of Hatfield's episcopal power, winning in the process 'a 
decisive moment in the long conflict between England and Scotland in the later Middle 
Ages.'^ ^^ 
482 Raine, Letters from Northern Registers, 387-89. 
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Part III - 1347: The Siege of Calais and BallioFs 
campaigning in Scotland 
How long Hatfield ultimately waited outside Calais for a second decisive battle 
is unclear. Yet the nature of the success at Neville's Cross would have surely given 
Edward all the more reason to let his bishop of Durham work long outside Calais, 
hideed in siege warfare Hatfield was quite probably in his element. As his military 
career before Crecy shows, Hatfield was skilled in the organisation of war, and he had 
surely had a great part in the planning of the sieges at Cambrai and Toumai. hi this 
sense Hatfield can be seen as something of a veteran, who along with Trussel and 
Kilsby, helped the newer government administrators, such as Thoresby, Bramber and 
Burton, in preparing 'a defended camp and slowly tightening his [Edward's] noose 
around the town until nothing could get in or out'."*^ "* hi fact in this sense it could well 
be that Calais, and not just Crecy, formed the zenith of Hatfield's military career. 
The evidence of later writs of exoneration for members of Hatfield's retinue 
indicates only that the bishop left France sometime before the siege's completion."*^^ A 
number of his retinue are listed elsewhere in the Calais Roll, as having also served as 
captains in their own right.'* '^' As stated above the dates of service have not survived, so 
this simply suggests that Hatfield arrived late or left early. It is possible that men such 
as William Marimon, Philip de le Despenser and Thomas Colville, were in command of 
their own retinues fi-om La Hogue and then joined Hatfield when he arrived later.'* '^ 
However, given the judgement that Hatfield sailed to La Hogue, the suggestion is that 
the bishop left Calais early. Whilst we have no real clue as to when this return may 
have been, it is possible to draw up a reasonable hypothesis. 
As bishop of Durham Hatfield was requested to conduct a number of important 
activities at home in England. Diocesan business such as this would have carried with it 
little compulsion to leave the walls of Calais. For example on the 15 November 1346 
the council at Windsor directed to Thomas, bishop of Durham, notice of the 
presentation of Robert de Hampslape, to the Church of EUeton in the diocese of 
Prestwich, 'English at Neville's Cross', 1. 
Chapters, iii, 169-70. For quote see Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 276-77. 
''"^  Wrottesley, Crecy and Calais, 132, 139, 141, 143, 148, 160, 163, 164, 166, 172, 179. 
Ayton, 'Normandy Campaign of 1346', 265. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 423-426. 
For example see Wrottesley, Crecy and Calais, 141, 201 [William Marmion], 87, 201[Philip de le 
Despenser], 101, 200 [Thomas Colville]. 
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Durham.''^^ Yet in reality this was simply being sent to the bishop's administration, as it 
is most unlikely that Hatfield ever dealt personally with such matters, even when in the 
north. 
The dating of Hatfield's first visitation is somewhat problematic. It is possible 
that, although it is noted as having started in February 1346, it was left uncompleted 
when Hatfield left for the continent, or, perhaps, it had not even been properly started.'*^^ 
Indeed i f the visitation continued into, or in reality started in, 1347, it is possible that 
this duty may have added weight to the bishop's need to return. Still it is unlikely to 
have provided the strongest pull, especially had he already undertaken the initial visit of 
the priory - in spring 1346 -, as he later showed that he had the ability to complete tasks 
far from their place of origin. For example, in March 1355 - some seven months after 
its commencement - Hatfield sent the injunctions of his second visitation north, having 
moved south to baptise Thomas of Woodstock.**^ *^  
Arguably far more of a pull away from Calais would have been the non-religious 
aspects of Hatfield's role as bishop. On 10 December 1346 Hatfield was amongst the 
northern lords summoned to a council to address matters of northern defence.'* '^ Then 
at the end of January 1347, the clergy of the province of York convened at St. Peter's, 
York , to grant funds for the king's wars.'*^ ^ Neither Edward III nor Hatfield sat outside 
Calais would have viewed the convocation as a trifling concern, as will be discussed 
below. Hatfield was a soldier in all senses of the word, and clearly understood the need 
to provide as much money as possible to feed the hungry war machine. However in 
early 1347 Hatfield would still have been reluctant to leave Calais before the conclusive 
battle, especially having seemingly played such a part in Edward's efforts to engineer 
it.^ -^^  
^^^CPR, 1345-48, 214. 
2.7. Pont. Ih. places the visitation as occuring from at least 8 February 1346. However Harbottle 
['Hatfield's Visitation', 84 n 17.] places the visitation in 1347, as does Dobson [Durham Priory, 231.], 
although sadly neither provide exact dates. Dobson cites 2.7. Pont. 1., as one of his sources, but also 
additionally cites Harbottle, so it is possible that the confusion stems from a Harbottle mistake. Harbottle 
cites 1.8. Pont. 9. as her source for all three Hatfield visitation dates [1347, 1354, 1371]. However 
Harbottle ['Hatfield's Visitation', 84.] notes that Hatfield stated, 'in 1346 before he visited the priory for 
the first time' that he would receive no procuration fee for the visitation, thus confirming the clause in le 
Conveniet. So perhaps the visitation did start in 1346, but why then do Harbottle and Dobson date the 
second visitation on the completion of the injunctions [1355]. 
One thing is clear; more work is needed to decipher the course of events of Hatfield's visitation. That it is 
confusing, is perhaps reflected by Harbottle's passing over it to work instead on the second visitation. 
Harbottle, 'Hatfield's Visitation', 85, 87. 
Foedera, iii, i, 97. 
^'^^CCR. 1346-49, 154, 508. 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 275-85. 
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Yet i f he had not left by May 1347 it is hard to see that Hatfield would have left 
before Calais was handed over to the English. This is because from this time Edward 
believed that his battle was imminent, as he had gained information that Philip was 
mustering an army.'*^ '* This importantly coincides with the timing of Edward Balliol's 
first incursion with the support of the northern lords. Sadly, relatively little is known of 
Balliol's moves into Scotland in 1347. What is known is that Hatfield was not part of 
the planned force drawn up in March 1347.'*^ ^ However Balliol did not cross into 
Scotland until May, so it is highly likely that Hatfield was sent back to add his weight to 
what was one of few aggressive moves by Edward III in Scotland after the 1330s. By 
this time apart from the hope for an ultimate battle, Hatfield's work outside Calais was 
surely largely done. 
Seeing that he held the initiative, given the Scottish calamity at Neville's Cross, 
Edward II I was willing to give Balliol another chance, and hence he fiilly supported him 
in another attempt to impose himself on Scotland."*^^ In the circumstances, after almost 
a year away, it is understandable that Hatfield would have been sent to serve his king in 
his own northern arena. In the end even with a second incursion in October, Balliol 
was not able to win a decisive battle, which would have allowed him to force himself 
upon the beleaguered Scots,"*^ ^ but Edward's thinking is understandable. It is important, 
despite the useful idea of how the king sought to use Hatfield in the most telling area, to 
remember that Edward was not compelled to use his bishop in accordance with any set 
doctrine, no such system would have even existed in his mind. Whilst a pattern and 
way of thinking can be deciphered, Edward was axiomatically making human 
judgements. Therefore there is no great contradiction in his bringing Hatfield to France 
for a decisive battle in 1346, keeping him there into 1347 but then sending him away 
before another potential battle in late 1347. 
In Balliol's first move, his army operated in Scotland through May and June 
1347, penetrating up to Glasgow and securing much of the border lands. Still, the 
campaign was something of a failure, and seems to have fiarther convinced Edward that 
the way to defeat Scotland was in securing the north, whilst fighting in France. The 
Scots were unwilling to give battle and Balliol was loathed to brave the dangers of a 
Ibid., 278. 
"^^ Rot. Scot, i, 691-92. 
"•'^  Campbell, 'England, Scotland', 214. 
See Ibid, and A.A.M. Duncan, 'Honi soit qui maly pense: David II and Edward 111, 1346-52', Scottish 
Historical Review, 67 (1988), 114. 
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march to the Tay.'^'^^ In supporting Balliol's moves in 1347, Edward's aim appears not 
to have been to make a concerted aggressive move, but instead to assess whether 
Neville's Cross had weakened the Scots so far that they would tamely submit. It was 
not long before the English king returned to a defensive stance in the north, prompting 
him to opt for diplomacy instead, as he decided to make use of David II , whom he had 
held in captivity since Neville's Cross. 
'''Ibid.,\\4. 
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Part IV - Organising the defence of the north, and the 
potentially divisive effect of tensions between the sees of 
Durham and York 
As noted above, given Hatfield's proposed enjoyment of participating on the 
field of battle, suggested by his seal and campaigning history, it would be easy to 
wrongly gauge his role in the north. Edward would have seen the advantages of 
promoting Hatfield when he was relatively youthful for a bishop - perhaps not much 
older than forty -, as it is hard not to link Bury's lapse into defence by payment, with his 
failing health. Tellingly, within a year of re-commencing these payments Bury was 
buried in the cathedral. Nevertheless, the defence of the north was not simply a 
question of skilled warriors riding about the north, dismissing the Scots back to whence 
they had come. And after the winter 1341-2 campaign of Edward's, the 1347 Balliol 
campaigns were the only English aggression until the winter 1355-56. Had the battle of 
Neville's Cross not all but ended serious Scottish raiding over their border, we would 
have been afforded a better picture of exactly the role Edward had in mind for his 
servant upon his appointment. However a picture can be compiled from various 
available pieces of information. 
The key to defending the north was organisation, something in which Hatfield 
had proved himself most capable. The Scots were able to move quickly with their 
lightly armoured hobelars, taking off supplies and burning what they could not carry. 
Only if, as in 1346, the raid was cut off, would a pitch battle ensue. As Edward IPs 
reign shows such raiding thrived off division; i f individual northerners were allowed to 
pay off the Scots, it allowed them easy passage and additional supplies to plunder 
further.'*^^ Durham was of particular importance as it was wealthy.^'"' Indeed, Hatfield 
would have had little difficulty in protecting only his bishopric, as is illustrated by the 
letters which it is claimed were written to him before the Neville's Cross raid: payment 
could ensure immunity. This was, however, specifically what his king did not want him 
to do, and Edward surely chose perfectly, as such a move would appear totally against 
the bishop's nature. 
See J. Scammell, 'Robert I and the North of England', EHR Ixxxiii (1958). C. McNamee, The Wars of 
theBruces: Scotland, England and Ireland, 1306-1328 (East Linton, 1997). 
Scammell, 'Robert I and the North', 391-92. 
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Hatfield was to join with the likes of Percy and Neville to protect the whole of 
the North-east. Here Edward II's wall analogy, although obvious, is usefiil; i f the Scots 
could not deal with the English individually they faced a far harder task. Where the 
analogy is less apt is in how the united front was to keep out the Scots. This was no 
Berlin wall, or Great Wall of China, rather it can tentatively be proposed that it was 
more of a Hadrian's wall. The northern lords could not literally hope to keep the Scots 
out of England should they want to make an incursion, though their presence could act 
as Hadrian's wall had in a symbolic sense, as a statement of control. The Scottish 
incursions in 1346 and 1355, when they perceived that the wall had left, lend credence 
to this interpretation. Yet i f the Scots did enter English territory, the northern lords 
provided a network of information, and pools of men - similar to the Roman forts 
someway behind the wall - that could then be mobilised, to drive the invaders away. 
Edward III had no aspirations for Hatfield to be an individual saviour of the 
north but hoped he could become a part of a system that had long existed, i f not always 
worked. For example, as Campbell rightly points out 'that an army to defeat the Scots 
was collected in time and at the right place in 1346 was the result, not of fortunate 
improvisation, but of the orderly working of a system of defence much of which was at 
least as old as the reign of Edward I ' . ^ ' " A thorough and detailed assessment of the 
intricate workings of northern taxation, recruitment, and other expenditure is beyond the 
scope of this study, but the indenture of 17 July 1346 can be used to bring out a number 
of important points. 
The northern lords are noted as having made 'convents' at Newcastle and York 
by which they had expected to receive money from the council. These indentures 
would have been made with the government commissions that arrived from the south to 
discuss the needs of the north. It was these indentures that were essential in providing 
the north with the manpower and men to repel the Scots.^ "^  Both of these, in general, 
came from the north, as it was left to deal with its own defence. The 17 July indenture 
also shows how northern magnates such as Thomas de Rokeby and William de Felton, 
came with their retinues to a general muster to be ready for any attack. They did not 
wait individually in their locality, although it was noted that they would leave i f 
payment were not forthcoming; this example illustrates the emphasis on collective 
Campbell, 'England, Scotland', 212. 
Calendar of Documents relating to Scotland, ed. J. Bain, iii (Edinburgh, 1887), 266-67. For the full 
transcript from the calendar of the document see above. 
Campbell, 'England, Scotland', 212. 
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defence.^ '^^  With men mustering together, at one or perhaps a number of points, it was 
vital for the northern lords to have good information of the enemy's movements. As 
noted above spies were used but also important were watchtowers and Castles, for 
example Norham, which belonged to the bishop of Durham, hideed, just after the 
period of this survey, in 18 November 1359, Hatfield was amongst many other northern 
lords, ordered to look after their castles and fortifications. 
That the lords of the north came together to form this indenture is indicative of 
the unity that was essential for effective defence. The mid-July meeting of 1346 seems 
something of an emergency measure but northern assemblies, and not just government 
ordered ones, appear to have been regular occurrences.^ "^ One fundamental reason for 
this was that the defence of the north was in all of their self-interests, and this is perhaps 
a compelling reason for appointing a northerner, like Hatfield, to Durham. 
Nevertheless, with his vast northern estate, any bishop had a vested interest in 
maintaining the freedom of northern lands from devastation. '^'^  
The potential for friction between the northem lords over defence is illustrated 
most poignantly by the murder of Richard Marmaduke, by Robert Neville on 
Framwellgate Bridge, in Durham, during Edward IPs reign. The immediate cause was 
seemingly the problem of the collection of the county's fruce payments. It is one of 
Edward Ill 's greater achievements that he was able to prevent such animosity, by 
offering balanced rewards to his notable magnates, such as Ralph Neville and Henry 
Percy. By the end of his pontificate Hatfield was part of this unified north; for 
example, in 1377, he noted that John Neville had 'de long temps adeste de nostre 
consaile et nous servant'. 
Hence the friction between the sees of York and Durham must be assessed, due 
to its potential to upset the much needed unity. The relationship between the two sees 
was traditionally strained because of Durham's wealth and power, and the fact that it 
was one of only two true suffragans that York e n j o y e d . T h a t Hatfield was not a man 
to pacify such disputes is revealed in his conflicts over a number of church benefices. 
^"'^ Calendar of Documents relating to Scotland, Bain, 266-67. 
Rot. Scot., i, 844. See Dobson ['Durham and the borders', 137.] for Norham's importance. 505 
Campbell, 'England, Scotland', 212. 
For indication of how jealously Hatfield tried to safeguard his income from his lands see R.H. Britnell, 
'Feudal Reaction after the Black Death in the Palatinate of Durham', Past and Present, 198 (1990), 248-
47. 
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104 
After initially swearing obedience to Zouche, Hatfield seems to have then slurred him 
by reftising to be consecrated by the archbishop. There is no evidence to indicate that 
relations ever improved, and by 22 September 1348 they had soured further as Clement 
VI responded to the bishop of Durham's request to be released from his oath.^'° So 
serious was the problem that Hatfield, his vicar general, official, chancellor, treasurer 
and crucifer were all exempt from excommunication, suspension or subjection to 
interdict. Hatfield probably expected that this would not be an end to the problems and 
at the same time he asked for letters conservatory.^" Clement granted Hatfield these 
letters, which allowed Hatfield to make a swift appeal to a named ecclesiastical panel in 
the event of further strife, negating the financially burdensome and time-consuming 
need to involve the pope again directly. This was Hatfield's insurance should Zouche 
move against him over his exemption.^ 
As Barrel] quite rightly surmises, the exemption must have been 'a frequent 
source of friction between Hatfield and his metropolitan', indeed it surely did much to 
produce the unabated vitriol of Thoresby's 1363 diatribe.^'^ Though it appears that 
Hatfield's relations with Zouche were not as problematic as those with Thoresby, 
Hatfield was implicated of involvement in a disgraceftil incident that occurred in York 
Minster, in early 1349. After vespers had been sung on 6 February a group of his 
supporters moved through the Minster to the gates of the choir. Here, it is reported, that 
under the crucifix they broke wind, shouted insults, and worse; all in order to illustrate 
their contempt for the clergy of York.''"* 
Given this apparent animosity could the parties be expected to work together? 
First of all, it must now be assessed just how far the archbishop was expected to be 
involved in the defence of the north? William Zouche, archbishop from 1340 until 
1352, '^^  was not unaccustomed to war having previously campaigned, and it was he 
who in 1346 stepped into the breach to be present at Neville's Cross. Yet he was not at 
Newcastle on 17 July 1346 and is a far from permanent fixture in documentation 
D.B. Weske, Convocation of the Clergy (London, 1937), 180. Canterbury had 18, York just Durham 
and Carlisle. 
''"CPP, 1342-1419, 137-38. CPL, 1342-62, 283. BarreW, Papacy, 190. 
^" CPP. 1342-1419, 138. 
'^^  Barren, Papac>;, 170-172. 
'^^  Quote from Ibid., 190. For Thoresby's attack see CPP, 1342-1419, All. Thoresby may well have 
known Hatfield well from their time in Edward's civil service, so there is possible true personal 
antagonism. In 1358 it is likely Hatfield's men attacked the archbishop's assistant [Foedera, iii, i, 389. 
Barren, Papacj, 190.]. 
'^^  R.B. Dobson, 'The Later Middle Ages, 1215-1500', A History of York Minster, eds. G.E. Aylmer and 
R. Cant (Oxford, 1977), 44. Letters from Northern Registers, (1873), 397-99. 
^'^ British Chronology, 264. 
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concerning northern d e f e n c e . ^ A s metropolitan of the province of York, the 
archbishop had to concern himself with the co-ordination of a large area. In addition his 
see was slightly removed firom the fi-ontier. Hence the archbishop's role was important 
but less 'hands on' than the bishop of Carlisle's, and he seems not to have been 
expected to work ' in the field' with the likes of Hatfield, Neville, and Percy. 
The archbishop was essential, however, in the granting and raising of taxes. 
York was the capital of the north, and the taxes collected from the lands north of the 
Trent were generally collated there, under the keeping of special officers.^'' In addition 
to this, the theory by which only those who had consented in person, or by proxy, could 
be held to contribute to a grant, was gaining increasing importance. Therefore 
convocations were a vital part of northern defence, in that they backed up the grants 
made in parliament, and hence extensive efforts were made to ensure full representation 
at them, and, as metropolitan, it was to the archbishop that this important task fell.^'^ 
The importance of consent at convocations is highlighted in early April 1347, when 
northern ecclesiastical figures including Hatfield, were written to requesting that they 
follow the lead of those clergy present in parliament who had assented to a wool loan.^'^ 
It was regarding convocations that the dispute most threatened northern defence. 
It seems that Hatfield was absent fi-om the 1347 convocation because he was outside 
Calais, but when, in May 1351, he was next called, he responded by sending his 
chancellor, William Legat, as a proctor. In convocation Legat read out Hatfield's 
protest that he enjoyed the privilege of papal exemption from the jurisdiction of York, 
but noted that 'less the king's business suffer damage by our absence, this proctor does 
appear.'^^° This explanation was accepted with the archbishop's commissary, who then 
went as far as to inform Legat that 'we are pleased to hold your lord excused, by reason 
of his stated privileges; nor do we intend anything to derogate from such privileges.'^^' 
There is little hint here of the kind of dislocation that might have been feared given 
some of the low points of the dispute noted above. The absence was only symbolic and 
in Legat, Hatfield appears to have had a man of no small ability, whom he trusted 
implicitly. Hence the north would have suffered little Irom the bishop's absence. 
'^^  For 17 July 1346 see Calendar of Documents relating to Scotland, Bain, 266-67. For general absence 
see Rot. Scot., and Chancery rolls. 
^" Campbell, 'England, Scotland', 212. 
'^^^ Weske, Convocation of the Clergy, 116. 
CCR, 1346-49, 262 
The Records of the Northern Convocation, Surtees Society, cxiii (Edinburgh, 1907), xlvi. 
Ibid. 
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There may be some possible suggestion of minor problems in the raising of cash 
for the defence of the north. Some time before 6 August 1347 the bailiffs of York 
arrested James Lumbard, Hatfield's moneyer, along with his money, 'for certain 
causes'. It was ordered that he be taken to London to go before the council."^ 
However, as there is no further information available, it is neither clear whether 
Lumbard ever appeared, nor what the council's verdict was i f he did. We can not even 
be certain that this bore any relation to the friction between the two sees, and the 
defence of the north. In conclusion, there is, as yet, little to indicate that the York-
Durham problems resulted in any serious paralysis in collecting of finances for northern 
defence. 
Behind all the show of the protests and insults Hatfield must surely have had 
some dealings with his metropolitan, even i f these were through intermediaries. 
Edward III would not have allowed a total breakdown to occur. The king was himself 
at odds with Zouche, who had obtained the see of York against Kilsby by papal 
provision and was subsequently one of provisions great supporters in England. But 
when it came to actual matters of defence the king knew where the archbishop's 
loyalties lay, and Zouche was not traitorous in his actions. Even Hatfield's and 
Thoresby's relationship does not seem to have been one of genuine hatted. At least it 
was not so strong that they were unable to share the same room with one another, as is 
revealed when, in 1354, they both witnessed Lancaster's receipt of secret orders for the 
Anglo-French negotiations.^ '^* More likely both men felt duty bound to fight for their 
rights, and did so with all the force available to them. Yet, as with the jurisdictional 
tensions between the king and Hatfield, detailed below, though hard fought, they were 
not allowed, nor surely wished, to compromise higher objectives. 
CCR. 1346-49, 304, 387. 
Palmer, English Law, 39-40. 
Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 146. 
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Part V - 1348-55: Hatfield's role in discussions for David IPs 
release 
Just over a year after Hatfield's essentially defensive appointment, the Scottish 
disaster at Neville's Cross gave the English the inifiative. That the Scottish king and a 
number of his most important nobles were in captivity across the border, exacerbated 
the existing political disorder in Scotland.^ ^^ However the situation was not changed to 
the extent that it required a rethink of Edward's grand strategy, or Hatfield's place 
within it. The English still lacked the wherewithal to wage aggressive war in both 
Scotland and on the continent. So after 1347, when he had ftinded Edward Balliol's 
bungled invasion of Scotland, once again Edward II I firmly committed his finances to 
France.^ ^^ The effect of Neville's Cross on Hatfield was to limit - for the time being -
any potential chances to soldier on a frontier battlefield, instead leaving him to confront 
the Scots over the negotiating table. 
For the next decade Hatfield, along with Neville and Percy, had a dominant role 
in running the negotiations for the release of David I I , and initially for a permanent 
Anglo-Scotfish peace. Though it is difficuft to define his exact role in the various 
negotiations with princes in the Low Countries, it is clear that during his rise through 
Edward's administration Hatfield would have gained a great deal of instruction in the 
intricacies of diplomacy. As with other notable warriors of the age, such as the Duke of 
Lancaster, Hatfield was no uncouth slayer; he was skilled at engaging the enemy with 
words, as well as weapons.^ ^^ Neville's Cross had been a great success for the English 
but had not created a fecund atmosphere for negotiation. That it was left to David 
himself to instigate proceedings, is in itself an indication of the problems Hatfield was 
to encounter over the next decade."^ Hatfield's task was to try to get the Scots to 
acquiesce to major English demands, in return for a king which they neither desperately 
needed nor really wanted back. 
It is unclear i f Hatfield was involved in the first discussions over David; the first 
Scottish embassy to London, arrived in the first half of April 1348, but we are lacking 
Campbell, 'England, Scotland', 214. 
""^  Campbell, 'England, Scotland', 214. Duncan, 'David II and Edward III', 114. 
For example the Duke of Lancaster was given secret instructions regarding the ratification of the 
Treaty of Guines in 1354 [Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 146.]. 
Duncan, 'David II and Edward III', 115. 
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details of the English who negotiated with them.^ ^^ Parliament met twice in early 1348, 
the later one running until mid April, but it is unclear i f Hatfield was present. Given his 
possible absence from the north from May-June 1346 until May 1347, it is likely that he 
had much to deal with in his diocese. We are similarly lacking details for those 
Englishmen who received the Scottish mission, which was planned in July 1348 to 
number seven but only arrived in October 1348 with three members."'^ In light of his 
position and his later involvement in negotiations it is highly possible that Hatfield 
would have been away from the north at this time. Indeed there is no evidence of any 
renewed English defensive measures, which were later caused by re-awakened fears of 
Scottish raiding and ran concurrently with negotiations; it seems the Scots were as yet 
still shell-shocked after Neville's Cross. 
On the other hand, the 1348 embassies were never going to be more than 
formative manoeuvres in a relafively long process. So perhaps Hatfield's presence 
would not have been necessary; sadly the available evidence does not suggest anything 
of Hatfield's movements in 1348. Indeed, though they were 'guardians against the 
Scots', the northern lords might only have gained responsibility for the negotiations, 
when Scottish unwillingness to travel too far into English territory, led to meeting being 
moved northwards. Ultimately, here, as in much of Hatfield's life, it is impossible to 
move beyond conjecture. 
1349 saw little development despite the issuing of safe conducts for an 
embassy.^ '^ During this period Hatfield is quite hidden from our view; for example, he 
is largely absent from the records relating to Scotland.^ '^^  This is perhaps explained by 
the arrival of the Black Death and his 'vigorous' feudal reaction within his own 
bishopric. For example, in mid-June 1349 Hatfield was busy appointing a commission 
to enforce the statute of Labourers in his bishopric lands, indicating that he was in the 
north dealing with the running of his bishopric."^ Hatfield certainly spent some fime in 
Yorkshire that autumn, as he is later noted as having granted a charter at Brotherton on 
Rot. Scot.,\, 714-15. 
"° The agenda included 'a final peace between the two kingdoms', but only got a truce extension [Rot. 
Scot, i, 722-23. Duncan, 'David II and Edward HI', 116.]. 
Duncan, 'David II and Edward III', 116-17. See e.g. Rot. Scot., i, 727. 
See Bain Documents Relating to Scotland., and Rot. Scot.. The exception is when on 24 February 
Hatfield was ordered to de-arrest a Scottish ship, which was taken against the terms of a truce. The Scots 
demanded that this was a precondition for their envoys to come to treat for peace [Bain Documents 
Relating to Scotland, 282. See also CCR, 1349-54, 57, 15.] This not the first request, but the first to note 
it as a bargaining tool in negotiations [see previously April 1348 [Bain, Documents Relating to Scotland, 
279.]]. For discussion see below. 
R.H. Britnell, 'Feudal Reaction after the Black Death in the Palatinate of Durham', Past and Present 
128(1990), 29. 
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the 9 August.^ '^* Though plague ravaged much of the country, Hatfield did not simply 
hide away, in his palatinate manors, hoping to escape the pestilence; indeed the north-
east was hit as badly as much of the rest of the land.^ "*^  On 28 May 1350 Hatfield was at 
Auckland,"^ having not long returned from a venture south, as on the 13"^  of that month 
Hatfield had attended a full chapter at St. Albans, at which king Edward had made a 
grant."^ 
Late 1350 saw the negotiations over David I I reopen nearer the Scottish border, 
with the northern lords now undoubtedly in control. On 12 August 1350 safe conducts 
were issued for two Scottish parties, of four, to come to York, to treat with Hatfield, 
Stafford, Percy, and Neville, who were ordered to make up the English delegation on 14 
October.^ ^^ However there were delays; Ralph Lord Stafford's expenses reveal that he 
only made the journey north, to join the three northern lords, on 13 November 1350. 
Indeed we lack details of the nature of negotiations but some Scots seem to have 
arrived, as William Douglas of Liddesdale's release was secured."^ Nevertheless, even 
the planned make up of their embassies is revealing of the lack of Scottish enthusiasm, 
as neither look like they were officially appointed by the Scottish council. Both 'have a 
suspicious resemblance to independent initiatives by the king's friends in the absence of 
any effort by the Steward', as both failed to contain either an earl or a bishop amongst 
their number.^ '*" 
The arrival of David in the north at the end of November 1350 may point to 
some early diplomatic progress by the English contingent. However by 17 December 
the Scottish king had returned to London and this failure can have surprised few 
people.^ '*' Therefore it was decided that a 'complaisant Scot' was to be sent home to 
treat directly with the Steward and others; William Douglas of Liddesdale appears to 
have been in Scotland by the end of the year.^ '*^  Such a decision would not have been 
left entirely to the discretion of the northern lords, but was surely made on their counsel. 
And at this point it is possible that they would have had to inform Edward, that they 
could achieve little or nothing by merely continuing as they had in previous years. 
CPR, 1348-50. 490. 
R. Lomas, 'The Black Death in County Durham', Journal of Medieval History 15 (1989), 127-39. 
Britnell, 'Feudal Reaction', 32. 
CCR, 1349-54, 222. 
"'Rot. Scot., i, 136-37. 




In early 1351 plans were made to hold negotiations even closer to Scotland. 
On 7 March safe-conducts were issued for the Earl March, four bishops, Livingstone 
and Erskine to proceed to Hexham. Hatfield was not included amongst the English 
party this time; somewhat surprisingly given the proximity to his episcopal seat.^ ''^  
However the apparent threat to Calais probably explains this, as at this time the bishop 
of Durham seems to have been burdened by requirements to provide exceptionally large 
amounts of victuals to be sent from Hartlepool.^ '*'* This highlights the degree to which 
Hatfield was still truly a royal servant: as theoretically the liberty was exempt from 
providing contributions, though it was noted that the sheriff of Northumberland would 
pay the bishop for costs.^ ''^  That Hatfield was actually involved in this logistical 
operation, rather than simply passing it on to his administration, can be inferred from 
both the aptitude he had earlier displayed for such tasks as receiver of the chamber and 
his absence from Hexham. In fact it is unlikely that Hatfield was greatly missed. The 
sources reveal that the only discussions to have taken place were with Edward Balliol, 
while the English awaited the Scottish delegation. ^ '*^  
In summer 1351 it was hoped that a breakthrough could at last be achieved. 
Safe conducts were issued on 28 June 1351 for a sizeable Scottish embassy to come to 
Newcastle.^ '*^ English thirst for a result is revealed by the speed with which major 
preparations were made, after an English delegation was named on the same day. This 
delegation was far more powerful than that sent to Hexham; Hatfield returned, joining 
Arundel, Percy, both Ralph and Hugh Neville, and the clerk John Winwick.^'*^ By 7 
July David II had been conveyed to York, and on the 16"* Hugh Neville and the earl of 
Arundel were about to head north. The instruction, which Edward sent north, that his 
negotiators could grant safe conducts in order to allow new Scots to move swiftly to 
Newcastle, is fiirther indication of both his desire for results, and importantly his trust in 
his delegation. It was hoped that this would facilitate more speedy progress, by 
negating the delays of conventional procedure through cenfral govemment.^ '*^ 
•^•^  Quote from Ibid., Rot. Scot., i, 737-8 
'^'^  Only Percy, Neville and William de Bohun, Earl of Northampton were listed as to attend Hexham 
[Rot. Scot., i, 739.]. 
^'^ CFR. 1347-56. 275, 291. CCR, 1349-54, 290-91. 
Lapsley, Palatinate, 306. CCR, 1349-54, 291. 
Duncan, 'David H and Edward HI', 123. 
'^'^  It included four of each of bishops, earls, knights, in addition to William, Lord of Douglas [Ibid., 
125.]. 
Rot. Scot., i, 741. 
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Although there were various hitches, by early November 1351 English efforts 
appeared to have been rewarded. The main negotiations were probably over by 23 
August, as Hugh Neville and Arundel arrived back in London on 28 August. Duncan 
cunningly asserts that they had returned home with the 'undated agreement', which he 
devotes much of his article to.^^° On 4 September, after a week's discussion, Edward 
III finally announced that 'articles in a certain indenture' had been drawn up. 
Seemingly, though pleased with his negotiators' efforts, Edward took time to make sure 
that the document was entirely to his satisfaction. 
Through October, Hatfield and the other remaining members of the delegation 
continued negotiations with those Scots remaining in Newcastle, presumably smoothing 
out lesser contentions after Edward had checked their handiwork. This finally 
culminated in the order for the temporary release of the Scottish king being issued on 3 
November 1351.^^' These northem lords then received David on 14 November 1351 at 
Newcastle,^^^ sending him home with the 'undated agreement'. The English were 
becoming increasingly frustrated by the variety of different Scottish factions, who had 
little incentive to ransom their king. Therefore it was decided to take the drastic step of 
allowing the king himself to return home, hoping that David's personal presence in his 
own country would provide the lubrication, which the release of William Douglas of 
Liddlesdale in 1350 had not yet achieved.^" The work of the northem lords did not end 
upon David's passage to Scotland. On 1 Febmary 1352 Hatfield, Percy and Neville 
were instmcted to negotiate further, to gain some insight into the effect David was 
having on his subjects.^ "^^  
In late March 1352 secret instmctions of the English council gave these northem 
lords allowance, to leave David I I at liberty in Scotland, and to receive him at Berwick 
or Newcastle at Whitsun, i f they judged benefit would be reaped.^ '^ Edward III had 
little choice but to give David more time. Clearly, it was realised by all that the 
prerequisite for a breakthrough would be David's gaining of a base of powerful Scottish 
allies, who wanted him to retum home. Without such a base - no matter how they 
expended their certifiable skills - Hatfield, Neville and Percy faced an almost 
impossible task. They could not hope to force the Scots to ransom a king they did not 
"° Duncan, 'David II and Edward III', 131. 
Rot. Scot., i, 743-45. 
Hatfield, along with Percy and Neville, was to receive David II [Ibid., 744-45.]. 
Duncan, 'David II and Edward III', 125-26. 
Rot. Scot., i, 747. 
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want. Frustratingly for the northern lords, as David was in London a week and a half 
before Whitsun, the deadlock had showed no signs of breaking but this must have been 
half expected/^^ However the order is perhaps most important in terms of this survey, 
in once again revealing just how much the king trusted the judgement of his negotiators. 
It further reinforces the interpretation that the northern lords largely ran the negotiation 
process, as opposed to being puppets with little scope for manoeuvre. 
One possibility opened up by David IPs initial passage to Scotland in 1352, and 
then the potential two-month extension, was that the Scottish king could enter his own 
country in force. Edward III requested that his own Scottish followers be ready to 
support William Douglas and David I I , should civil war erupt from David's desire to 
have his provisional agreement with Edward ratified.^^'' In such an atmosphere Edward 
was surely hoping to provoke his followers rather than merely warn them of its 
possibility. 
However Edward stopped short of active English involvement. Interestingly, 
the chronicle of Henry Knighton suggests that Englishmen were actively involved in 
Scotland in 1353. Knighton recounts that upon hearing of the rejection of the treaty, 
Edward III instructed a number of Englishmen - the northern lords, the 'Disinherited' 
and William de Bohun - to gather with his brother-in-law and wage war against his 
enemies in Scotland. This is surely a case of Knighton confusing his chronology, and 
mixing together the events of 1352 and 1353.^ ^^ However the generally valued 
Knighton is not only wrong in his chronology but also in his understanding of the extent 
of the English king's involvement. No other record of such a move on Edward's part is 
extant, and it seems unlikely that such an invitation to the northern lords would ever 
have been sent. Due to their frustration with the apparent ftitility of their negotiations, 
the northern lords would have jumped at the chance to be able to force a settlement 
upon the Scots. Yet Edward knew that for David to be accepted by his kinsmen, and 
begin to win over some of the supporters of the Steward, it was vital that he appear to 
stand by himself as the true king of Scotland, rather than an English puppet."^ 
On 20 July 1352 Hatfield was summoned to a conference on the 'great and 
urgent affairs at Westminster on the morrow of the assumption next'.'^° Hatfield was 
ordered to send receipt of when he received this summons and to also detail who the 
'^ ^ David was back in the tower on 16 May [Duncan, 'David II and Edward III ' , 132. 
Rot. Scot., i, 748. 
Duncan, 'David II and Edward HI', 133. 
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messenger was. Given these safeguards it would seem fair to assume that Hatfield 
would have travelled to London by mid-August 1352, especially as it is probable that 
the council rethought Edward's strategy for Anglo-Scottish negotiations. Until the 
failure of 1352 the English had been hoping to conclude David's release as part of a 
greater Anglo-Scottish peace settlement. However, after five years of false dawns the 
king was willing to rescind his desire for a more comprehensive settlement. From now 
on Edward simply hoped to cut his losses by securing both long lasting truce, and 
importantly ransom cash to finance the war in France. 
The change of policy did not produce immediate results. Hatfield returned north 
- being at Durham on 27 January 1353^ ^^  - perhaps not with David II but doubtless the 
bishop's return was related to the Scottish king's passage north to Newcastle. David's 
arrival, in late January, appears to have been a hopeful move to entice the Scots to the 
table but it was ultimately unsuccessfial, with no embassy appearing in the records until 
late 1353.^ ^^ On 15 July Hatfield was ordered to attend parliament on 21 September,^^ 
but later in 1353 he was to be back in the north. On 15 October 1353 Edward ordered 
an even greater delegation to treat with the Scots. This time it was to be made up of 
Hatfield, Northampton, Percy, Neville, and for the first time regarding David I I , the 
bishop of Carlisle, Thomas de Lucy, William Greystock, and Henry le Scrope.^ ''^  But 
once again little seems to have been achieved. This was perhaps not unexpected, as 
Edward appears to have been increasingly wary that after such a period of quiet, in 
terms of cross border raiding, discussion might quickly turn to war. The lack of 
Scottish interest in the negotiations exacerbated English concerns, that years of 
negotiations had been merely a way to bide time and cloak the recovery after Neville's 
Cross. Hence on the 30 October Edward prudently demanded that the north be ready for 
any Scottish incursion.^^^ 
No attack materialised and in March 1354 it was deemed safe enough for 
Hatfield to leave the north for a time. On the 18"' the admiral of the north fleet was 
ordered to deliver to Hatfield three ships, to allow him to bring his victuals to London 
Duncan, 'David II and Edward I I I ' . 134. 
Hatfield noted as being a Durham on '27 January, in the eighth year of his pontificate', where he made 
a grant of the office of master forester of the royal liberty of Durham, for life, to his yeoman and 
chamberlain, John de Belgrave, [CPR. 1354-58. 533.]. 
Rot. Scot., i, 759-60. 
' ^ C C / f , 1349-54. 610. 
^''^ Rot. Scot.,i, 761. 
Rot. Scot., i, 762. 
for the parliament.^''^ This should not simply be taken as a general sign of Edward Ill 's 
keenness to have his reluctant episcopate represented at his parliaments.^ *'^  This was a 
time of war and the shipping was highly sought after. That three ships were ordered is 
clearly a measure of Edward's particular affection for his bishop, but also of his need 
for Hatfield to be conveyed speedily but nevertheless still with the necessary majesty 
afforded by his household. 
Yet soon Hatfield was again part of negotiations in the north concerning David 
II's ransom,^ ^" and once again there were early indications that the English lords had 
made progress. Indeed, on 13 July 1354, the negotiations produced an indenture 
detailing that David was to be released for £60,000, which was to be paid in nine annual 
instalments, and guaranteed by hostages. In addition it decreed that a fiirther meeting be 
held on 25 August 1354. Hatfield seems to have taken the gap of a month and a half 
before the next meeting, as a chance to notify Prior Fossour that he wished to make his 
second visitation of Durham, and he conducted the initial visit in Durham fi-om 23-26 
July."' Hatfield almost certainly planned to attend the proposed later meeting with the 
Scots, as on 28 August 1354 he was at Kepier, on the edge of Durham, and then on 1 
September he was at Auckland cast le .However there is no evidence showing that the 
meeting ever occurred.^ ^^ Still, in early October 1354 David was once again sent north 
to Newcastle, along with documentation for ratification.^^'* The English once again 
made extensive preparations but still David was not released. 
Hatfield appears to have sought personal audience with Edward upon this 
failure, as he moved south for a time. He was at Westminster on the last day of October 
1354, before Lancaster left for France."'' It is likely that after discussing the matter 
with his king Hatfield returned north, where on 12 November another indenture was 
drawn up. Both sides agreed to return on 14 January 1355 to ratify the indenture, 
having secured official approval, but i f the meeting ever took place, the advances ended 
^^'^ CCR, 1354-60, 10. Foedera, iii, i, 275. 
See Ormrod's interpretation [W.M. Ormrod, The Reign of Edward III: Crown and Political Society in 
England U27-1377 {London, 1990), 131.]. 
Nautical transport was the quickest and cheapest method of travel at this time. 
'™ The delegation was the same as October 1353 except for the addition of Gilbert de Umfraville, Earl of 
Angus [Rot. Scot., i, 766.]. Foedera, iii, i, 285-91, 293. 
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up being yet another false dawn."^ The problem was as ever that the Scots were 
waiting to gauge the Anglo-French situation. Both the English and Scottish knew that 
there was a treaty under discussion at Guines. In July 1354 it must have appeared to the 
Scots that they would soon be alone. The French king, John I I , was on the verge of 
severing the auld alliance in treating independently with Edward III , yet ratification was 
not due until the end of 1354.^ ''^  It was pragmatic for the Scots to feign a willingness to 
sign but in reality hold back and wait. Ultimately their approach was rewarded when 
the treaty of Guines was not ratified, and hence by the end of February 1355 David was 
once again returned south."^ In response to the setback it was decreed that the defence 
of the North be solidified once again.^^° 
However, the concern was not compelling enough to prevent Hatfield from 
moving south again, as he joined the royal court at Woodstock and was greatly 
honoured by the royal couple. On 22 February 1355 Hatfield baptised Thomas of 
Woodstock, the couple's sixth son, also conducting Philippa's churching.^^' After the 
first day's religious duties Hatfield surely enjoyed the ensuing feasting and jousting,^^^ 
though he could not have taken part in the latter. Clearly as the sixth bom son, the 
young Thomas was not destined for particular greatness but the baptism appears more 
than a matter of official necessity. Rather it was the result of a long personal association 
between Hatfield and the royal couple. 
Philippa had been heavily involved in securing Hatfield's election, and had 
asked Hatfield to help secure benefices at her behest.^ ^^ The couple's second son, and 
third bom child, William, died at Hatfield's birthplace in 1336. It has even been 
suggested that Hatfield was tutor of the Prince of Wales, and though it is not clear 
where this assertion originates,^ '^* given Hatfield's role in the chamber such a bond 
should not be at all surprising, hideed it is plausible that the naming of Thomas was 
partially influenced by Hatfield, who seems to have been godfather to the young prince. 
Certainly, that the baptism was no mere detached formality for the bishop of Durham is 
Campbell, 'England, Scotland', 216. Duncan, 'David II and Edward I I I ' , 134. 
Campbell, 'England, Scotland', 217. 
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shown by Hatfield's will of 1381, in which he asked Thomas - since August 1377, Earl 
of Buckingham - to assist John de Popham, in receiving a thousand marks of silver 
CDC 
owed to the bishop. The pair were then entrusted to use this money to further ease 
Hatfield's path through purgatory; clearly a task for someone held in affection, even 
though the bishop had already done much to secure his salvation.^^^ 
As the summer of 1355 approached unease grew upon the northern frontier. 
News of a French presence north of the border provoked a well organised response; for 
example, on 8 June 1355 the north was issued orders to ready itself, with further 
instruction being sent at the end of the month.^^^ The north had long been left to 
organise itself against the Scots but French assistance threatened to increase the Scottish 
potential to lay waste to English territory. In March 1355 John II of France had sent 
Sire de Garencieres to Scotland, with a force of fifty men-at-arms and apparently 40,000 
deniers d'or a I'escu, a substanfial amount of capital. 
Hatfield seems to have been given a predominant role in preparations. On 18 
July 1355, at Northfleet, Edward and his council detailed that, because the archbishop 
was himself absent, Hatfield was to receive those troops that could be raised in the York 
diocese, in addition to his own f o r c e s . T h i s was a sensible course of action but 
cannot have soothed relations between archbishop and suffragan. Exactly how the 
muster of men from York was concluded is unclear, as it was later noted upon the order 
that it was 'vacated and nothing was done there upon.' Nevertheless, by August 1355 a 
sizeable force was ready at Newcastle.^^'' This appears to have frightened many of the 
Scots, and by the end of September some of them had agreed to a truce, in the 
negotiation of which Avesbury recounts Hatfield played the greatest hand.^ '^ The failure 
of some Scottish nerves appears to have produced a belief amongst many of the English, 
that the French support could not have been as real as their initial intelligence had 
portrayed it. To Edward III this was all important. Upon the agreement of the Anglo-
Scottish truce of Michaelmas 1355, Edward allowed a number of his most important 
Testa. Ebora., 121. For Thomas of Woodstock's titles see British Chronology, 36. 
"^•^  See Barker, 'Death and the bishop'. 
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above with the addition of Mowbray, Buzoun, Deyncourt, and Grey] noted that men who were 
'corporibus impotentes' were not simply excused but should contribute to the expenses of those who were 
able bodied [/WJ., 779-80.]. 
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northern lords leave to join him in campaigning abroad. With the benefit of hindsight 
Campbell has interpreted this as imprudent.^''^ Yet in assessing Hatfield's role as royal 
servant and especially 'guardian of the north', it is important to try and understand the 
thinking behind the move that left the north without Hatfield, Neville, Percy and the 
Keeper of Berwick. 
As the evidence below illustrates, the French presence in Scotland in 1355 did 
not prompt the English king to halt his continental campaigning. It did, however, 
threaten a step up from traditional Scottish raiding; even that of autumn 1346, which 
was launched partly at the behest of the French. Having failed to gain a good peace at 
the negotiating table at Avignon, Edward would have been rightly troubled by the 
Valois' apparent desire, and ability, to attack England from Scotland. Since Sluys the 
English had grown accustomed to the security of its borders from French attack. 
Decisively, the Michaelmas treaty would at once have firstly suggested to Edward that 
Scotland was now safe. But secondly, it told Edward, more bluntly than ever, that the 
solution to his problems with both Scotland and France lay in making 'war in France 
more vigorously than ever before'.^^^ 
So Campbell's comment can perhaps be modified a little. Unbeknown to the 
English, only some of the Scottish nobility had agreed to the truce, whilst others had 
received the promised French money at Bruges on 15 September. Perhaps Edward 
should have catered for the possibility that the French threat had not yet been 
neutralised, as the unusual move against Berwick in early November ultimately 
illustrated to him.^ '^* Moreover, the truce could well have lasted, and the Picardy 
chevauchee of 1355 produced an English victory in a further decisive battle, assisted by 
the fighting abilities of the northern lords. In such a scenario we would be hard pressed 
to see Edward's move as anything other than inspired, i f also not a little daring but 
surely such qualities were valuable in a war leader, especially one who believed he 
had God on his side. As noted above, when assessing Hatfield's probable presence at 
first Crecy, and then his continuing attendance of the siege of Calais in 1346-7, when 
Edward fought on the continent he felt he was competing for a higher stake than in 
Avesbury, 427. 
''-Campbell, 'England, Scotland', 217. 
This is how Froissart has Edward remarking after the failure of the French to make peace at Avignon 
in 1355 [Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 292.] 
Campbell, 'England, Scotland,' 217. 
A comparison between Edward III and Philip VI in the Crecy campaign of 1346 illuminates this point, 
see Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 217-272. 
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Scotland. For Edward III it was pmdent to take risks, when the situation appeared to 
allow it, in order to play his biggest games with his best hand. 
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Part VI - Hatfield in France 1355, the *Burnt Candlemas' of 
1356, and the culmination of a decade's hard work with the 
release of David II in 1357 
In early April 1355 the great council at Westminster had decided on the make up 
of the Gascon campaign and the king's expedition to Cherbourg.^^^ Though the King's 
fleet was assembled at Greenwich by the 10 July 1355, bad weather prevented it fi-om 
doing more than moving along the English coast. Thus it happened that Hatfield was 
fi-eed for participation in continental campaigning in 1355 by the tmce, which was 
concluded with the Scots around Michaelmas. The weather delays and the treachery of 
the king of Navarre, meant that Edward's expedition did not leave until late October 
1355, and also that the destination was switched to Calais.^ ^^ It was not until the 26 
October that Edward's force docked at Calais. 
Though no reliable evidence is currently available for the exact size of the force 
contributed by the late-joining northern lords, something of its significance is indicated 
by Avesbury's figures. He notes that Hatfield's sizeable retinue numbered a hundred 
men-at-arms and eighty mounted archers, which was the same as that noted for Neville, 
with Percy having 50 men-at-arms and 80 mounted archers.^ ^^ Clearly chroniclers were 
often left to make educated guesses regarding numbers, but that the retinues of these 
late comers are specifically noted may suggest the figures had some basis in reality. I f 
this is so, they may reflect the hurried nature of the northem lords' preparations for 
campaigning. Although Hatfield's force in 1346 had a similar number of mounted 
archers, it had far more men-at-arms, however as noted above these 1346 figures must 
be approached with care.^ ^^ 
After Calais's fall in 1347, there had been no full-scale campaigns, as the 
English sought to gain a 'proper peace' without further loss of life. But once Edward III 
was in France he actively sought a battle to defeat the new French king, John II , for the 
first time, and the Valois family for a third major time. The English once again planned 
to bum the French countryside to force its king to face them in a trial by battle. After a 
period of diplomatic and geographical manoeuvring by both monarchs, Edward and 
John finally held discussions outside Calais, both apparently hungry for a battle. Yet 
^"^Ubid, 294-295. 
Ibid, 291. 
^'^^ Avesbury, 427. 
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neither wished to fight upon the others terms.''"'^  Though the duration of the campaign 
was just two weeks there were signs of winter's approach and supplies had dwindled. 
This coupled with the failure of the initial invasion to 'sting' Jean II into battle, seemed 
to condemn the English army to a harsh winter of comparative inertia, whilst diplomatic 
fencing tried to secure a battle.^ *" Though denied a second Crecy, Hatfield certainly 
increased his repute as the warrior bishop of his age; playing a large part in a 
chevauchee, which according to Avesbury was 'much praised' upon the army's 
retum.^"^ Importantly, the chronicler's assessment bears out the interpretation, that 
Edward had succeeded in making Jean II 'appear as reluctant to face the test of battle as 
his father had been'. '^'^  In this sense, though the campaign did not give Edward III what 
he wanted, it was hardly a failure. 
Whether Edward had already decided to return home before he heard of the 
capture of Berwick is open to dispute. Rogers believes that Edward hastened back from 
France because of the news, despite the fact that in 1346 the English army remained 
outside Calais despite Scottish raiding.^^'' Admittedly 1355 presented a different 
situation, as Berwick was the 'largest and most prosperous town in the realm' [of 
Sco t l and] . I t s capture also represented something of a change in approach on the part 
of the Scots, and i f maintained would have provided the Scots with a base to launch 
telling raids against the north. 
Yet in the short term it did not threaten in anyway to decisively alter the Anglo-
Scottish situation. The Scots were still divided and those at Berwick only held the town 
and not the Castle. Had Edward III , in France, believed he had any chance of having his 
trial by battle, on his terms, it is extremely doubtfully that he would have lead his army 
back across the channel in late 1355. Importantly, Campbell does not place the news of 
Berwick's capture as the major reason for Edward's return, noting that 'Edward III 
learned of this either just before or just after he left Calais for England on about 19 
November.'^°^ The situation in France and not in the north, provided the stronger push 
for Edward to return home. 
For Hatfield's retinue see Wrottesley, Crecy and Calais, 198. For its reliability see above. 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 297-303. 
Ibid, 300. 
^''^ Avesbury, 431. 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 304. 
Ibid., 303, 335. 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 60. 
Campbell, 'England, Scotland,' 217. 
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Although he did not return simply because of it, once he had returned Edward III 
nevertheless grabbed his chance to punish the Scots for breaking his truce. Edward 
hoped in doing so to at once reclaim Berwick, and more importantly grease the 
seemingly deadlocked Anglo-Scottish negotiations. The first objective was swiftly and 
painlessly realised. Great energies were devoted to the recruitment and organisation of 
a force, to assemble at Newcastle for the first day of the new year.^ "'' Almost straight 
after the return 120 miners began to mine under the walls of Berwick.''^^ By 23 
December the King was at Durham,^°^ and the royal army had arrived outside Berwick 
by 13 January 1356, which was about the time the mining work reached completion.'^''^ 
The Scottish force inside Berwick realised that they had no hope of resisting, so they 
surrendered allowing the English army to proceed into the Scottish lowlands. 
Hatfield was present at Roxburgh on 20 January 1356 when Edward took the 
step of securing Balliol's cession of his claims to the Scottish throne, and probably had 
a role in the negotiations that preceded it .^" Yet after just over a decade trying to 
maintain a defensive position in the north of England, Hatfield would have been under 
no illusions that this did in fact represent a decisive shifting of focus to his fronfier. 
Edward was still in no position to commit himself to an aggressive war in Scotland. 
Rather in threatening to assert and impose direct lordship, Edward sought to make 
David II more appealing to the, seemingly obstinate, people and nobility of Scotland. In 
doing so Edward hoped first to provoke them into ransoming David. Secondly, he 
hoped to convince the Scots of the value of the peace arrangements that he had already 
drawn up with David.^'^ 
As noted above, moves in 1352 to provoke civil war as a means of helping 
David I I reclaim Scotland had failed. This partly because it was all too clear that the 
Scottish King was being sent home with the backing of his English captor. Therefore in 
1356 Edward's tactic was to reject Balliol, and hence suggest that he was no longer 
interested in puppet rulers. By virtue of his apparent desire to claim the throne for 
himself and not merely his heirs, Edward III now hoped to dupe the Scots into believing 
For example on 24 November 1355 the sheriff of Yorkshire was ordered to collect both mounted men 
and footsoldiers to march swiftly against the Scots [Rot. Scot., i, 783.] 
608 
^'''^ Rot. Scot., i, 785. 
Avesbury, 450. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 335. 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 335. 
''^^ Rot. Scot., i, 788-89. 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 338. 
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that now David II no was longer his puppet, but his rival, and by necessity his enemy. '^^  
After Roxburgh the 'Burnt Candlemas' campaign was the calculated display of 'brute 
force', by which the English sought to back up Edward's assertion of his right.^''* 
Hence the 'Burnt Candlemas' was something of a gamble on Edward Ill 's behalf By 
quickly reopening the Scottish fi-ont, he hoped to deliver a knock out blow and gain a 
passive Scotland under a relatively Anglophile king. Edward could, in no sense, afford 
a return to full scale war on his northern frontier. 
The mere threat of violence nearly produced immediate results. Even before 
Roxburgh, a Scottish commission met an English contingent to treat over the release of 
David I I on 17 January 1356.*^ '^  Then soon after leaving Roxburgh, Edward was 
approached by Lord William Douglas, and Hatfield - amongst others - was then 
instructed to undertake discussions with the Scots. '^^  These failed and the English 
reaction was predictable. The English army split into three sections and, with a front of 
up to twenty leagues breath, proceeded northwards, savagely burning all in their path, 
until Haddington.^Weather problems hindered the supply fleet, necessitating a week 
spent laying waste to Lothian, over Candlemas, and hence the campaign gained the 
infamous title by which it is oft referred.^Because of the failure of the Scots to meet 
his army and due to the logistical problems, Edward started to think of returning south. 
In the destruction dispensed by his army he had already achieved much of what he set 
out to do. However he still hoped for a pitched battle. Hence he soon took a small 
force, perhaps including the bishop of Durham, on an ultimately unsuccessful quest, to 
answer a call of the Duke of Lancaster. Lancaster, having proceeded further north than 
Edward's position at JVIelrose, had heard rumours that there were some Scots who were 
prepared to give batfle.^'^ 
Ultimately on 18 April 1356 William Douglas and Northampton concluded a 
truce, which terminated significant Anglo-Scotfish warfare for the time being.^^° After 
over half a year of activity Hatfield, along with Percy and Neville, was once again left 
in charge of the northern frontier, as the king once again returned south to focus on 
'^^  For discussion of the technicalities of what David 11 had at various times previously been willing to 
give up to Edward see Ibid., 336-37. 
^^Ubid.,33S. 
Foedera, iii, i, 114. 
Hatfield, Carlisle, Northampton, Umfraville, Percy, Neville, Scrope [Rot. Scot., i, 791.]. Rogers, War 
Cruel and Sharp, 338-39. 
Avesbury, 455. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 339. 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 339. 
•^ '^  Ibid., 340. 
''^^ Foedera, iii, i, 122. 
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F r a n c e . O n the face of it, the situation was not drastically different in appearance 
from a year previously. Nevertheless, Hatfield had played an important role in a flow of 
events, which helped produce notable results both in Scotland and France before 1357 
was at its end. 
Having been left in the north, the northem lords reopened negotiations upon 
Edward's retum south in 1356. Immediate results were not achieved, yet by the 
summer of 1357 there was again expectation of a breakthrough. On 16 August 1357 
Hatfield was present at negotiations held at Berwick.^^^ The Black Prince's victory at 
Poitiers in September 1356 had left the French in disarray, and with their own king in 
captivity they were in no position to help the Scots. Now the Scots knew that they were 
alone, and the memories of Edward's bmtal 'Burnt Candlemas' campaign under the 
banner of the king of Scotland, were surely fresh in their minds. Therefore they finally 
agreed to ransom David I I , with terms for his release being reached by the start of 
October 1357.^ "^* Hatfield was present on 5 October 1357 when the indenture 
concerning David II's ransom was notarially attested at Berwick, and the king was 
finally retumed to his people.^ '^^  
The events of 1356-7 should be seen as the closing of a chapter in Hatfield's 
life. Much of his time as bishop was devoted to discussion over David I I , and his release 
was surely something of a relief It is rightly noted that the terms of the Berwick 
indenture of 1357 did little to rectify Anglo-Scottish p r o b l e m s . Y e t it would have 
been felt by the English that having, at last, coerced the Scots into buying back their 
king, there would axiomatically be some shift in diplomatic relations. Hatfield must 
have hoped for a less stagnant diplomatic situation, because it was round the table and 
not upon the battlefield that he stood to continue his role as a 'guardian of the north'. 
Indeed, the 'Burnt Candlemas' of 1356 marks Hatfield's retirement from major 
campaigning, though in 1370-1, an ageing Hatfield did harbour desires to answer the 
call of the pope, and lead a cmsade to assist in the 'defence of the Roman church in 
Avesbury, 456. 
York, Carlisle, Hatfield, Percy, Neville, Scrop, Musgrave [Rot. Scot., i, 809. Foedera, iii, i, 365-8.]. 
"-^ Rot. Scot., i, 811-14. Foedera, iii, i, 372-8. 
Also present in the English delegation were York, Carlisle, Percy, Neville, Scrop and Musgrave, who 
were described as messengers and deputies of Edward III [The Acts of David II, King of Scots, 1329-
1371, Regesta Regum Scottorum, ed. B. Webster, vi (Edinburgh, 1982), 173-74. Rot. Scot., i, 814.]. 
The auld alliance was not mentioned, there was no specific recognition of David II as King of 
Scotland, and territorial issues were not addressed. Neither was the vital problem of the inheritance of the 
crown after David dealt with [See Campbell, 'England, Scotland', 218.]. 
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I t a l y ' . W h e n Henry of Lancaster left for Normandy in mid June 1356, Hatfield was 
still very much involved in the north. ^ '^ '^  After the brutal show of force in 1356 there 
could be no suggestion that Hatfield leave his post, as it was apparent that he could now 
help conclude the task to which he had devoted much of the previous decade. It has 
been argued that Edward used Hatfield when he wanted to throw his full weight against 
his Valois enemy. Nevertheless there was surely little question that a man so involved 
in the north would head so far away as the South of France, and hence Hatfield was not 
present on the Poitiers campaign. 
After Scotland in 1356, BCing Edward did not enter the field again until he led 
his last campaign to Reims in 1359-60, at the age of 48.^ ^^ Hatfield did not join his 
king; was this because he was not needed or was there greater need for him in the north? 
Alternatively, was absence a product of a physical deterioration, meaning that he would 
have had little to offer in the field? It is reasonable to perhaps suggest a combination of 
the above. On 16 November 1359 Edward III ordered that he did not wish Hatfield to 
leave the north and jeopardise the safe custody of the march, as David I I was 
threatening to join in a Franco-Danish assault on England.^^^ The implication is that, 
after his use in 1346-7 and 1355, the bishop of Durham was eyeing a return to northern 
France. But by this time, as Rogers notes, though 'the war was not yet over... it was 
already won.'^^'' In this situation Edward had no need to gamble and take Hatfield with 
him, when there were potenfially serious problems in the north. Nevertheless, had 
Hatfield been in his prime it is not impossible that he would have found his way on to 
the campaign at some point, especially after the feared invasion did not materialise. 
That he did not perhaps indicates that time was catching up with him. This 
hypothesised retirement from campaigning is important because Hatfield clearly saw 
himself as a warrior, and would therefore have regarded his inability to campaign as the 
sad closing of an important chapter of his life. 
As it is suggested that Hatfield's body was ailing, it is useful to think of his age. 
Though we have no indication of Hatfield's age, a number of suggestions can be made 
based on events in his life. He entered royal service in 1337, achieved his bishopric at 
Edward III however commanded his royal servant to remain at his post [CPL. 1362-1404, 98. 
Foedera, iii, ii, 936]. 
Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 341. 
For the Reims Campaign of 1359-60, see Ibid., 385-422. 
CCR. 1354-60, 664. 
"° Rogers, iVar Cruel and Sharp, 384. 
125 
1345, and in 1363 he applied for a licence to be buried in Durham Cathedral.^^' When 
he died in 1381^^^ he had been bishop of Durham for just under thirty-six years, and in 
royal service for almost forty-four years. The impression is that Hatfield died an old 
man, who had had to long consider 'that nothing is more certain than death nor less 
certain than its hour'.^^^ Indeed it is relatively certain that he was seriously infirm for a 
period before his death.^ "^* However, just how old Hatfield was at his death is far from 
clear. It is possible, though far from certain, that the Thomas de Hatfield mentioned in 
May 1321, as part of a brutal felony, was indeed a youthful later-to-be-bishop of 
Durham.^" 
By attempting to fit the above information into a possible path of a person's life, 
it may seem reasonable to - very approximately - hypothesise Hatfield was bom around 
1305. I f this birth of date were used, it would make him a youth of 16 for the felony 
and a man of just over thirty when he entered Edward's service. He would have been in 
his mid-forties when consecrated bishop and fifty when he last campaigned. When he 
gained licence for his tomb he would have been just under sixty, being not far off eighty 
when he died. Admittedly this is little more than guesswork, albeit based on hunches 
developed over a couple of years study. Nevertheless, it seems to me that none of the 
dates for these events would seem out of place, in a proposed dme span of his life. 
It seems to me that a birth date for Hatfield around 1305, would also fit his 
relationship with Edward III , who was bom in 1312.^ ^^ Hatfield would perhaps have 
been just old enough to have commanded Edward's respect for his greater experience. 
But less than ten years the king's senior, he would have been in a position to adopt a 
stance perhaps more like a much older brother, than a potentially distant father figure. 
I f some corroboration could be found for this dating of Hatfield's birth, it could be 
suggested that, though he was clearly most talented, Hatfield's age was another telling 
factor in his success. 
Script. Tres., cxxii. 
Testa. Ebora.. 121. 
Ibid., 121. 
His will notes that he was infirm of body, and a letter dated simply 15 December but which cannot 
have been from after 1380, seems to indicate a man who was having to live with the slow but 
unmistakable deterioration to his last breath [Script. Tres., cxlv. Barker, 'Death and the bishop', 2.] 
CPR. 1317-21. 606. 
British Chronology, 35. 
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Part VII - Hatfield's justice: a source of tension with 
Edward III? 
Though this dissertation has focused predominantly on Hatfield's position in 
relation to Edward's waging of war, there were clearly many other tasks that the king 
expected Hatfield to carry out. And as such it is important to look at these briefly, as 
space will allow, before conclusions are reached. One major area in which Edward 
would have had expectation was law and order. Before 1346 the northern frontier had 
become a dangerous place. Bands of brigands roamed the country, bearing no particular 
allegiance to either crown.^^^ This lawlessness ran hand in hand with the cross border 
raiding, one often being hard to differentiate from the other. The task was far from 
easy; i f punitive measures were too harsh they ran the risk of driving men to join the 
Scots - as an initiative in the north west had come close to doing.^^^ Further 
exacerbating the problem was the jurisdictional nature of the liberty of Durham. It was 
common practice for those who had committed crime elsewhere to try and escape the 
king's justice, and to do this they simply entered the bishop's land, where the king's 
writ did not run. In 1341 Bury had taken measures to counter this in a deal with the 
king.^^^ However making the deal was one thing, but the determination needed for both 
to enforce it was another, regardless of good intentions. 
Hatfield seems to have struggled to combat the activities of outlaws in his 
liberty. There were problems as early as February 1346, when Edward was forced to 
request Hatfield find a band of men at large in his palatinate. '^*" Having been called 
before an Oyer and Terminer commission at Newcastle, the men had fled into the 
liberty, delaying their punishment. Less easily excusable was Hatfield's failure, in the 
same month, to provide Flemish burgesses with justice regarding a ship arrested by 
some of his own ministers. The king threatened to provide justice himself, 
notwithstanding the bishop's liberty, i f Hatfield continued to delay. 
It seems that Edward did not see the results he wished for, and again in 1350 he 
complained of the bishop's administration of justice. Hatfield responded by appointing 
Campbell, 'England, Scotland', 211. 
'''Ibid. 
Lapsley, Palatinate, 226. 
CFR, 1337-47, 454. 
CCR, 1346-48, 12, 38. 
127 
a special commission to put 'certain articles' received from the king into execufion.^ "*^ 
In 1353 the people of the palatinate went to the king to obtain from him confirmation of 
a charter of Bishop Bek's, which dealt with the confrol of the bishop.^ '*^ By 1358 the 
problems still existed and Hatfield, apparently without his king's prompting, launched a 
similar commission to investigate reports of oppression and extortion, on the part of his 
ministers.'''^ '* Sadly it is almost impossible to assess whether Hatfield was making 
genuine attempts to deal with the problems, and whether the same can be said for his 
justices. 
Clearly there is much scope for a detailed analysis of Hatfield's household and 
their activities, and it may well be that he harboured criminals. In fact, Aberth draws 
parallel between the situations in Ely and Durham, as both had a degree of autonomy in 
their adminisfration and justice.^ "*^ Supporting any suggestion of activities outside the 
law are Hatfield's contacts with noted wrongdoers such as Bradestan and Molyns. Both 
of these men were long tolerated by their king; at times enjoying great favour before 
Edward felt obliged to act.^ "*^  Aberth's work on Lisle has aided our understanding of 
how criminals could be maintained. '^*'' Yet it should, and indeed must, not lead us into 
labelling as a criminal anyone who had trouble with justice, or allowed his followers a 
little leeway. For a man such as Hatfield it was a major task to control his large 
household, especially in such an area of the country. 
Hatfield was himself on the receiving end of crime on more than one occasion. 
These may in time be seen as revenge attacks against a bishop, implicating him in the 
midst of frontier crime. Yet from the available information they appear little more than 
examples of lawlessness against a wealthy lord. In the summer of 1348 Hatfield 
complained of a series of instances when a group of poachers entered different warrens 
Laps\ey, Palatinate, 178. 
CPR, 1350-54, 466. Lapsley, Palatinate, 131, 134. 
^ Lapsley, Palatinate, 178. 
Aberth, Lisle, 147. 
For example, Bradestan. In 1331 the king received petitions that he and his wife, Isabella, had 
prevented justice being enacted against their valet who was accused of muUipIe murders. The petitioners 
complained that Bradestan had so much influence with the king that he could act with impunity in the 
county, and always sided with malefactors [Waugh, England in the reign of Edward III, 160.]. However 
he was pardoned in 1339, in 'part recompense of his labours and charges in service of the king from his 
early years in constant attendance at his side' [CPR, 1338-40, 381, 389, 399.]. As Vale points out the 
inference is that Bradestan had a large part to play in Mortimer and Isabella's fall [J. Vale, Edward III 
and Chivalry: Chivalric Society and its Context. 1270-1350 (Woodbridge, 1982), 61.]. For Molyns see 
N. Fryde, 'Removal of Ministers', 158. 
Aberth, Lisle, esp. 147-158. 
Hatfield had a large household, see his plans for their entertainment after his death in his will [Testa. 
Ebora., 121-22.]. See also the work of Lapsley [Palatinate, esp. 78-120.]. 
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of his and carried away game.^ '*^  More threatening was the attack in early 1352 made 
on Hatfield whilst he was trying to carry out the king's orders. As stated above, 
Hatfield was one of a number of northern lords who was to receive David I I at Berwick, 
and then take him to Newcastle, to treat further with ambassadors of both s i d e s . T h e 
motivation of this attack seems not to have been directly connected with David's return, 
but was rather a simple - i f large scale - felony. It was certainly not a proper Anglo-
Scottish battle, though it is unclear exactly what the result of the attack at Morpeth was, 
and how and when Hatfield was able to secure his release. Hatfield was far fi-om the 
only recipient of such banditry in the area. For example, in the same year Prior Fossour 
had horses and timber stolen, and crops trampled down, along with the obligatory attack 
on his servants.^ '^ 
Edward III may have tried to indicate that he expected more success ft-om 
Hatfield in his combating of crime. But fighting crime was not high upon Edward's list 
of objectives. Therefore he was surely resigned to a lawless fi-ontier. Although the 
king's writ did not run in the liberty, palatinate borders did not prevent the infiltration of 
the general atmosphere of the time. The vast number of pardons received on each of 
Edward's campaigns serves to illustrate the nature of the problem. Firstly, Edward had 
geared his whole country to war. And secondly too harsh an assault on law and order 
would have had a major negative impact on his recruiting capability. It may also be 
argued that bands of pardoned criminals were the perfect weapon with which to savage 
northern France, to draw the Valois into accepting a trial by battle. Hence Hatfield's 
request that his king pardon Robert Fitzlngram, due to his good service in Scotland, was 
probably not a move on the part of the bishop to establish his own band of supported 
criminals.^" Rather it was part of a theory, used and supported by Edward, of 
forgetting the indiscretions of those who were considered to be of use.^" Aberth may 
perhaps be a little too harsh on the king. Yet it is hard to argue with his general 
assessment: 'the inconsistent and intensely personal way in which Edward interpreted 
his role as lawgiver provided a poor example...to society at large.'^ "^^  Ultimately, it is 
^"CP/f, J 345-48. 163. 
CPR, 1350-54, 339. The calendar notes how a band of brigands was said to have sought 'to hinder the 
expedition of the kings business contrary to their allegiance, despising his honour and the great father, his 
messenger, clandestinely gathered together armed and attacked the bishop on his way to Berwick to do 
the things contained in the letters patent at Morpath, co Northumberland, arrested him and detained him 
under arrest and assaulted his men and servants, whereby he lost their service for a great time.' 
CPR, 1350-54, 388. 
•^"CP/?,, 1343-45, 561. 
See for example Bradestan and Molyns. 
Aberth, Lisle, 198. 
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hard to see Hatfield as a particular wrongdoer within the panorama of the enforcement 
of law and order in England during this period, though further research could modify 
this picture. 
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Part VIII - A brief assessment of the 'disputes' over rights 
between master and servant 
In 1348 Hatfield was granted 400 marks by the community of the liberty of 
Durham, to pay for the energy and finances he had expended preserving the firanchise 
and his rights against the king.^^^ This corroborates the assessment found in his eulogy, 
suggesting that perhaps Wessington was using his memory for this part rather than 
simply ascribing Hatfield qualities from ancient bishops in the Gesta.^ ^^  The monks and 
people of Durham were understandably keen to laud Hatfield for his efforts. Yet it is 
initially perplexing to find Hatfield so quick in challenging Edward III in his own, 
king's courts. In October 1345 Hatfield fought but lost a case over the church of 
Houghton.^" Similarly, the king's right was upheld in further cases noted in the 
chancery rolls, in 1350 and 1352.^ ^^ 
Were such actions not a great insult to the monarch who had just secured 
Hatfield's provision to Durham, and who - out of his affection for the bishop-elect - had 
pardoned the liberty's tenants of the tallage due of them?^^^ It appears not. Instead, 
these cases are instances of the bishop asking for a judgement to be made because he 
was keen to make the most of any available patronage. He was not embarking on long 
or expensive litigation but rather wondering if, by right of law, he had a better claim. 
He cannot have been much surprised when all decisions went against him but, 
importantly, he probably felt it was his duty to enquire. 
It was not only over ecclesiastical matters that Hatfield challenged his king. In 
1346 he followed Bury's lead in petitioning for the right to 'distrain his subjects to 
assume knighthood' and to claim all the financial b e n e f i t s . T h e bishop argued that 
these had traditionally fallen to his predecessors. Sadly the result is lost to us but the 
king did agree to examine the matter. Later, in 1352, Edward had 'deliberately i f tacitly 
withdrawn fi-om the bishop the privilege' of forfeitures of war, simply leaving the 
saving clause for Durham of his assertion of it for the rest of the country.^^' Hatfield 
apparently accepted this. More seriously, in late 1354, Hatfield disputed his right to 
^" Lapsley, Palatinate, 119. 
Script. Tres., 137. 
CPR 1343 45 11 563 
In 1350 the church of Halghton [CCR. 1349-52. 186.] and in 1352 Gretham Hospital [CCR, 1349-52. 
407-08.]. 
•^'^ CCR, 1343-46. 541. 
^^ '^  Lapsley, Palatinate, 288. 
collect a subsidy on cloth in his liberty that the king had been granted in council. 
Hatfield openly resisted Edward, causing the king to 'wonder that he presumed to do 
such things' .Nevertheless the problem seems to have been solved and makes no 
further mark on available records. 
The impression given by these examples is of two men who were each keen to 
uphold their rights; seeing it as their duty to do so. Both would assuredly have realised 
this of each other, and therefore neither would have genuinely taken offence from each 
other's actions. Even Edward's reaction in 1352 - i f anything can be read into the 
wording of the calendar - appears more of genuine surprise than anger. The days of 
Bek were long gone.^ ^^ Rather than aggression, there was manoeuvring for position 
within a stable, and still positive, relationship.^^'' 
Ibid., 40. 
CCR, ]354-60, [Quote] 48, 159. 
For Bek's stuggles see Lapsley, Palatinate, 92-3. 
Lapsley [fbid., 76.] notes how the fourteenth century was 'a period of perplexed toleration' by the 
crown, with no major encroachments. 
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Part IX - A brief assessment of Hatfield's activities as 
bisliiop post-1357 and what they reveal about his role pre-1357 
Post-1357 Anglo-Scottish diplomacy had in theory moved on from ransoms and 
release dates. Although David I I stalled over payments, Hatfield could now hope to 
devote his efforts to securing a perpetual p e a c e . H a t f i e l d was still often ordered to 
remain in the north, even though the return of the relatively anglophile David I I did 
much to limit the potential threat of cross border raiding.^^^ Indeed it was only really 
after first, David II's death in 1371, and then that of Edward III in 1377, that the north 
was again truly threatened. This was particularly so because Edward's death left his 
ten-year-old grandson, Richard I I , on the throne.^ ^^ It was at this point, during the spate 
of castle fortification and building that these events appear to have prompted, that 
Hatfield decided to rebuild - in stone - the keep of Durham Castle.^ *'^  He probably used 
the highly regarded John Lewyn, who was in 1368-9 described as the bishop's mason, 
and was in his pay.^ ^^ Hatfield was by now an extremely rich man.^ ^" This allowed him 
to employ Lewyn and others on an array of building projects, designed both to benefit 
and protect those in his locality, and as a result help speed his path to heaven.^ '^ It is 
important to note this building activity, for which he is perhaps now most remembered. 
This is because it helps illuminate the period 1345-57, by the contrasts with the later 
years of his long pontificate. 
See August 1360 [Foedera, iii, i, 506.] June 1362 [Ibid., iii, ii, 659.]. For example in the first half of 
1359 he helped address problems over Berwick and in Norham with regard to the truce [CCR, 1354-60, 
598. Rot. Scot., i, 839.]. 
For example 16 November 1359 [CCR, 1354-60, 664. For the particular reason see Campbell, 
'England, Scotland', 219]. For discussion of David H's reputation as craven betrayer of the national 
cause, see Duncan, 'David II and Edward III', esp. 113, 137-38. 
David II d. 22 Feb 1371, Edward III d. 21 June 1377, Richard II b. 6 January 1367 [British 
Chronology, 56, 35-6]. 
J. Harvey, English Medieval Architects: A biographical Dictionary down to 1550 (Gloucester, 1984), 
182. 
^^Ubid., 181. 
™^ For his later wealth it suffices to note a few examples: he was owed 1000 marks by Alice Ferrers at 
time of his death [Testa. Eborca., 121.], and around 1370 he loaned double this to Edward III [Foedera, 
iii, ii, 893, 901.]. Finally, and perhaps most notably, a robbery of £2500 from Hatfield's treasury, in 1369, 
apparently either failed to unduly concern the bishop, or possibly even went unnoticed, as it is absent 
from records until 1385 [Lapsley, Palatinate, 293.]. 
For details of his later building munificence see Harvey, Medieval Architects, 181-2. [cathedral, 
castle,]. Script. Tres. [castle, cathedral, his manor and chapel at Oldford near London], 137-8. DNB xxv, 
156. [the above, Carmelite house at Northallerton], Barker, 'Death and the Bishop' [esp. the importance 
of his constructions for his salvation], also E. Cambridge, 'The Masons and Building Works of Durham 
Priory, 1339-1539' (Durham University Ph.D. Thesis, 1992), 57-67, 265-68 [Cathedral esp. episcopal 
throne/tomb and nearby windows]. 
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Hatfield would probably have always considered himself a royal servant on the 
national stage. Whilst far more research is needed to draw more than tentative 
conclusions from the initial evidence, it seems that from 1356-1362 his part was 
essentially played as a diplomat. June 1362 appears to have been his last foray to the 
Anglo-Scottish negotiating table.^ ^^ After this Hatfield arguably became a trusted, i f 
ageing, and probably distant, advisor. This must have been a saddening decline for a 
loyal servant, who had - until his retirement fi-om campaigning - had been most 
energetic in his service of his king. During his time in Edward's civil service he had 
been an almost constant companion of the king. Even after his elevation to Durham he 
seems to have been at court or Westminster fairly regularly. Also, in addition to the 
almost continuous yearly Anglo-Scottish negotiations and preparations for the defence 
of the north, Hatfield had managed to travel to France twice more to serve his king, in 
1346-7 and 1355. As his retirement fi-om active service indicates, by the 1360s 
Hatfield's efforts appear to have begun to catch up with him. 
Even as Hatfield's active use to the king dwindled, there is no indication that his 
affection for his king followed suit, nor indeed vice-versa. In fact it is debatable 
whether this would have meant longer periods apart, as we lack detailed itineraries for 
either. It is likely that Hatfield spent much time at the manor he built at Oldford, as in 
his will of 1381 he referred to it as his 'place of hab i t a t ion ' .O ld fo rd was near to 
London, the seat of govenmient, and therefore this would at least have facilitated the 
maintaining of an association, i f not a more official advisory role. Indeed in financing 
Durham College at Oxford, just before his death, Hatfield made heavy demands for an 
'elaborate series of masses and obits to be said for the souls of Edward III , Queen 
Philippa', in addition to himself and relatives. '^''* He also made similar demands in his 
other chantr ies .Though chantry prayers for the monarch were far from unique, in 
Hatfield's case they would appear to be a mark of continuing and strong personal 
affection, rather than merely a concession to fashion. In light of this, it is possible to 
view his rebuilding of the keep at Durham in the 1370s as more than merely a product 
of his increased wealth and the prospect of a weak boy king. 
Could it not also be indicative of how Hatfield had had to change how he sought 
to ful f i l the role given to him by his king, that of 'guardian of the north'. Perhaps, had 
he had the time and money to embark upon the rebuilding of the keep in the late 1340s 
Foedera, iii, ii, 659. 
Testa. Ebora., 121. 
Dobson, Durham Priory, 347. 
134 
or 1350s he would have done so. Indeed, the keep project may well be seen as little 
more than the next way to spend his apparent fortune, having by this point already 
commissioned the construcfion of his unique tomb.^ ^^ Nevertheless, it is difficult not to 
see it as some reflection - albeit largely symbolic, given Durham's already largely 
impregnable natural location - of a realisation on Hatfield's behalf that i f he was no 
longer able to defend the north in body, he could perhaps do so in stone. 
For these chantries see Barker, 'Death and the Bishop', 30-2. 
Cambridge ['Masons of Durham Priory', 60] suggests that the construction of the funerary monument 
may well have started before the granting of the formal licence in 1363. 
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Chapter I V - Conclusion 
By the end of 1357 Edward III had gained a dominant position in northern 
Europe. He held the French king captive, and by securing the release of David I I had 
gained an Anglophile monarch north of the border and the promise of regular ransom 
payments. Had Edward mused upon the reasons for his success he would have first 
thanked God and his divine right and then perhaps the heroic Black Prince. However, 
depending on how long he contemplated the issue, it is not inconceivable that he may 
have remembered a moment around two decades previously when he noticed something 
in a clerk outside his service. Alternatively, he might have recalled the realisation, a 
number of years after this, that he had found the perfect replacement for the ageing 
Bury. Edward would surely have had no regrets in these recollections; Thomas de 
Hatfield had been one of the many cogs that had driven the English war machine. 
Hatfield played a vital role in choking Calais, he was present on both campaigns of the 
winter 1355-1356, and devoted much of a decade to difficult negotiation with the Scots 
over David II . In addifion the bishop was most probably present at Sluys, Crecy and on 
Balliol's Scottish incursions. 
Nevertheless had Hatfield played the part he had been chosen for? It has been 
argued here that the rationale behind his creation as bishop of Durham was that he be a 
'guardian of the north'. Yet in 1346 Hatfield missed the decisive battle of Neville's 
Cross and in 1355 he left for France just before the attack on Berwick. Was Durham 
then little more than a way to financially reward a loyal servant? Or did Edward just 
abandon plans that the north be Hatfield's focus, when he had a chance to use him 
elsewhere? Instead, was the appointment little more than a symbolic gesture to pacify 
the disgruntled northerners by giving them a warrior as bishop of Durham? 
It has been argued that Hatfield was devoted to the north but also that Edward III 
understood that France and Scotland were two fronts of the same war and, moreover, 
that Edward knew France was the arena in which he had most to gain. Between 1347-
1355 neither man was active in France, crucially this was because Edward saw no 
possibility of a decisive 'trial by b a t t l e ' . E d w a r d was 'a sincere Christian, i f not a 
677 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 286. 
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very sophisticated one'^ ^ ,^ whose motto was Dieu et mon droit but this did not lead him 
to reject practical concerns. The English king knew that i f he was to face the heavenly 
jury, he needed to do as much as he could to ensure victory before entrusting his fate to 
God. 
Despite their hard work, Edward and Hatfield would have rightly believed that 
there was no potential for the 'guardians of the north' to take the initiative and further 
the cause of the north in their own arena, as the Scots could not be brought to battle. 
Hence Hatfield was not deserting the northern cause in 1346 or 1355. Rather he was 
hoping that he could play a part in France, which would be more beneficial for the 
north, than the one he would have played on the border. That the Scots attacked both 
times Hatfield 'deserted' the north helps support the importance of Edward's 
campaigns. The Scots realised that Edward was making a push in France that directly 
threatened their ability to stand up to the English, and hence were compelled to act. In 
all other years Hatfield worked hard for northern defence, and in light of our 
understanding of Edward's tactics, there is every reason to think that Hatfield took his 
role as 'guardian of the north' very seriously, and was part of a successful northern unit. 
However, Dobson has suggested that Hatfield and his immediate successors 
were relatively minor figures in northern d e f e n c e . T h e r e can be little doubt that 
Hatfield's successors were not active 'guardians of the north'. Fordham was granted 
license to appoint deputies to assume his responsibilities as 'warden of the march', and 
later disgraced himself by declining to lead his men to Battle at Otterbum, even though 
he was in the vicinity.^^° Upon his appointment Skirlaw was a diplomat of some repute 
and he seems to have been selected as bishop for this purpose.''^' Clearly Hatfield also 
spent much of his episcopal career as a negotiator but this was not the role for which he 
was chosen. Although he had some diplomatic experience upon his provision, this was 
not what had propelled him through Edward's civil service. The combination of 
Hatfield's work as a negotiator and his French campaigns perhaps prompted Dobson to 
reduce the bishop's active regional role, viewing him as a national and international 
figure. 




Dobson, 'Durham and the borders', 135. 
'Ibid., 128-29, 134. 
Ibid., 133-34. As a result he was able to do much to ease the situation in the north in the period after 
the Scottish victory at Otterbum in 1388. 
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By looking closely at the events, it seems that Edward picked Hatfield as bishop 
of Durham precisely to play a major part in northern defence, due to the situation in 
1344-45, and that Hatfield did this successfiilly. Fordham and Skirlaw were not chosen 
by Edward III and hence belong to a different mindset, in a different situation. Upon 
shifting his focus to France, at the start of the 1340s, Edward needed a wall against the 
Scots and when Bury died he had long since chosen Hatfield to reinforce it. Despite the 
easing of the situation after 1346 Hatfield was still able to work actively for northern 
defence. He did so around the negofiating table, in Scotland in 1347 and 1356, in aiding 
the war in France and by apparently spending much of his time in the north being ready 
to meet any problems that may have arisen. 
War was the overarching concern of both Edward and Hatfield throughout this 
period of study, and it was the issue to which Hatfield devoted most of his efforts. In 
addition to his own role as a warrior-bishop 'guardian of the north', as a member of the 
episcopate Hatfield was one of many 'all-purpose workhorses of the realm'.^^^ During 
war bishops were to secure taxes at convocations and parliaments, and then use these on 
supplies, equipment, and troops, whilst also meeting far reaching demands for prayers 
pro rege.^^^ 
Therefore, although he was far from negligent, Hatfield's great involvement in 
every aspect of Edward's wars has meant that as a royal servant he achieved little else 
of note. Any attempts the bishop made to combat crime were largely unsuccessfiil but 
this was at least as much a product of the time, as the result of any personal failings. 
However, this interpretation could change i f evidence could be found for Hatfield's 
sponsoring or tolerating criminals. Elsewhere, Hatfield sought to uphold the rights of 
the liberty, often against his king, but there is no evidence that this was seen as a breach 
of faith. Edward had not put a royal servant in Durham so he could ride roughshod over 
the traditional rights of the palatinate. Within his liberty Hatfield was a tough 
landlord.^ '^* Nevertheless, he does not appear to have attempted any large scale 
administrative reform, as his survey was only started in his later years and not 
completed until after his death.^ ^^ 
McHardy, 'Reflections on Propaganda', 174. 
Ibid. For prayers see W.R. Jones, 'The English Church and Royal Propaganda During the Hundred 
Years War', Journal of British Studies, 19(1979-80), 18-30. Hatfield was requested for example on 15 
June 1345 [CCR, 1343-46, 588] 3 August 1346 [Ibid., 1346-48, 145.] 
See Britnell, 'Feudal Reaction'. 
See Bishop Hatfield's Survey, ed. W. Greenwell. 
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It seems clear that Edward III would have seen his efforts to secure Hatfield as 
bishop as being entirely justified. Hatfield had risen swiftly through Edward's civil 
service and had not disappointed as bishop. However, as bishop, Hatfield was not only 
a servant of Westminster. Although this study has focused on Hatfield as a royal 
servant, it is worth considering how he would have been viewed at Avignon by the end 
of 1357. Though Hatfield's relationship with Avignon appears to have improved 
greatly from 1344, he remained very much Edward's man through the 1340s and 50s. 
During this period Edward had managed to 'overawe the pope...through a combination 
of military terror abroad and political control and propaganda at home.'^ ^^ Politically 
the pope might have felt that he did not get much in return from Hatfield, after the 
'agreement' of 1345. Yet this does nothing to support the idea that the pope had 
Hatfield forced on him or that the aspersions of the St. Albans chronicle are correct. In 
1345, the pope would have hoped for Hatfield's assistance in furthering his peace plans, 
but he would have been realistic. As any glimpse at the calendar entries illustrates, 
Hatfield was but one of many voices around the king that he hoped to influence. 
Hatfield was too involved in Edward's wars to make any real pretence of serving 
his papal master. For example, Hatfield was only asked seven times between 1345-70 
to execute the provision of a benefice, whereas Bury had been asked six times 1342-
687 
45. But Hatfield was never going to be a 'religious' bishop, and indeed he was rather 
liberal in his use of dispensafions.''^^ There is no evidence, however, of any great 
breakdown in the running of the diocese in this period.^^^ This need not be surprising, 
as Hatfield would have employed more ecclesiastically minded men for this purpose. 
Nevertheless, when called to act in this capacity as bishop, Hatfield appears to have 
conducted himself satisfactorily, even i f he did not display any religious zeal, as the 
example of his second visitation in 1354 shows.^ '^^  Ultimately Hatfield enjoyed a 
relatively good relationship with his monks, and it seems that in the worldly Prior 
Fossour, the bishop had perhaps found a kindred spirit who maintained a large 
'^'^ Aberth, Lisle, 182. 
Barren, Papacy, 207. Hatfield's tardiness over the provision of the highly sought after church of 
Bishop Wearmouth angered the pope [Ibid., 208.]. 
Ibid., 231-48. Interestingly, in 1366 Hatfield dispensed Thomas Eyr who had drawn blood when he 
punched a Carmelite friar in the face [Ibid., 48.]. 
A fiill study, such as that initially embarked upon by Hamilton-Thompson, of Hatfield's register, 
would be fruitful. The register appears to be almost entirely devoted to the ecclesiastical workings of the 
diocese. 
Harbottle, 'Hatfield's Visitation'. Barker, 'Death and the Bishop', 12. 
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household and even employed a professional fool.^^' Hatfield's later offer to crusade 
for the pope in Italy in 1370, seems little more than a way of achieving salvation. 
Nevertheless, the contrast between the problems that Lisle caused Edward III , and the 
merely moderate service that Hatfield offered the pope, is striking. 
Here it is worth returning to a point made when discussing the sources used. It 
is often difficult to gain any indication of the personalities behind medieval figures, 
even when many events of their lives are known. What kind of man was Hatfield? I f 
his motivation could be gauged it would be easier to decipher and make sense of his 
actions. A strong case can be made for Hatfield being a loyal and determined man, who 
stuck with a task once he started. Alternatively, he could have been a glory seeker, 
whose personality Edward had simply been drawn to. It is the former interpretation that 
is far more compelling, although it would surely be possible for other historians to 
address the events of his life with this assessment of him. 
Moving on from this, as this is the first major survey to take Hatfield as its 
subject here is great scope for revision and reinterpretation. More detailed research into 
Hatfield's career from 1357 to 1381 is likely to reveal a great deal about his life before 
this. Similarly, fiirther work in a number of areas could lead to a dramatic re-evaluation 
of the man Thomas de Hatfield. Hence new insights into the confiision surrounding 
Hatfield's presence at Crecy; the possibility of his criminal links; the exact roles behind 
the orders to defend the north; any 'agreements' between Clement and Edward in 1345; 
and any scraps of information that could help to produce a more developed itinerary, 
would be most welcomed. 
Far from being an 'ass' who owed his appointment to circumstance, Thomas de 
Hatfield appears to have been a most able man. His ascent through the civil service was 
startling and his achievements after his provision to Durham, suggest that he was a 
devoted and determined royal servant. Nevertheless, hours of study have in many ways 
left me little closer to truly knowing what kind of man he was. In this sense, the 
warrior-bishop, housed in his lavish fiinerary monument in Durham Cathedral, remains 
as wonderfially intriguing as the day I embarked upon piecing together, and trying to 
make sense of, the events of his life. 
Dobson, Durham Priory, 92-105. 
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